TWO LETTERS

ADDRESSED TO

A MEMBER

OF

THE PRESENT PARLIAMENT,

ON THE PROPOSALS FOR

PEACE

WITH THE

REGICIDE DIRECTORY

OF

FRANCE.

BY THE RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE.

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ERRATA.

Page 24, l. 15, inſtead of " *For* as we have gone" read " *Far* as we have gone," &c.

39, l. 17, inſtead of " with him," read " with Citizen Barthelemi"

57, l. 25, inſtead of "from her" read "from them."

LETTER I.

On the Overtures of Peace.

MY DEAR SIR,

OUR laſt converſation, though not in the tone of abſolute deſpondency, was far from chearful. We could not eaſily account for ſome unpleaſant appearances. They were repreſented to us as indicating the ſtate of the popular mind; and they were not at all what we ſhould have expected from our old ideas even of the faults and vices of the Engliſh character. The diſaſtrous events, which have followed one upon another in a long unbroken funereal train, moving in a proceſſion, that ſeemed to have no end, theſe were not the principal cauſes of our dejection. We feared more from what threatened to fail within, than what menaced to oppreſs us from abroad. To a people who have once been proud and great, and great becauſe they were proud, a change in the national ſpirit is the moſt terrible of all revolutions.

I ſhall not live to behold the unravelling of the intricate plot, which ſaddens and perplexes the

awful drama of Providence, now acting on the moral theatre of the world. Whether for thought or for action, I am at the end of my career. You are in the middle of yours. In what part of it's orbit the nation, with which we are carried along, moves at this inſtant, it is not eaſy to conjecture. It may, perhaps, be far advanced in its aphelion.—But when to return?

Not to loſe ourſelves in the infinite void of the conjectural world, our buſineſs is with what is likely to be affected for the better or the worſe, by the wiſdom or weakneſs of our plans. In all ſpeculations upon men and human affairs, it is of no ſmall moment to diſtinguiſh things of accident from permanent cauſes, and from effects that cannot be altered. It is not every irregularity in our movement that is a total deviation from our courſe. I am not quite of the mind of thoſe ſpeculators, who ſeem aſſured, that neceſſarily, and by the conſtitution of things, all States have the ſame periods of infancy, manhood, and decrepitude, that are found in the individuals who compoſe them. Parallels of this ſort rather furniſh ſimilitudes to illuſtrate or to adorn, than to ſupply analogies from whence to reaſon. The objects which are attempted to be forced into an analogy are not found in the ſame claſſes of exiſtence. Individuals are phyſical be-

ings, ſubject to laws univerſal and invariable. The immediate cauſe acting in theſe laws may be obſcure: The general reſults are ſubjects of certain calculation. But commonwealths are not phyſical but moral eſſences. They are artificial combinations; and in their proximate efficient cauſe, the arbitrary productions of the human mind. We are not yet acquainted with the laws which neceſſarily influence the ſtability of that kind of work made by that kind of agent. There is not in the phyſical order (with which they do not appear to hold any aſſignable connexion) a diſtinct cauſe by which any of thoſe fabricks muſt neceſſarily grow, flouriſh, or decay; nor, in my opinion, does the moral world produce any thing more determinate on that ſubject, than what may ſerve as an amuſement (liberal indeed, and ingenious, but ſtill only an amuſement) for ſpeculative men. I doubt whether the hiſtory of mankind is yet compleat enough, if ever it can be ſo, to furniſh grounds for a ſure theory on the internal cauſes which neceſſarily affect the fortune of a State. I am far from denying the operation of ſuch cauſes: But they are infinitely uncertain, and much more obſcure, and much more difficult to trace, than the foreign cauſes that tend to raiſe, to depreſs, and ſometimes to overwhelm a community.

It is often impoſſible, in theſe pol tical nquiries, to find any proportion between the apparent force

of any moral cauſes we may aſſign and their known operation. We are therefore obliged to deliver up that operation to mere chance, or more piouſly (perhaps more rationally) to the occaſional interpoſition and irreſiſtible hand of the Great Diſpoſer. We have ſeen States of conſiderable duration, which for ages have remained nearly as they have begun, and could hardly be ſaid to ebb or flow. Some appear to have ſpent their vigour at their commencement. Some have blazed out in their glory a little before their extinction. The meridian of ſome has been the moſt ſplendid. Others, and they the greateſt number, have fluctuated, and experienced at different periods of their exiſtence a great variety of fortune. At the very moment when ſome of them ſeemed plunged in unfathomable abyſſes of diſgrace and diſaſter, they have ſuddenly emerged. They have begun a new courſe and opened a new reckoning; and even in the depths of their calamity, and on the very ruins of their country, have laid the foundations of a towering and durable greatneſs. All this has happened without any apparent previous change in the general circumſtances which had brought on their diſtreſs. The death of a man at a critical juncture, his diſguſt, his retreat, his diſgrace, have brought innumerable calamities on a whole nation. A common ſoldier, a child, a girl at the door of an inn, have changed the face of fortune, and almoſt of Nature.

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Such, and often influenced by ſuch cauſes, has commonly been the fate of Monarchies of long duration. They have their ebbs and their flows. This has been eminently the fate of the Monarchy of France. There have been times in which no Power has ever been brought ſo low. Few have ever flouriſhed in greater glory. By turns elevated and depreſſed, that Power had been, on the whole, rather on the encreaſe; and it continued not only powerful but formidable to the hour of the total ruin of the Monarchy. This fall of the Monarchy was far from being preceded by any exterior ſymptoms of decline. The interior were not viſible to every eye; and a thouſand accidents might have prevented the operation of what the moſt clear-ſighted were not able to diſcern, nor the moſt provident to divine. A very little time before its dreadful cataſtrophe, there was a kind of exterior ſplendour in the ſituation of the Crown, which uſually adds to Government ſtrength and authority at home. The Crown ſeemed then to have obtained ſome of the moſt ſplendid objects of ſtate ambition. None of the Continental Powers of Europe were the enemies of France. They were all, either tacitly diſpoſed to her, or publickly connected with her; and in thoſe who kept the moſt aloof, there was little appearance of jealouſy; of animoſity there was no appearance at all. The Britiſh Nation, her great preponderating rival, ſhe had humbled; to

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all appearance ſhe had weakened; certainly had endangered, by cutting off a very large, and by far the moſt growing part of her empire. In that it's acmé of human proſperity and greatneſs, in the high and palmy ſtate of the Monarchy of France, it fell to the ground without a ſtruggle. It fell without any of thoſe vices in the Monarch, which have ſometimes been the cauſes of the fall of kingdoms, but which exiſted, without any viſible effect on the ſtate, in the higheſt degree in many other Princes; and, far from deſtroying their power, had only left ſome ſlight ſtains on their character. The financial difficulties were only pretexts and inſtruments of thoſe who accompliſhed the ruin of that Monarchy. They were not the cauſes of it.

Deprived of the old Government, deprived in a manner of all Government, France fallen as a Monarchy, to common ſpeculators might have appeared more likely to be an object of pity or inſult, according to the diſpoſition of the circumjacent powers, than to be the ſcourge and terror of them all: But out of the tomb of the murdered Monarchy in France, has ariſen a vaſt, tremendous, unformed ſpectre, in a far more terrific guiſe than any which ever yet have overpowered the imagination, and ſubdued the fortitude of man. Going ſtraight forward to it's end, unappalled by peril, unchecked by remorſe, deſpiſing all common maxims and all common means, that hideous phantom

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tom overpowerd thofe who could not believe it was poffible fhe could at all exift, except on the principles, which habit rather than nature had perfuaded them were neceffary to their own particular welfare and to their own ordinary modes of action. But the conftitution of any political being, as well as that of any phyfical being, ought to be known, before one can venture to fay what is fit for it's confervation, or what is the proper means of it's power. The poifon of other States is the food of the new Republick. That bankruptcy, the very apprehenfion of which is one of the caufes affigned for the fall of the Monarchy, was the capital on which fhe opened her traffick with the world.

The Republick of Regicide with an annihilated revenue, with defaced manufactures, with a ruined commerce, with an uncultivated and half depopulated country, with a difcontented, diftreffed, enflaved, and famifhed people, paffing with a rapid, eccentrick, incalculable courfe, from the wildeft anarchy to the fterneft defpotifm, has actually conquered the fineft parts of Europe, has diftreffed, difunited, deranged, and broke to pieces all the reft; and fo fubdued the minds of the rulers in every nation, that hardly any refource prefents itfelf to them, except that of entitling themfelves to a contemptuous mercy by a difplay of their imbecility and meannefs. Even in their greateft military efforts

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and the greateſt diſplay of their fortitude, they ſeem not to hope, they do not even appear to wiſh, the extinction of what ſubſiſts to their certain ruin. Their ambition is only to be admitted to a more favoured claſs in the order of ſervitude under that domineering power.

This ſeems the temper of the day. At firſt the French force was too much deſpiſed. Now it is too much dreaded. As inconſiderate courage has given way to irrational fear, ſo it may be hoped, that through the medium of deliberate ſober apprehenſion, we may arrive at ſteady fortitude. Who knows whether indignation may not ſucceed to terror, and the revival of high ſentiment, ſpurning away the deluſion of a ſafety purchaſed at the expence of glory, may not yet drive us to that generous deſpair, which has often ſubdued diſtempers in the State for which no remedy could be found in the wiſeſt councils.

Other great States, having been without any regular certain courſe of elevation, or decline, we may hope that the Britiſh fortune may fluctuate alſo; becauſe the public mind, which greatly influences that fortune, may have it's changes. We are therefore never authorized to abandon our country to it's fate, or to act or adviſe as if it had no reſource. There is no reaſon to apprehend, becauſe ordinary means

means threaten to fail, that no others can ſpring up. Whilſt our heart is whole, it will find means, or make them. The heart of the citizen is a perennial ſpring of energy to the State. Becauſe the pulſe ſeems to intermit, we muſt not preſume that it will ceaſe inſtantly to beat. The publick muſt never be regarded as incurable. I remember in the beginning of what has lately been called the ſeven years war, that an eloquent writer and ingenious ſpeculator, Dr. Browne, upon ſome reverſes which happened in the beginning of that war, publiſhed an elaborate philoſophical diſcourſe to prove that the diſtinguiſhing features of the people of England had been totally changed, and that a frivolous effeminacy was become the national character. Nothing could be more popular than that work. It was thought a great conſolation to us the light people of this country (who were and are light, but who were not and are not effeminate) that we had found the cauſes of our misfortunes in our vices. Pythagoras could not be more pleaſed with his leading diſcovery. But whilſt in that ſplenetick mood we amuſed ourſelves in a ſour critical ſpeculation, of which we were ourſelves the objects, and in which every man loſt his particular ſenſe of the publick diſgrace in the epidemic nature of the diſtemper; whilſt, as in the Alps *Goître* kept *Goitre* in countenance; whilſt we were thus abandoning ourſelves to a direct con-

feſſion of our inferiority to France, and whilſt many, very many, were ready to act upon a ſenſe of that inferiority, a few months effected a total change in our variable minds. We emerged from the gulph of that ſpeculative deſpondency; and were buoyed up to the higheſt point of practical vigour. Never did the maſculine ſpirit of England diſplay itſelf with more energy, nor ever did it's genius ſoar with a prouder pre-eminence over France, than at the time when frivolity and effeminacy had been at leaſt tacitly acknowledged as their national character, by the good people of this kingdom.

For one (if they be properly treated) I deſpair neither of the publick fortune nor of the publick mind. There is much to be done undoubtedly, and much to be retrieved. We muſt walk in new ways, or we can never encounter our enemy in his devious march. We are not at an end of our ſtruggle, nor near it. Let us not deceive ourſelves: we are at the beginning of great troubles. I readily acknowledge that the ſtate of publick affairs is infinitely more unpromiſing than at the period I have juſt now alluded to, and the poſition of all the Powers of Europe, in relation to us, and in relation to each other, is more intricate and critical beyond all compariſon. Difficult indeed is our ſituation. In all ſituations of difficulty men will be influenced in the

part they take, not only by the reaſon of the caſe, but by the peculiar turn of their own character. The ſame ways to ſafety do not preſent themſelves to all men, nor to the ſame men in different tempers. There is a courageous wiſdom: there is alſo a falſe reptile prudence, the reſult not of caution but of fear. Under misfortunes it often happens that the nerves of the underſtanding are ſo relaxed, the preſſing peril of the hour ſo completely confounds all the faculties, that no future danger can be properly provided for, can be juſtly eſtimated, can be ſo much as fully ſeen. The eye of the mind is dazzled and vanquiſhed. An abject diſtruſt of ourſelves, an extravagant admiration of the enemy, preſent us with no hope but in a compromiſe with his pride, by a ſubmiſſion to his will. This ſhort plan of policy is the only counſel which will obtain a hearing. We plunge into a dark gulph with all the raſh precipitation of fear. The nature of courage is, without a queſtion, to be converſant with danger; but in the palpable night of their terrors, men under conſternation ſuppoſe, not that it is the danger, which, by a ſure inſtinct, calls out the courage to reſiſt it, but that it is the courage which produces the danger. They therefore ſeek for a refuge from their fears in the fears themſelves, and conſider a temporizing meanneſs as the only ſource of ſafety.

The rules and definitions of prudence can rarely be exact; never univerſal. I do not deny that in ſmall truckling ſtates a timely compromiſe with power has often been the means, and the only means, of drawling out their puny exiſtence: But a great ſtate is too much envied, too much dreaded, to find ſafety in humiliation. To be ſecure, it muſt be reſpected. Power, and eminence, and conſideration, are things not to be begged. They muſt be commanded: and they who ſupplicate for mercy from others can never hope for juſtice thro' themſelves. What juſtice they are to obtain, as the alms of an enemy, depends upon his character; and that they ought well to know before they implicitly confide.

Much controverſy there has been in Parliament, and not a little amongſt us out of doors, about the inſtrumental means of this nation towards the maintenance of her dignity, and the aſſertion of her rights. On the moſt elaborate and correct detail of facts, the reſult ſeems to be, that at no time has the wealth and power of Great Britain been ſo conſiderable as it is at this very perilous moment. We have a vaſt intereſt to preſerve, and we poſſeſs great means of preſerving it: But it is to be remembered that the artificer may be incumbered by his tools, and that reſources may be among impediments. If wealth is the obedient and laborious ſlave of

virtue and of publick honour, then wealth is in it's place, and has it's ufe: But if this order is changed, and honor is to be facrificed to the confervation of riches, riches which have neither eyes nor hands, nor any thing truly vital in them, cannot long furvive the being of their vivifying powers, their legitimate mafters, and their potent protectors. If we command our wealth, we fhall be rich and free: If our wealth commands us, we are poor indeed. We are bought by the enemy with the treafure from our own coffers. Too great a fenfe of the value of a fubordinate intereft may be the very fource of it's danger, as well as the certain ruin of interefts of a fuperiour order. Often has a man loft his all becaufe he would not fubmit to hazard all in defending it. A difplay of our wealth before robbers is not the way to reftrain their boldnefs, or to leffen their rapacity. This difplay is made, I know, to perfuade the people of England that thereby we fhall awe the enemy, and improve the terms of our capitulation: it is made, not that we fhould fight with more animation, but that we fhould fupplicate with better hopes. We are miftaken. We have an enemy to deal with who never regarded our conteft as a meafuring and weighing of purfes. He is the Gaul that puts his *fword* into the fcale. He is more tempted with our wealth as booty, than terrified with it as power. But let us be rich or poor, let us be either in what

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proportion we may, nature is falfe or this is true, that where the effential publick force, (of which money is but a part,) is in any degree upon a par in a conflict between nations, that ftate which is refolved to hazard it's exiftence rather than to abandon it's objects, muft have an infinite advantage over that which is refolved to yield rather than to carry it's refiftance beyond a certain point. Humanly fpeaking, that people which bounds it's efforts only with it's being, muft give the law to that nation which will not pufh it's oppofition beyond its convenience.

If we look to nothing but our domeftick condition, the ftate of the nation is full even to plethory; but if we imagine that this country can long maintain it's blood and it's food, as disjoined from the community of mankind, fuch an opinion does not deferve refutation as abfurd, but pity as infane.

I do not know that fuch an improvident and ftupid felfifhnefs, deferves the difcuffion, which, perhaps, I may beftow upon it hereafter. We cannot arrange with our enemy in the prefent conjuncture, without abandoning the intereft of mankind. If we look only to our own petty peculium in the war, we have had fome advantages; advantages ambiguous in their nature, and dearly bought. We have not in the flighteft degree, impaired the

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ſtrength of the common enemy, in any one of thoſe points in which his particular force conſiſts; at the ſame time that new enemies to ourſelves, new allies to the Regicide Republick, have been made out of the wrecks and fragments of the general confederacy. So far as to the ſelfiſh part. As compoſing a part of the community of Europe, and intereſted in it's fate, it is not eaſy to conceive a ſtate of things more doubtful and perplexing. When Louis the XIVth had made himſelf maſter of one of the largeſt and moſt important provinces of Spain; when he had in a manner over-run Lombardy, and was thundering at the gates of Turin; when he had maſtered almoſt all Germany on this ſide the Rhine; when he was on the point of ruining the auguſt fabrick of the Empire; when with the Elector of Bavaria in his alliance, hardly any thing interpoſed between him and Vienna; when the Turk hung with a mighty force over the Empire on the other ſide; I do not know, that in the beginning of 1704 (that is in the third year of the renovated war with Louis the XIV) the ſtate of Europe was ſo truly alarming. To England it certainly was not. Holland (and Holland is a matter to England of value ineſtimable) was then powerful, was then independant, and though greatly endangered, was then full of energy and ſpirit. But the great reſource of Europe was in England: Not in a ſort of England detached

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from the reſt of the world, and amuſing herſelf with the puppet ſhew of a naval power, (it can be no better, whilſt all the ſources of that power, and of every ſort of power, are precarious) but in that ſort of England, who conſidered herſelf as embodied with Europe; but in that ſort of England, who, ſympathetick with the adverſity or the happineſs of mankind, felt that nothing in human affairs was foreign to her. We may conſider it as a ſure axiom that, as on the one hand no confederacy of the leaſt effect or duration can exiſt againſt France, of which England is not only a part, but the head, ſo neither can England pretend to cope with France but as connected with the body of Chriſtendom.

Our account of the war, *as a war of communion*, to the very point in which we began to throw out lures, oglings, and glances for peace, was a war of diſaſter and of little elſe. The independant advantages obtained by us at the beginning of the war, and which were made at the expence of that common cauſe, if they deceive us about our largeſt and our ſureſt intereſt, are to be reckoned amongſt our heavieſt loſſes.

The allies, and Great Britain amongſt the reſt, (and perhaps amongſt the foremoſt) have been miſerably deluded by this great fundamental error;

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that it was in our power to make peace with this monſter of a State, whenever we choſe to forget the crimes that made it great, and the deſigns that made it formidable. People imagined that their ceaſing to reſiſt was the ſure way to be ſecure. This "pale caſt of thought ſicklied over all their enterprizes and turned all their politicks awry." They could not, or rather they would not read, in the moſt unequivocal declarations of the enemy, and in his uniform conduct, that more ſafety was to be found in the moſt arduous war, than in the friendſhip of that kind of being. It's hoſtile amity can be obtained on no terms that do not imply an inability hereafter to reſiſt it's deſigns. This great prolific error (I mean that peace was always in our power) has been the cauſe that rendered the allies indifferent about the *direction* of the war; and perſuaded them that they might always riſque a choice, and even a change in it's objects. They ſeldom improved any advantage; hoping that the enemy, affected by it, would make a proffer of peace. Hence it was, that all their early victories have been followed almoſt immediately with the uſual effects of a defeat; whilſt all the advantages obtained by the Regicides, have been followed by the conſequences that were natural. The diſcomfitures, which the Republick of Aſſaſſins has ſuffered, have uniformly called forth new exertions, which not only repaired old

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loffes, but prepared new conquefts. The loffes of the allies, on the contrary, (no provifion having been made on the fpeculation of fuch an event) have been followed by defertion, by difmay, by difunion, by a dereliction of their policy, by a flight from their principles, by an admiration of the enemy, by mutual accufations, by a diftruft in every member of the alliance of it's fellow, of it's caufe, it's power, and it's courage.

Great difficulties in confequence of our erroneous policy, as I have faid, prefs upon every fide of us. Far from defiring to conceal or even to palliate the evil in the reprefentation, I wifh to lay it down as my foundation, that never greater exifted. In a moment when fudden panick is apprehended, it may be wife, for a while to conceal fome great publick difafter, or to reveal it by degrees, until the minds of the people have time to be re-collected, that their underftanding may have leifure to rally, and that more fteady councils may prevent their doing fomething defperate under the firft impreffions of rage or terror. But with regard to a *general* ftate of things, growing out of events and caufes already known in the grofs, there is no piety in the fraud that covers it's true nature; becaufe nothing but erroneous refolutions can be the refult of falfe reprefentations. Thofe meafures which in common diftrefs might be available, in greater,

are no better than playing with the evil. That the effort may bear a proportion to the exigence, it is fit it ſhould be known; known in it's quality, in it's extent, and in all the circumſtances which attend it. Great reverſes of fortune, there have been, and great embarraſſments in council: a principled Regicide enemy poſſeſſed of the moſt important part of Europe and ſtruggling for the reſt: within ourſelves a total relaxation of all authority, whilſt a cry is raiſed againſt it, as if it were the moſt ferocious of all deſpotiſm: a worſe phænomenon;—our government diſowned by the moſt efficient member of it's tribunals; ill ſupported by any of their conſtituent parts; and the higheſt tribunal of all (from cauſes not for our preſent purpoſe to examine) deprived of all that dignity and all that efficiency which might enforce, or regulate, or if the caſe required it, might ſupply the want of every other court. Public proſecutions are become little better than ſchools for treaſon; of no uſe but to improve the dexterity of criminals in the myſtery of evaſion; or to ſhew with what compleat impunity men may conſpire againſt the Commonwealth; with what ſafety aſſaſſins may attempt it's awful head. Every thing is ſecure, except what the laws have made ſacred; every thing is tameneſs and languor that is not fury and faction. Whilſt the diſtempers of a relaxed fibre prognoſticate and prepare all the morbid force of convulſion in the body of the State, the ſteadineſs

of the phyſician is overpowered by the very aſpect of the diſeaſe.* The doctor of the Conſtitution, pretending to under-rate what he is not able to contend with, ſhrinks from his own operation. He doubts and queſtions the ſalutary but critical terrors of the cautery and the knife. He takes a poor credit even from his defeat; and covers impotence under the maſk of lenity. He praiſes the moderation of the laws, as, in his hands, he ſees them baffled and deſpiſed. Is all this, becauſe in our day the ſtatutes of the kingdom are not engroſſed in as firm a character, and imprinted in as black and legible a type as ever? No! the law is a clear, but it is a dead letter. Dead and putrid, it is inſufficient to ſave the State, but potent to infect, and to kill. Living law, full of reaſon, and of equity and juſtice, (as it is, or it ſhould not exiſt) ought to be ſevere and awful too; or the words of menace, whether written on the parchment roll of England, or cut into the brazen tablet of Rome, will excite nothing but contempt. How comes it, that in all the State proſecutions of magnitude, from the Revolution to within theſe two or three years, the Crown has ſcarcely ever retired diſgraced and defeated from it's Courts? Whence this alarming change? By a connexion eaſily felt, and not impoſſible to be traced to it's cauſe, all the parts of the State have their correſpon-

* "Muſſabat tacito medicina timore."

dence

dence and confent. They who bow to the enemy abroad will not be of power to fubdue the confpirator at home. It is impoffible not to obferve, that in proportion as we approximate to the poifonous jaws of anarchy, the fafcination grows irrefiftible. In proportion as we are attracted towards the focus of illegality, irreligion, and defperate enterprize, all the venomous and blighting infects of the State are awakened into life. The promife of the year is blafted, and fhrivelled, and burned up before them. Our moft falutary and moft beautiful inftitutions yield nothing but duft and fmut: the harveft of our law is no more than ftubble. It is in the nature of thefe eruptive difeafes in the State to fink in by fits and re-appear. But the fuel of the malady remains; and in my opinion is not in the fmalleft degree mitigated in it's malignity, though it waits the favourable moment of a freer communication with the fource of Regicide to exert and to encreafe it's force.

Is it that the people are changed, that the Commonwealth cannot be protected by its laws? I hardly think it. On the contrary, I conceive, that thefe things happen becaufe men are not changed, but remain always what they always were; they remain what the bulk of us muft ever be, when abandoned to our vulgar propenfities, without guide, leader or controul: That is, made to be full of a blind elevation in

profperity; to defpife untried dangers; to be overpowered with unexpected reverfes; to find no clue in a labyrinth of difficulties; to get out of a prefent inconvenience with any rifque of future ruin; to follow and to bow to fortune; to admire fuccefsful though wicked enterprize, and to imitate what we admire; to contemn the government which announces danger from facrilege and regicide, whilft they are only in their infancy and their ftruggle, but which finds nothing that can alarm in their adult ftate and in the power and triumph of thofe deftructive principles. In a mafs we cannot be left to ourfelves. We muft have leaders. If none will undertake to lead us right, we fhall find guides who will contrive to conduct us to fhame and ruin.

We are in a war of a *peculiar* nature. It is not with an ordinary community, which is hoftile or friendly as paffion or as intereft may veer about; not with a State which makes war through wantonnefs, and abandons it through laffitude. We are at war with a fyftem, which, by it's effence, is inimical to all other Governments, and which makes peace or war, as peace and war may beft contribute to their fubverfion. It is with an *armed doctrine*, that we are at war. It has, by it's effence, a faction of opinion, and of intereft, and of enthufiafm, in every country. To us it is a Coloffus which beftrides our channel. It has one foot on a foreign

fhore,

ſhore, the other upon the Britiſh ſoil. Thus advantaged if it can at all exiſt, it muſt finally prevail. Nothing can ſo compleatly ruin any of the old Governments, ours in particular, as the acknowledgment, directly or by implication, of any kind of ſuperiority in this new power. This acknowledgment we make, if in a bad or doubtful ſituation of our affairs, we ſolicit peace; or if we yield to the modes of new humiliation, in which alone ſhe is content to give us an hearing. By that means the terms cannot be of our chooſing; no, not in any part.

It is laid in the unalterable conſtitution of things:—None can aſpire to act greatly, but thoſe who are of force greatly to ſuffer. They who make their arrangements in the firſt run of miſadventure, and in a temper of mind the common fruit of diſappointment and diſmay, put a ſeal on their calamities. To their power they take a ſecurity againſt any favours which they might hope from the uſual inconſtancy of fortune. I am therefore, my dear friend, invariably of your opinion (though full of reſpect for thoſe who think differently) that neither the time choſen for it, nor the manner of ſoliciting a negotiation, were properly conſidered; even though I had allowed (I hardly ſhall allow) that with the hord of Regicides we could by any ſelection of time, or uſe of means,

obtain

obtain any thing at all deſerving the name of peace.

In one point we are lucky. The Regicide has received our advances with ſcorn. We have an enemy, to whoſe virtues we can owe nothing; but on this occaſion we are infinitely obliged to one of his vices. We owe more to his inſolence than to our own precaution. The haughtineſs by which the proud repel us, has this of good in it; that in making us keep our diſtance, they muſt keep their diſtance too. In the preſent caſe, the pride of the Regicide may be our ſafety. He has given time for our reaſon to operate; and for Britiſh dignity to recover from it's ſurpriſe. From firſt to laſt he has rejected all our advances. Far as we have gone he has ſtill left a way open to our retreat.

There is always an augury to be taken of what a peace is likely to be, from the preliminary ſteps that are made to bring it about. We may gather ſomething from the time in which the firſt overtures are made; from the quarter whence they come; from the manner in which they are received. Theſe diſcover the temper of the parties. If your enemy offers peace in the moment of ſucceſs, it indicates that he is ſatisfied with ſomething. It ſhews that there are limits to his ambition or his reſentment.

refentment. If he offers nothing under misfortune, it is probable, that it is more painful to him to abandon the profpect of advantage than to endure calamity. If he rejects folicitation, and will not give even a nod to the fuppliants for peace, until a change in the fortune of the war threatens him with ruin, then I think it evident, that he wifhes nothing more than to difarm his adverfary to gain time. Afterwards a queftion arifes, which of the parties is likely to obtain the greater advantages, by continuing difarmed and by the ufe of time.

With thefe few plain indications in our minds, it will not be improper to re-confider the conduct of the enemy together with our own, from the day that a queftion of peace has been in agitation. In confidering this part of the queftion, I do not proceed on my own hypothefis. I fuppofe, for a moment, that this body of Regicide, calling itfelf a Republick, is a politick perfon, with whom fomething deferving the name of peace may be made. On that fuppofition, let us examine our own proceeding. Let us compute the profit it has brought, and the advantage that it is likely to bring hereafter. A peace too eagerly fought, is not always the fooner obtained. The difcovery of vehement wifhes generally fruftrates their attainment; and your adverfary has gained a great

advantage over you when he finds you impatient to conclude a treaty. There is in reſerve, not only ſomething of dignity, but a great deal of prudence too. A ſort of courage belongs to negotiation as well as to operations of the field. A negotiator muſt often ſeem willing to hazard the whole iſſue of his treaty, if he wiſhes to ſecure any one material point.

The Regicides were the firſt to declare war. We are the firſt to ſue for peace. In proportion to the humility and perſeverance we have ſhewn in our addreſſes, has been the obſtinacy of their arrogance in rejecting our ſuit. The patience of their pride ſeems to have been worn out with the importunity of our courtſhip. Diſguſted as they are with a conduct ſo different from all the ſentiments by which they are themſelves filled, they think to put an end to our vexatious ſollicitation by redoubling their inſults.

It happens frequently, that pride may reject a public advance, while intereſt liſtens to a ſecret ſuggeſtion of advantage. The opportunity has been afforded. At a very early period in the diplomacy of humiliation, a gentleman was ſent on an errand*, of which, from the motive of it, what-

* Mr. Bird ſent to ſtate the real ſituation of the Duc de Choiſeul.

ever the event might be, we can never be aſhamed. Humanity cannot be degraded by humiliation. It is it's very character to ſubmit to ſuch things. There is a conſanguinity between benevolence and humility. They are virtues of the ſame ſtock. Dignity is of as good a race; but it belongs to the family of Fortitude. In the ſpirit of that benevolence, we ſent a gentleman to beſeech the Directory of Regicide, not to be quite ſo prodigal as their Republick had been of judicial murder. We ſolicited them to ſpare the lives of ſome unhappy perſons of the firſt diſtinction, whoſe ſafety at other times could not have been an object of ſolicitation. They had quitted France on the faith of the declaration of the rights of citizens. They never had been in the ſervice of the Regicides, nor at their hands had received any ſtipend. The very ſyſtem and conſtitution of government that now prevails, was ſettled ſubſequent to their emigration. They were under the protection of Great Britain, and in his Majeſty's pay and ſervice. Not an hoſtile invaſion, but the diſaſters of the ſea had thrown them upon a ſhore, more barbarous and inhoſpitable than the inclement ocean under the moſt pitileſs of it's ſtorms. Here was an opportunity to expreſs a feeling for the miſeries of war; and to open ſome ſort of converſation, which (after our publick overtures had glutted their pride), at a cautious and jealous diſtance, might lead to ſomething like an

accommodation. What was the event? A ſtrange uncouth thing, a theatrical figure of the opera, his head ſhaded with three-coloured plumes, his body fantaſtically habited, ſtrutted from the back ſcenes, and after a ſhort ſpeech, in the mock-heroic falſetto of ſtupid tragedy, delivered the gentleman who came to make the repreſentation into the cuſtody of a guard, with directions not to loſe ſight of him for a moment; and then ordered him to be ſent from Paris in two hours.

Here it is impoſſible, that a ſentiment of tenderneſs ſhould not ſtrike athwart the ſternneſs of politicks, and make us recal to painful memory, the difference between this inſolent and bloody theatre, and the temperate, natural majeſty of a civilized court, where the afflicted family of Aſgill did not in vain ſolicit the mercy of the higheſt in rank, and the moſt compaſſionate of the compaſſionate ſex.

In this intercourſe, at leaſt, there was nothing to promiſe a great deal of ſucceſs in our future advances. Whilſt the fortune of the field was wholly with the Regicides, nothing was thought of but to follow where it led; and it led to every thing. Not ſo much as a talk of treaty. Laws were laid down with arrogance. The moſt moderate politician

in their clan * was chofen as the organ, not fo much for prefcribing limits to their claims, as to mark what, for the prefent, they are content to leave to others. They made, not laws, not Conventions, not late poffeffion, but phyfical nature, and political convenience, the fole foundation of their claims. The Rhine, the Mediterranean, and the ocean were the bounds which, for the time, they affigned to the Empire of Regicide. What was the Chamber of Union of Louis the Fourteenth, which aftonifhed and provoked all Europe, compared to this declaration? In truth, with thefe limits, and their principle, they would not have left even the fhadow of liberty or fafety to any nation. This plan of empire was not taken up in the firft intoxication of unexpected fuccefs. You muft recollect, that it was projected, juft as the report has ftated it, from the very firft revolt of the faction againft their Monarchy; and it has been uniformly purfued, as a ftanding maxim of national policy, from that time to this. It is, generally, in the feafon of profperity that men difcover their real temper, principles, and defigns. But this principle fuggefted in their firft ftruggles, fully avowed in their profperity, has, in the moft adverfe ftate of their affairs, been tenacioufly adhered to. The report,

* Boifly d'Anglas.

combined

combined with their conduct, forms an infallible criterion of the views of this Republick.

In their fortune there has been ſome fluctuation. We are to ſee how their minds have been affected with a change. Some impreſſion it made on them undoubtedly. It produced ſome oblique notice of the ſubmiſſions that were made by ſuppliant nations. The utmoſt they did, was to make ſome of thoſe cold, formal, general profeſſions of a love of peace which no Power has ever refuſed to make; becauſe they mean little, and coſt nothing. The firſt paper I have ſeen (the publication at Hamburgh) making a ſhew of that pacific diſpoſition, diſcovered a rooted animoſity againſt this nation, and an incurable rancour, even more than any one of their hoſtile acts. In this Hamburgh declaration, they chooſe to ſuppoſe, that the war, on the part of England, *is a war of Government, begun and carried on againſt the ſenſe and intereſts of the people*; thus ſowing in their very overtures towards peace, the ſeeds of tumult and ſedition: for they never have abandoned, and never will they abandon, in peace, in war, in treaty, in any ſituation, or for one inſtant, their old ſteady maxim of ſeparating the people from their Government. Let me add—and it is with unfeigned anxiety for the character and credit of Miniſters that I do add—if our Government perſeveres,

ſeveres, in its as uniform courſe, of acting under inſtruments with ſuch preambles, it pleads guilty to the charges made by our enemies againſt it, both on it's own part, and on the part of parliament itſelf. The enemy muſt ſucceed in his plan for looſening and diſconnecting all the internal holdings of the kingdom.

It was not enough, that the Speech from the Throne in the opening of the ſeſſion in 1795, threw out oglings and glances of tenderneſs. Leſt this coquetting ſhould ſeem too cold and ambiguous, without waiting for it's effect, the violent paſſion for a relation to the Regicides, produced a direct Meſſage from the Crown, and it's conſequences from the two Houſes of Parliament. On the part of the Regicides theſe declarations could not be entirely paſſed by without notice; but in that notice they diſcovered ſtill more clearly the bottom of their character. The offer made to them by the meſſage to Parliament was hinted at in their anſwer; but in an obſcure and oblique manner as before. They accompanied their notice of the indications manifeſted on our ſide, with every kind of inſolent and taunting reflection. The Regicide Directory, on the day which, in their gipſey jargon, they call the 5th of Pluvioſe, in return for our advances, charge us with eluding our declarations under "evaſive formalities

and

and frivolous pretexts." What theſe pretexts and evaſions were, they do not ſay, and I have never heard. But they do not reſt there. They proceed to charge us, and, as it ſhould ſeem, our allies in the maſs, with direct *perfidy*; they are ſo conciliatory in their language as to hint that this perfidious character is not new in our proceedings. However, notwithſtanding this our habitual perfidy, they will offer peace "on conditions *as* moderate"—as what? as reaſon and as equity require? No! as moderate "as are ſuitable to their *national dignity*." National dignity in all treaties I do admit is an important conſideration. They have given us an uſeful hint on that ſubject: but dignity, hitherto, has belonged to the mode of proceeding, not to the matter of a treaty. Never before has it been mentioned as the ſtandard for rating the conditions of peace; no, never by the moſt violent of conquerors. Indemnification is capable of ſome eſtimate; dignity has no ſtandard. It is impoſſible to gueſs what acquiſitions pride and ambition may think fit for their *dignity*. But leſt any doubt ſhould remain on what they think for their dignity, the Regicides in the next paragraph tell us "that they will have no peace with their "enemies, until they have reduced them to a "ſtate, which will put them under an *impoſſibility* of "purſuing their wretched projects;" that is, in plain French or Engliſh, until they have accom-

pliſhed

plifhed our utter and irretrievable ruin. This is their *pacific* language. It flows from their unalterable principle in whatever language they fpeak, or whatever fteps they take, whether of real war, or of pretended pacification. They have never, to do them juftice, been at much trouble in concealing their intentions. We were as obftinately refolved to think them not in earneft: but I confefs jefts of this fort, whatever their urbanity may be, are not much to my tafte.

To this conciliatory and amicable publick communication, our fole anfwer, in effect, is this— "Citizen Regicides! whenever *you* find yourfelves "in the humour, you may have a peace with *us*. "That is a point you may always command. We "are conftantly in attendance, and nothing you "can do fhall hinder us from the renewal of our "fupplications. You may turn us out at the "door; but we will jump in at the window."

To thofe, who do not love to contemplate the fall of human greatnefs, I do not know a more mortifying fpectacle, than to fee the affembled majefty of the crowned heads of Europe waiting as patient fuitors in the anti-chamber of Regicide. They wait, it feems, until the fanguinary tyrant *Carnot*, fhall have fnorted away the fumes of the indigefted blood of his Sovereign. Then, when

ſunk on the down of uſurped pomp, he ſhall have ſufficiently indulged his meditations with what Monarch he ſhall next glut his ravening maw, he may condeſcend to ſignify that it his pleaſure to be awake; and that he is at leiſure to receive the propoſals of his high and mighty clients for the terms on which he may reſpite the execution of the ſentence he has paſſed upon them. At the opening of thoſe doors, what a ſight it muſt be to behold the plenipotentiaries of royal impotence, in the precedency which they will intrigue to obtain, and which will be granted to them according to the ſeniority of their degradation, ſneaking into the Regicide preſence, and with the reliques of the ſmile which they had dreſſed up, for the levee of their maſters, ſtill flickering on their curled lips, preſenting the faded remains of their courtly graces, to meet the ſcornful, ferocious, ſardonic grin of a bloody ruffian, who, whilſt he is receiving their homage, is meaſuring them with his eye, and fitting to their ſize the ſlider of his Guillotine! Theſe ambaſſadors may eaſily return as good courtiers as they went; but can they ever return from that degrading reſidence, loyal and faithful ſubjects; or with any true affection to their maſter, or true attachment to the conſtitution, religion, or laws of their country? There is great danger that they who enter ſmiling into this Trophonian Cave, will come out of it ſad and ſerious conſpirators; and

ſuch will continue as long as they live. They will become true conductors of contagion to every country, which has had the misfortune to ſend them to the ſource of that electricity. At beſt they will become totally indifferent to good and evil, to one inſtitution or another. This ſpecies of indifference is but too generally diſtinguiſhable in thoſe who have been much employed in foreign Courts; but in the preſent caſe the evil muſt be aggravated without meaſure; for they go from their country, not with the pride of the old character, but in a ſtate of the loweſt degradation; and what muſt happen in their place of reſidence can have no effect in raiſing them to the level of true dignity, or of chaſte ſelf eſtimation, either as men, or as repreſentatives of crowned heads.

Our early proceeding, which has produced theſe returns of affront, appeared to me totally new, without being adapted to the new circumſtances of affairs. I have called to my mind the ſpeeches and meſſages in former times. I find nothing like theſe. You will look in the journals to find whether my memory fails me. Before this time, never was a ground of peace laid, (as it were, in a parliamentary record,) until it had been as good as concluded. This was a wiſe homage paid to the diſcretion of the Crown. It was known how much

a negotiation muft fuffer by having any thing in the train towards it prematurely difclofed. But when thofe parliamentary declarations were made, not fo much as a ftep had been taken towards a negotiation in any mode whatever. The meafure was an unpleafant and unfeafonable difcovery.

I conceive that another circumftance in that tranfaction has been as little authorifed by any example; and that it is as little prudent in itfelf; I mean the formal recognition of the French Republick. Without entering, for the prefent, into a queftion on the good faith manifefted in that meafure, or on it's general policy, I doubt, upon mere temporary confiderations of prudence, whether it was perfectly adviseable. It is not within the rules of dexterous conduct to make an acknowledgment of a contefted title in your enemy, before you are morally certain that your recognition will fecure his friendfhip. Otherwife it is a meafure worfe than thrown away. It adds infinitely to the ftrength, and confequently to the demands of the adverfe party. He has gained a fundamental point without an equivalent. It has happened as might have been forefeen. No notice whatever was taken of this recognition. In fact, the Directory never gave themfelves any concern about it; and they received our acknowledgment with perfect fcorn. With them, it is not for

the States of Europe to judge of their title: But in their eye the title of every other power depends wholly on their pleafure.

Preliminary declarations of this fort, thrown out at random, and fown, as it were, broad-caft, were never to be found in the mode of our proceeding with France and Spain, whilft the great Monarchies of France and Spain exifted. I do not fay, that a diplomatick meafure ought to be, like a parliamentary or a judicial proceeding, according to ftrict precedent. I hope I am far from that pedantry: But this I know, that a great ftate ought to have fome regard to it's antient maxims; efpecially where they indicate it's dignity; where they concur with the rules of prudence; and above all, where the circumftances of the time require that a fpirit of innovation fhould be refifted, which leads to the humiliation of fovereign powers. It would be ridiculous to affert, that thofe powers have fuffered nothing in their eftimation. I admit, that the greater interefts of ftate will for a moment fuperfede all other confiderations: but if there was a rule that a fovereign never fhould let down his dignity without a fure payment to his intereft, the dignity of Kings would be held high enough. At prefent, however, fafhion governs in more ferious things than furniture and drefs. It looks as if fovereigns abroad were emulous in bidding

againft

againſt their eſtimation. It ſeems as if the pre-eminence of Regicide was acknowledged; and that Kings tacitly ranked themſelves below their ſacrilegious murderers, as natural magiſtrates and judges over them. It appears as if dignity were the prerogative of crime; and a temporiſing humiliation the proper part for venerable authority. If the vileſt of mankind are reſolved to be the moſt wicked, they loſe all the baſeneſs of their origin, and take their place above Kings. This example in foreign Princes, I truſt, will not ſpread. It is the concern of mankind, that the deſtruction of order ſhould not be a claim to rank: that crimes ſhould not be the only title to pre-eminence and honour.

At this ſecond ſtage of humiliation, (I mean the inſulting declaration in conſequence of the meſſage to both Houſes of Parliament) it might not have been amiſs to pauſe; and not to ſquander away the fund of our ſubmiſſions, until we know what final purpoſes of publick intereſt they might anſwer. The policy of ſubjecting ourſelves to further inſults is not to me quite apparent. It was reſolved however, to hazard a third trial. Citizen Barthelemi had been eſtabliſhed on the part of the new Republick, at Baſle; where, with his proconſulate of Switzerland and the adjacent parts of Germany, he was appointed as a ſort of factor to deal in the degradation of the crowned heads of Europe.

At

At Basle it was thought proper, in order to keep others, I suppose, in countenance, that Great Britain should appear at this market, and bid with the rest, for the mercy of the People-King.

On the 6th of March 1796 Mr. Wickham, in consequence of authority, was desired to sound France on her disposition towards a general pacification; to know whether she would consent to send Ministers to a Congress at such a place as might be hereafter agreed upon; to know whether they would communicate the general grounds of a pacification such as France (the diplomatick name of the Regicide power) would be willing to propose, as a foundation for a negociation for peace with his Majesty *and his allies*: but he had no authority to enter into any negociation or discussion with him upon these subjects.

On the part of Great Britain this measure was a voluntary act, wholly uncalled for on the part of Regicide. Suits of this sort are at least strong indications of a desire for accommodation. Any other body of men but the Directory would be somewhat soothed with such advances. They could not however begin their answer, which was given without much delay, and communicated on the 28th of the same month, without a preamble of insult and reproach. "They doubt the sincerity

of

of the pacifick intentions of this Court." She did not begin, ſay they, yet to "know her real intereſts," "ſhe did not ſeek peace *with good faith.*" This, or ſomething to this effect, has been the conſtant preliminary obſervation, (now grown into a ſort of office-form) on all our overtures to this power: a perpetual charge on the Britiſh Government of fraud, evaſion, and habitual perfidy.

It might be aſked, from whence did theſe opinions of our inſincerity and ill faith ariſe? It was, becauſe the Britiſh Miniſtry (leaving to the Directory however to propoſe a better mode) propoſed a *Congreſs* for the purpoſe of a general pacification, and this they ſaid "would render negociation endleſs." From hence they immediately inferred a fraudulent intention in the offer. Unqueſtionably their mode of giving the law would bring matters to a more ſpeedy concluſion. As to any other method more agreeable to them than a Congreſs, an alternative expreſsly propoſed to them, they did not condeſcend to ſignify their pleaſure.

This refuſal of treating conjointly with the powers allied againſt this Republick, furniſhes matter for a great deal of ſerious reflexion. They have hitherto conſtantly declined any other than a treaty with a ſingle power. By thus diſſociating every State from every other, like deer ſeparated from

from the herd, each power is treated with, on the merit of his being a deſerter from the common cauſe. In that light the Regicide power finding each of them inſulated and unprotected, with great facility gives the law to them all. By this ſyſtem for the preſent, an incurable diſtruſt is ſown amongſt confederates; and in future all alliance is rendered impracticable. It is thus they have treated with Pruſſia, with Spain, with Sardinia, with Bavaria, with the Eccleſiaſtical State, with Saxony; and here we ſee them refuſe to treat with Great Britain in any other mode. They muſt be worſe than blind who do not ſee with what undeviating regularity of ſyſtem, in this caſe and in all caſes, they purſue their ſcheme for the utter deſtruction of every independent power; eſpecially the ſmaller, who cannot find any refuge whatever but in ſome common cauſe.

Renewing their taunts and reflections, they tell Mr. Wickham, "that their policy has no guides "but openneſs and good faith, and that their "conduct ſhall be conformable to theſe princi-"ples." They ſay concerning their Government, that "yielding to the ardent deſire by which it is "animated to procure peace for the French Re-"publick, and for all nations, it will not *fear to* "*declare itſelf openly.* Charged by the Conſtitu-"tion with the execution of the *laws*, it cannot

" *make* or *liſten* to any propoſal that would be " contrary to them. The conſtitutional act does " not permit it to conſent to any alienation of " that which, according to the exiſting laws, con-" ſtitutes the territory of the Republick."

" With reſpect to the countries *occupied by the* " *French armies and which have not been united to* " *France*, they, as well as other intereſts political " and commercial, may become the ſubject of a " negociation, which will preſent to the Directory " the means of proving how much it deſires to " attain ſpeedily to a happy pacification. That " the Directory is ready to receive in this reſpect " any overtures that ſhall be juſt, reaſonable, and " compatible *with the dignity of the Republick*." On the head of what is *not* to be the ſubject of negotiation, the Directory is clear and open. As to what may be a matter of treaty, all this open dealing is gone. She retires into her ſhell. There ſhe expects overtures from *you*—and that you are to gueſs what ſhe ſhall judge juſt, reaſonable, and above all, *compatible with her dignity*.

In the records of pride there does not exiſt ſo inſulting a declaration. It is inſolent in words, in manner, but in ſubſtance it is not only inſulting but alarming. It is a ſpecimen of what may be expected from the maſters we are preparing for

our humbled country. Their opennefs and candour confift in a direct avowal of their defpotifm and ambition. We know that their declared refolution had been to furrender no object belonging to France previous to the war. They had refolved, that the Republick was entire, and muft remain fo. As to what fhe has conquered from the allies and united to the fame indivifible body, it is of the fame nature. That is, the allies are to give up whatever conquefts they have made or may make upon France, but all which fhe has violently ravifhed from her neighbours and thought fit to appropriate, are not to become fo much as objects of negociation.

In this unity and indivifibility of poffeffion are funk ten immenfe and wealthy provinces, full of ftrong, flourifhing and opulent cities, the Auftrian Netherlands, the part of Europe the moft neceffary to preferve any communication between this kingdom and its natural allies, next to Holland the moft interefting to this country, and without which Holland muft virtually belong to France. Savoy and Nice, the keys of Italy, and the citadel in her hands to bridle Switzerland, are in that confolidation. The important territory of Leige is torn out of the heart of the Empire. All thefe are integrant parts of the Republick, not to be fubject to any difcuffion, or to be purchafed

by any equivalent. Why? becaufe there is a law which prevents it. What law? The law of nations? The acknowledged public law of Europe? Treaties and conventions of parties? No! not a pretence of the kind. It is a declaration not made in confequence of any prefcription on her fide, not on any ceffion or dereliction, actual or tacit, of other powers. It is a declaration *pendente lite* in the middle of a war, one principal object of which was originally the defence, and has fince been the recovery of thefe very countries.

This ftrange law is not made for a trivial object, not for a fingle port, or for a fingle fortrefs; but for a great kingdom; for the religion, the morals, the laws, the liberties, the lives and fortunes of millions of human creatures, who without their confent, or that of their lawful government, are, by an arbitrary act of this regicide and homicide Government, which they call a law, incorporated into their tyranny.

In other words, their will is the law, not only at home, but as to the concerns of every nation. Who has made that law but the Regicide Republick itfelf, whofe laws, like thofe of the Medes and Perfians, they cannot alter or abrogate, or even fo much as take into confideration? Without the leaft ceremony or compliment, they have

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ſent out of the world whole ſets of laws and law-givers. They have ſwept away the very conſtitutions under which the Legiſlatures acted, and the Laws were made. Even the fundamental ſacred rights of man they have not ſcrupled to profane. They have ſet this holy code at nought with ignominy and ſcorn. Thus they treat all their domeſtick laws and conſtitutions, and even what they had conſidered as a Law of Nature; but whatever they have put their ſeal on for the purpoſes of their ambition, and the ruin of their neighbours, this alone is invulnerable, impaſſible, immortal. Aſſuming to be maſters of every thing human and divine, here, and here alone, it ſeems they are limited, "cooped and cabined in;" and this omnipotent legiſlature finds itſelf wholly without the power of exerciſing it's favourite attribute, the love of peace. In other words, they are powerful to uſurp, impotent to reſtore; and equally by their power and their impotence they aggrandize themſelves, and weaken and impoveriſh you and all other nations.

Nothing can be more proper or more manly than the ſtate publication called a *note* on this proceeding, dated Downing-ſtreet, the 10th of April, 1796. Only that it is better expreſſed, it perfectly agrees with the opinion I have taken the liberty of

ſubmitting

submitting to your consideration.* I place it below at full length as my justification in thinking that this astonishing paper is not only a direct negative, to all treaty, but is a rejection of every principle upon which treaties could be made. To admit it for a moment were to erect this power, usurped at home, into a Legislature to govern mankind.

* "This Court has seen, with regret, how far the tone and spirit of that answer, the nature and extent of the demands which it contains, and the manner of announcing them, are remote from any dispositions for peace.

"The inadmissible pretension is there avowed of appropriating to France all that the laws existing there may have comprised under the denomination of French territory. To a demand such as this, is added an express declaration that no proposal contrary to it will be made, or even listened to. And even this, under the pretence of an internal regulation, the provisions of which are wholly foreign to all other nations.

"While these dispositions shall be persisted in, nothing is left for the King, but to prosecute a war equally just and necessary.

"Whenever his enemies shall manifest more pacific sentiments, his Majesty will, at all times, be eager to concur in them, by lending himself, in concert with his allies, to all such measures as shall be calculated to re-establish general tranquillity on conditions just, honourable and permanent, either by the establishment of a general Congress, which has been so happily the means of restoring peace to Europe, or by a preliminary discussion of the principles which may be proposed, on either side, as a foundation of a general pacification; or, lastly, by an impartial examination of any other way which may be pointed out to him for arriving at the same salutary end."

Downing-Street, April 10, 1796.

mankind. It is an authority that on a thouſand occaſions they have aſſerted in claim, and whenever they are able, exerted in practice. The dereliction of this whole ſcheme of policy became, therefore, an indiſpenſible previous condition to all renewal of treaty. The remark of the Britiſh Cabinet on this arrogant and tyrannical claim is natural and unavoidable. Our Miniſtry ſtate, "*That while theſe diſpoſitions ſhall be perſiſted in, nothing is left for the King but to proſecute a war that is juſt and neceſſary.*"

It was of courſe, that we ſhould wait until the enemy ſhewed ſome ſort of diſpoſition on their part to fulfil this condition. It was hoped indeed that our ſuppliant ſtrains might be ſuffered to ſteal into the auguſt ear in a more propitious ſeaſon. That ſeaſon, however, invoked by ſo many vows, conjurations and prayers, did not come. Every declaration of hoſtility renovated, and every act purſued with double animoſity—the over-running of Lombardy—the ſubjugation of Piedmont—the poſſeſſion of its impregnable fortreſſes—the ſeizing on all the neutral ſtates of Italy—our expulſion from Leghorn—inſtances for ever renewed for our expulſion from Genoa—Spain rendered ſubject to them and hoſtile to us—Portugal bent under the yoke—half the Empire over-run and ravaged, were the only ſigns which this mild Republick thought proper to manifeſt of their pacific ſentiments.

Every

Every demonſtration of an implacable rancour and an untameable pride were the only encouragements we received to the renewal of our ſupplications. Here therefore they and we were fixed. Nothing was left to the Britiſh Miniſtry but "to proſecute a war juſt and neceſſary"—a war equally juſt as at the time of our engaging in it—a war become ten times more neceſſary by every thing which happened afterwards. This reſolution was ſoon, however, forgot. It felt the heat of the ſeaſon and melted away. New hopes were entertained from ſupplication. No expectations, indeed, were then formed from renewing a direct application to the French Regicides through the Agent General for the humiliation of Sovereigns. At length a ſtep was taken in degradation which even went lower than all the reſt. Deficient in merits of our own, a Mediator was to be ſought—and we looked for that Mediator at Berlin! The King of Pruſſia's merits in abandoning the general cauſe might have obtained for him ſome ſort of influence in favour of thoſe whom he had deſerted—but I have never heard that his Pruſſian Majeſty had lately diſcovered ſo marked an affection for the Court of St. James's, or for theCourt of Vienna, as to excite much hope of his interpoſing a very powerful mediation to deliver them from the diſtreſſes into which he had brought them.

If humiliation is the element in which we live, if it is become not only our occaſional policy but our habit, no great objection can be made to the modes in which it may be diverſified; though, I confeſs, I cannot be charmed with the idea of our expoſing our lazar ſores at the door of every proud ſervitor of the French Republick, where the court-dogs will not deign to lick them. We had, if I am not miſtaken, a miniſter at that court, who might try it's temper, and recede and advance as he found backwardneſs or encouragement. But to ſend a gentleman there on no other errand than this, and with no aſſurance whatever that he ſhould not find, what he did find, a repulſe, ſeems to me to go far beyond all the demands of a humiliation merely politick. I hope, it did not ariſe from a predeliction for that mode of conduct.

The cup of bitterneſs was not, however, drained to the dregs. Baſle and Berlin were not ſufficient. After ſo many and ſo diverſified repulſes, we were reſolved to make another trial, and to try another Mediator, among the unhappy gentlemen in whoſe perſons Royalty is inſulted and degraded at the ſeat of plebeian pride, and upſtart inſolence.— There is a miniſter from Denmark at Paris. Without any previous encouragement to that; any more than the other ſteps, we ſent through this

turnpike to demand a paſſport for a perſon who on our part was to ſolicit peace in the metropolis, at the footſtool of Regicide itſelf. It was not to be expected that any one of thoſe degraded beings could have influence enough to ſettle any part of the terms in favour of the candidates for further degradation; beſides, ſuch intervention would be a direct breach in their ſyſtem, which did not permit one ſovereign power to utter a word in the concerns of his equal.—Another repulſe.—We were deſired to apply directly in our perſons.—We ſubmitted and made the application.

It might be thought that here, at length, we had touched the bottom of humiliation; our lead was brought up covered with mud. But "in the "loweſt deep, a lower deep" was to open for us ſtill more profound abyſſes of diſgrace and ſhame. However, in we leaped. We came forward in our own name. The paſſport, ſuch a paſſport and ſafe conduct as would be granted to thieves, who might come in to betray their accomplices, and no better, was granted to Britiſh ſupplication. To leave no doubt of it's ſpirit, as ſoon as the rumour of this act of condeſcenſion could get abroad, it was formally announced with an explanation from authority, containing an invective againſt the Miniſtry of Great Britain, their habitual frauds, their proverbial, *punick* perfidy. No ſuch State Paper, as a

preliminary

preliminary to a negociation for peace has ever yet appeared. Very few declarations of war have ever ſhewn ſo much and ſo unqualified animoſity. I place it below * as a diplomatick curioſity: and in order to be the better underſtood, in the few remarks I have

* *Official Note, extracted from the Journal of the Defenders of the Country.*

Executive Directory.

"Different Journals have advanced that an Engliſh Plenipotentiary had reached Paris, and had preſented himſelf to the Executive Directory, but that his propoſitions not having appeared ſatisfactory, he had received orders inſtantly to quit France.

"All theſe aſſertions are equally falſe.

"The notices given, in the Engliſh Papers, of a Miniſter having been ſent to Paris, there to treat of peace, bring to recollection the overtures of Mr. Wickham to the Ambaſſador of the Republick at Baſle, and the rumours circulated relative to the miſſion of Mr. Hammond to the Court of Pruſſia. The *inſignificance*, or rather the *ſubtle duplicity*, the *PUNICK ſi'e of* Mr. Wickham's note, is not forgotten. According to the partizans of the Engliſh Miniſtry, it was to Paris that Mr. Hammond was to come to ſpeak for peace: when his deſtination became publick, and it was known that he went to Pruſſia, the ſame writer repeated that it was to accelerate a peace, and notwithſtanding the object, now well known, of this negociation, was to engage Pruſſia to break her treaties with the Republick, and to return into the coalition—The Court of Berlin, faithful to its engagements, repulſed theſe *perfidious* propoſitions. But in converting this intrigue into a miſſion for peace, the Engliſh Miniſtry joined to the hope of giving a new enemy to France, *that of juſtifying the continuance of the war in the eyes of the Engliſh nation, and of throwing all the odium of it on the French Government.*

Such

I have to make upon a piece which indeed defies all defcription—"None but itfelf can be it's parallel."

I pafs by all the infolence and contumely of the performance as it comes from them. The queftion is not now how we are to be affected with it

Such was alfo the aim of Mr. Wickham's note. *Such is ftill that of the notices given at this time in the Englifh papers.*

"This aim will appear evident, if we reflect how difficult it is, that the ambitious Government of England fhould fincerely wifh for a peace that would *fnatch from it it's maritime preponderancy, would re-eftablifh the freedom of the feas, would give a new impulfe to the Spanifh, Dutch, and French marines*, and would carry to the higheft degree of profperity the induftry and commerce of thofe nations in which it has always found *rivals*, and which it has confidered as *enemies* of it's commerce, when they were tired of being it's *dupes*.

"But there will *no longer be any credit given to the pacific intentions of the Englifh Miniftry, when it is known, that it's gold and it's intrigues, it's open practices, and it's infinuations, befiege more than ever the Cabinet of Vienna, and are one of the principal obftacles to the negociation which* that Cabinet *would of itfelf be induced to enter on for peace.*

"They will no longer *be credited*, finally, when the moment of the rumour of thefe overtures being circulated is confidered. *The Englifh nation fupports impatiently the continuance of the war, a reply muft be made to it's complaints, it's reproaches*: the Parliament is about to re-open it's fittings, the mouths of the orators who will declaim againft the war muft be fhut, the demand of new taxes muft be juftified; and to obtain thefe refults, it is neceffary to be enabled to advance, that the French Government refufes every reafonable propofition of peace.

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in regard to our dignity. That is gone. I ſhall ſay no more about it. Light lie the earth on the aſhes of Engliſh pride. I ſhall only obſerve upon it *politically*, and as furniſhing a direction for our own conduct in this low buſineſs.

The very idea of a negociation for peace, whatever the inward ſentiments of the parties may be, implies ſome confidence in their faith, ſome degree of belief in the profeſſions which are made concerning it. A temporary and occaſional credit, at leaſt, is granted. Otherwiſe men ſtumble on the very threſhold. I therefore wiſh to aſk what hope we can have of their good faith, who, as the very baſis of the negociation, aſſume the ill faith and treachery of thoſe they have to deal with? The terms, as againſt us, muſt be ſuch as imply a full ſecurity againſt a treacherous conduct—that is what this Directory ſtated in it's firſt declaration, to place us "in an utter impoſſibility of executing our wretched projects." This is the omen, and the ſole omen, under which we have conſented to open our treaty.

The ſecond obſervation I have to make upon it, (much connected undoubtedly with the firſt,) is, that they have informed you of the reſult they propoſe from the kind of peace they mean to grant you; that is to ſay, the union they propoſe among nations

nations with the view, of rivalling our trade and deſtroying our naval power: and this they ſuppoſe (and with good reaſon too) muſt be the inevitable effect of their peace. It forms one of their principal grounds for ſuſpecting our Miniſters could not be in good earneſt in their propoſition. They make no ſcruple beforehand to tell you the whole of what they intend; and this is what we call, in the modern ſtyle, the acceptance of a propoſition for peace! In old language it would be called a moſt haughty, offenſive, and inſolent rejection of all treaty.

Thirdly, they tell you what they conceive to be the perfidious policy which dictates your deluſive offer; that is, the deſign of cheating not only them, but the people of England, againſt whoſe intereſt and inclination this war is ſuppoſed to be carried on.

If we proceed in this buſineſs, under this preliminary declaration, it ſeems to me, that we admit, (now for the third time) by ſomething a great deal ſtronger than words, the truth of the charges of every kind which they make upon the Britiſh Miniſtry, and the grounds of thoſe foul imputations. The language uſed by us, which in other circumſtances would not be exceptionable, in this caſe tends very ſtrongly to confirm and realize the ſuſ-

picion

picion of our enemy. I mean the declaration, that if we do not obtain ſuch terms of peace as ſuits our opinion of what our intereſts require, *then*, and in *that* caſe, we ſhall continue the war with vigour. This offer ſo reaſoned plainly implies, that without it, our leaders themſelves entertain great doubts of the opinion and good affections of the Britiſh people; otherwiſe there does not appear any cauſe, why we ſhould proceed under the ſcandalous conſtruction of our enemy, upon the former offer made by Mr. Wickham, and on the new offer made directly at Paris. It is not, therefore, from a ſenſe of dignity, but from the danger of radicating that falſe ſentiment in the breaſts of the enemy, that I think, under the auſpices of this declaration, we cannot, with the leaſt hope of a good event, or, indeed, with any regard to the common ſafety, proceed in the train of this negociation. I wiſh Miniſtry would ſeriouſly conſider the importance of their ſeeming to confirm the enemy in an opinion, that his frequent appeals to the people againſt their Government has not been without it's effect. If it puts an end to this war, it will render another impracticable.

Whoever goes to the directorial preſence under this paſſport, with this offenſive comment, and foul explanation, goes, in the avowed ſenſe of the Court to which he is ſent; as the inſtrument of a

Government

Government diſſociated from the intereſts and wiſhes of the Nation, for the purpoſe of cheating both the people of France and the people of England. He goes out the declared emiſſary of a faithleſs Miniſtry. He has perfidy for his credentials. He has national weakneſs for his full powers. I yet doubt whether any one can be found to inveſt himſelf with that character. If there ſhould, it would be pleaſant to read his inſtructions on the anſwer which he is to give to the Directory, in caſe they ſhould repeat to him the ſubſtance of the Manifeſto which he carries with him in his portfolio.

So much for the *firſt* Manifeſto of the Regicide Court which went along with the paſſport. Leſt this declaration ſhould ſeem the effect of haſte, or a mere ſudden effuſion of pride and inſolence, on full deliberation, about a week after comes out a ſecond. In this manifeſto, which is dated the fifth of October, one day before the ſpeech from the Throne, on the vigil of the feſtive day of cordial unanimity ſo happily celebrated by all parties in the Britiſh Parliament, the Regicides, our worthy friends, (I call them by advance and by courteſy what by law I ſhall be obliged to call them hereafter) our worthy friends, I ſay, renew and enforce the former declaration concerning our faith and ſincerity, which they pinned to our paſſport. On three other points which

which run through all their declarations, they are more explicit than ever.

Firſt, they more directly undertake to be the real repreſentatives of the people of this kingdom: and on a ſuppoſition in which they agree with our parliamentary reformers, that the Houſe of Commons is not that Repreſentative, the function being vacant, they, as our true conſtitutional organ, inform his Majeſty and the world of the ſenſe of the nation. They tell us that "the Engliſh people ſee "with regret his Majeſty's Government ſquandering "away the funds which had been granted to him." This aſtoniſhing aſſumption of the publick voice of England, is but a ſlight foretaſte of the uſurpation which, on a peace, we may be aſſured they will make of all the powers in all the parts of our vaſſal conſtitution. "If it be thus in the green leaf, "what will it be in the dry?"

Next they tell us as a condition to our treaty, that "this Government muſt abjure the unjuſt ha-"tred it bears to them, and at laſt open it's ears "to the voice of humanity."—Truely this is even from her an extraordinary demand. Hitherto it ſeems we have put wax into our ears to ſhut them up againſt the tender, ſoothing ſtrains, in the *affettuoſo* of humanity, warbled from the throats of Reubel, Carnot, Tallien, and the whole chorus of

Confiscators, domiciliary Visitors, Committee-men of Research, Jurors and Presidents of Revolutionary Tribunals, Regicides, Assassins, Massacrers, and Septembrizers. It is not difficult to discern what sort of humanity our Government is to learn from these syren singers. Our Government also I admit, with some reason, as a step towards the proposed fraternity, is required to abjure the unjust hatred which it bears to this body of honour and virtue. I thank God I am neither a Minister nor a leader of Opposition. I protest I cannot do what they desire, if I were under the guillotine, or as they ingeniously and pleasantly express "it, looking out of the little national window." Even at that opening I could receive none of their light. I am fortified against all such affections by the declaration of the Government, which I must yet consider as lawful, made on the 29th of October 1793*, and still ringing in my ears. This

* "In their place has succeeded a system destructive of all "publick order, maintained by proscriptions, exiles and confiscations without number: by arbitrary imprisonment; by massacres which cannot be remembered without horror; and at "length by the execrable murder of a just and beneficent Sovereign, and of the illustrious Princess, who, with an unshaken firmness, has shared all the misfortunes of her Royal "Consort, his protracted sufferings, his cruel captivity and his "ignominious death."—"They (the allies) have had to encounter acts of aggression without pretext, open violations of "all treaties, unprovoked declarations of war; in a word, "whatever

This declaration was tranſmitted not only to all our commanders by ſea and land, but to our Miniſters in every Court of Europe. It is the moſt eloquent and highly finiſhed in the ſtyle, the moſt judicious

" whatever corruption, intrigue or violence could effect for the " purpoſe ſo openly avowed, of ſubverting all the inſtitutions " of ſociety, and of extending over all the nations of Europe " that confuſion, which has produced the miſery of France."—

" This ſtate of things cannot exiſt in France without in- " volving all the ſurrounding powers in one common danger, " without giving them the right, without impoſing it upon them " as a duty, to ſtop the progreſs of an evil, which exiſts only by " the ſucceſſive violation of all law and all property, and which " attacks the fundamental principles by which mankind is united " in the bonds of civil ſociety."—" The King would impoſe " none other than equitable and moderate conditions, not ſuch " as the expence, the riſques and the ſacrifices of the war might " juſtify; but ſuch as his Majeſty thinks himſelf under the in- " diſpenſible neceſſity of requiring, with a view to theſe conſi- " derations, and ſtill more to that of his own ſecurity and of " the future tranquillity of Europe. His Majeſty deſires nothing " more ſincerely than thus to terminate a war, which he in vain " endeavoured to avoid, and all the calamities of which, as now " experienced by France, are to be attributed only to the ambi- " tion, the perfidy and the violence of thoſe, whoſe crimes have " involved their own country in miſery, and diſgraced all civi- " lized nations."—" The King promiſes on his part the ſuſpen- " ſion of hoſtilities, friendſhip, and (as far as the courſe of " events will allow, of which the will of man cannot diſpoſe) " ſecurity and protection to all thoſe who, by declaring for a " monarchical form of Government, ſhall ſhake off the yoke of " ſanguinary anarchy; of that anarchy which has broken all " the moſt ſacred bonds of ſociety, diſſolved all the relations of " civil

judicious in the choice of topicks, the moſt orderly in the arrangement, and the moſt rich in the colouring, without employing the ſmalleſt degree of exaggeration, of any ſtate paper that has ever yet appeared. An ancient writer, Plutarch, I think it is, quotes ſome verſes on the eloquence of Pericles, who is called "the only orator that "left ſtings in the minds of his hearers." Like his, the eloquence of the declaration, not contradicting, but enforcing ſentiments of the trueſt humanity, has left ſtings that have penetrated more than ſkin-deep into my mind; and never can they be extracted by all the ſurgery of murder; never can the throbbings they have created, be aſſuaged by all the emollient cataplaſms of robbery and confiſcation.

The third point which they have more clearly expreſſed than ever, is of equal importance with

"civil life, violated every right, confounded every duty; which "uſes the name of liberty to exerciſe the moſt cruel tyranny, "to annihilate all property, to ſeize on all poſſeſſions; which "founds it's power on the pretended conſent of the people, and "itſelf carries fire and ſword through extenſive provinces for "having demanded their laws, their religion and their *lawful* "*Sovereign*."

Declaration ſent by his Majeſty's command to the Commanders of his Majeſty's fleets and armies employed againſt France, and to his Majeſty's Miniſters employed at foreign Courts.

Whitehall, *Oct.* 29, 1793.

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the reſt; and with them furniſhes a complete view of the Regicide ſyſtem. For they demand as a condition, without which our ambaſſador of obedience cannot be received with any hope of ſucceſs, that he ſhall be "provided with full powers "to negociate a peace between the French Republick and Great Britain, and to conclude it *defi-"nitively* between the TWO powers."[1] With their ſpear they draw a circle about us. They will hear nothing of a joint treaty. We muſt make a peace ſeparately from our allies. We muſt, as the very firſt and preliminary ſtep, be guilty of that perfidy towards our friends and aſſociates, with which they reproach us in our tranſactions with them our enemies. We are called upon ſcandalouſly to betray the fundamental ſecurities to ourſelves and to all nations. In my opinion, (it is perhaps but a poor one) if we are meanly bold enough to ſend an ambaſſador, ſuch as this official note of the enemy requires, we cannot even diſpatch our emiſſary without danger of being charged with a breach of our alliance. Government now underſtands the full meaning of the paſſport.

Strange revolutions have happened in the ways of thinking and in the feelings of men: But, it requires a very extraordinary coalition of parties indeed, and a kind of unheard of unanimity in public Councils, which can impoſe this new-

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difcovered fyftem of negociation, as found national policy on the underftanding of a fpectator of this wonderful fcene, who judges on the principles of any thing he ever before faw, read, or heard of, and above all, on the underftanding of a perfon who has had in his eye the tranfactions of the laft feven years.

I know it is fuppofed, that if good terms of capitulation are not granted, after we have thus fo repeatedly hung out the white flag, the national fpirit will revive with tenfold ardour. This is an experiment cautioufly to be made. *Reculer pour mieux fauter*, according to the French by-word, cannot be trufted to as a general rule of conduct. To diet a man into weaknefs and langour, afterwards to give him the greater ftrength, has more of the empirick than the rational phyfician. It is true that fome perfons have been kicked into courage; and this is no bad hint to give to thofe who are too forward and liberal in beftowing infults and outrages on their paffive companions. But fuch a courfe does not at firft view appear a well chofen difcipline to form men to a nice fenfe of honour, or a quick refentment of injuries. A long habit of humiliation does not feem a very good preparative to manly and vigorous fentiment. It may not leave, perhaps, enough of energy in the mind fairly to difcern what are good

terms

terms or what are not. Men low and diſpirited may regard thoſe terms as not at all amiſs, which in another ſtate of mind they would think intolerable: if they grew peeviſh in this ſtate of mind, they may be rouſed, not againſt the enemy whom they have been taught to fear, but againſt the Miniſtry*, who are more within their reach, and who have refuſed conditions that are not unſeaſonable, from power that they have been taught to conſider as irreſiſtible.

If all that for ſome months I have heard have the leaſt foundation, I hope it has not, the Miniſters are, perhaps, not quite ſo much to be blamed, as their condition is to be lamented. I have been given to underſtand, that theſe proceedings are not in their origin properly theirs. It is ſaid that there is a ſecret in the Houſe of Commons. It is ſaid that Miniſters act not according to the votes, but according to the diſpoſitions, of the majority. I hear that the minority has long ſince ſpoken the general ſenſe of the nation; and that to prevent thoſe who compoſe it from having the open and avowed lead in that houſe, or perhaps in both Houſes, it was neceſſary to pre-occupy their ground, and to take their propoſitions out of their mouths, even with the ha-

* Ut lethargicus hic, cum fit pugil, et medicum urget.—Hor.

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zard of being afterwards reproached with a compliance which it was foreseen would be fruitless.

If the general disposition of the people be, as I hear it is, for an immediate peace with Regicide, without so much as considering our publick and solemn engagements to the party in France whose cause we had espoused, or the engagements expressed in our general alliances, not only without an enquiry into the terms, but with a certain knowledge that none but the worst terms will be offered, it is all over with us. It is strange, but it may be true, that as the danger from Jacobinism is increased in my eyes and in yours, the fear of it is lessened in the eyes of many people who formerly regarded it with horror. It seems, they act under the impression of terrors of another sort, which have frightened them out of their first apprehensions. But let their fears or their hopes, or their desires, be what they will, they should recollect, that they who would make peace without a previous knowledge of the terms, make a surrender. They are conquered. They do not treat; they receive the law. Is this the disposition of the people of England? Then the people of England are contented to seek in the kindness of a foreign systematick enemy combined with a dangerous faction at home, a security which they cannot find

in their own patriotiſm and their own courage. They are willing to truſt to the ſympathy of Regicides, the guarantee of the Britiſh Monarchy. They are content to reſt their religion on the piety of atheiſts by eſtabliſhment. They are ſatisfied to ſeek in the clemency of practiſed murderers the ſecurity of their lives. They are pleaſed to confide their property to the ſafeguard of thoſe who are robbers by inclination, intereſt, habit, and ſyſtem. If this be our deliberate mind, truly we deſerve to loſe, what it is impoſſible we ſhould long retain, the name of a nation.

In matters of State, a conſtitutional competence to act, is in many caſes the ſmalleſt part of the queſtion. Without diſputing (God forbid I ſhould diſpute) the ſole competence of the King and the Parliament, each in it's province, to decide on war and peace, I venture to ſay, no war *can* be long carried on againſt the will of the people. This war, in particular, cannot be carried on unleſs they are enthuſiaſtically in favour of it. Acquieſcence will not do. There muſt be zeal. Univerſal zeal in ſuch a cauſe, and at ſuch a time as this is, cannot be looked for; neither is it neceſſary. A zeal in the larger part carries the force of the whole. Without this, no Government, certainly not our Government, is capable of a great war. None of the ancient regular Governments have wherewithal

to fight abroad with a foreign foe, and at home to overcome repining, reluctance, and chicane. It muſt be ſome portentous thing, like Regicide France, that can exhibit ſuch a prodigy. Yet even ſhe, the mother of monſters, more prolifick than the country of old called *Ferax monſtrorum*, ſhews ſymptoms of being almoſt effete already; and ſhe will be ſo, unleſs the fallow of a peace comes to recruit her fertility. But whatever may be repreſented concerning the meanneſs of the popular ſpirit, I, for one, do not think ſo deſperately of the Britiſh nation. Our minds, as I ſaid, are light, but they are not depraved. We are dreadfully open to deluſion and to dejection; but we are capable of being animated and undeceived.

It cannot be concealed. We are a divided people. But in diviſions, where a part is to be taken, we are to make a muſter of our ſtrength. I have often endeavoured to compute and to claſs thoſe who, in any political view, are to be called the people. Without doing ſomething of this ſort we muſt proceed abſurdly. We ſhould not be much wiſer, if we pretended to very great accuracy in our eſtimate: But I think, in the calculation I have made, the error cannot be very material. In England and Scotland, I compute that thoſe of adult age, not declining in life, of tolerable leiſure for ſuch diſcuſſions, and of ſome means of infor-

mation,

mation, more or lefs, and who are above menial dependence, (or what virtually is fuch) may amount to about four hundred thoufand. There is fuch a thing as a natural reprefentative of the people. This body is that reprefentative; and on this body, more than on the legal conftituent, the artificial reprefentative depends. This is the Britifh publick; and it is a publick very numerous. The reft, when feeble, are the objects of protection; when ftrong, the means of force. They who affect to confider that part of us in any other light, infult while they cajole us; they do not want us for counfellors in deliberation, but to lift us as foldiers for battle.

Of thefe four hundred thoufand political citizens, I look upon one fifth, or about eighty thoufand, to be pure Jacobins; utterly incapable of amendment; objects of eternal vigilance; and when they break out, of legal conftraint. On thefe, no reafon, no argument, no example, no venerable authority, can have the flighteft influence. They defire a change; and they will have it if they can. If they cannot have it by Englifh cabal, they will make no fort of fcruple of having it by the cabal of France, into which already they are virtually incorporated. It is only their affured and confident expectation of the advantages of French fraternity and the approaching bleffings of

Regicide intercourfe, that fkins over their mifchievous difpofitions with a momentary quiet.

This minority is great and formidable. I do not know whether if I aimed at the total overthrow of a kingdom, I fhould wifh to be encumbered with a larger body of partizans. They are more eafily difciplined and directed than if the number were greater. Thefe, by their fpirit of intrigue, and by their reftlefs agitating activity, are of a force far fuperior to their numbers; and if times grew the leaft critical, have the means of debauching or intimidating many of thofe who are now found, as well as of adding to their force large bodies of the more paffive part of the nation. This minority is numerous enough to make a mighty cry for peace, or for war, or for any object they are led vehemently to defire. By paffing from place to place with a velocity incredible, and diverfifying their character and defcription, they are capable of mimicking the general voice. We muft not always judge of the generality of the opinion by the noife of the acclamation.

The majority, the other four fifths, is perfectly found; and of the beft poffible difpofition to religion, to government, to the true and undivided intereft of their country. Such men are naturally difpofed to peace. They who are in poffeffion

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of all they wiſh are languid and improvident. With this fault, (and I admit it's exiſtence in all it's extent) they would not endure to hear of a peace that led to the ruin of every thing for which peace is dear to them. However, the deſire of peace is eſſentially the weak ſide of that kind of men. All men that are ruined, are ruined on the ſide of their natural propenſities. There they are unguarded. Above all, good men do not ſuſpect that their deſtruction is attempted through their virtues. This their enemies are perfectly aware of: And accordingly, they, the moſt turbulent of mankind, who never made a ſcruple to ſhake the tranquillity of their country to it's center, raiſe a continual cry for peace with France. Peace with Regicide, and war with the reſt of the world, is their motto. From the beginning, and even whilſt the French gave the blows, and we hardly oppoſed the *vis inertiæ* to their efforts, from that day to this hour, like importunate Guinea-fowls crying one note day and night, they have called for peace.

In this they are, as I confeſs in all things they are, perfectly conſiſtent. They who wiſh to unite themſelves to your enemies, naturally deſire, that you ſhould diſarm yourſelf by a peace with theſe enemies. But it paſſes my conception, how they, who wiſh well to their country on it's antient ſyſtem

tem of laws and manners, come not to be doubly alarmed, when they find nothing but a clamor for peace, in the mouths of the men on earth the leaſt diſpoſed to it in their natural or in their habitual character.

I have a good opinion of the general abilities of the Jacobins : not that I ſuppoſe them better born than others ; but ſtrong paſſions awaken the faculties. They ſuffer not a particle of the man to be loſt. The ſpirit of enterpriſe gives to this deſcription the full uſe of all their native energies. If I have reaſon to conceive that my enemy, who, as ſuch, muſt have an intereſt in my deſtruction, is alſo a perſon of diſcernment and ſagacity, then I muſt be quite ſure, that in a conteſt, the object he violently purſues, is the very thing by which my ruin is likely to be the moſt perfectly accompliſhed. Why do the Jacobins cry for peace ? Becauſe they know, that this point gained, the reſt will follow of courſe. On our part, why are all the rules of prudence, as ſure as the laws of material nature, to be at this time reverſed ? How comes it, that now for the firſt time, men think it right to be governed by the counſels of their enemies ? Ought they not rather to tremble, when they are perſuaded to travel on the ſame road ; and to tend to the ſame place of reſt ?

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The minority I ſpeak of, is not ſuſceptible of an impreſſion from the topics of argument, to be uſed to the larger part of the community. I therefore do not addreſs to them any part of what I have to ſay. The more forcibly I drive my arguments againſt their ſyſtem, ſo as to make an impreſſion where I wiſh to make it, the more ſtrongly I rivet them in their ſentiments. As for us, who compoſe the far larger, and what I call the far better part of the people; let me ſay, that we have not been quite fairly dealt with when called to this deliberation. The Jacobin minority have been abundantly ſupplied with ſtores and proviſions of all kinds towards their warfare. No ſort of argumentative materials, ſuited to their purpoſes, have been withheld. Falſe they are, unſound, ſophiſtical; but they are regular in their direction. They all bear one way; and they all go to the ſupport of the ſubſtantial merits of their cauſe. The others have not had the queſtion ſo much as fairly ſtated to them.

There has not been in this century, any foreign peace or war, in it's origin, the fruit of popular deſire; except the war that was made with Spain in 1739. Sir Robert Walpole was forced into the war by the people, who were inflamed to this meaſure by the moſt leading politicians, by the firſt orators, and the greateſt poets of the

the time. For that war, Pope ſung his dying notes. For that war, Johnſon, in more energetic ſtrains, employed the voice of his early genius. For that war, Glover diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the way in which his muſe was the moſt natural and happy. The crowd readily followed the politicians in the cry for a war, which threatened little bloodſhed, and which promiſed victories that were attended with ſomething more ſolid than glory. A war with Spain was a war of plunder. In the preſent conflict with Regicide, Mr. Pitt has not hitherto had, nor will perhaps for a few days have, many prizes to hold out in the lottery of war, to tempt the lower part of our character. He can only maintain it by an appeal to the higher; and to thoſe, in whom that higher part is the moſt predominant, he muſt look the moſt for his ſupport. Whilſt he holds out no inducements to the wiſe, nor bribes to the avaricious, he may be forced by a vulgar cry into a peace ten times more ruinous than the moſt diſaſtrous war. The weaker he is in the fund of motives which apply to our avarice, to our lazineſs, and to our laſſitude, if he means to carry the war to any end at all, the ſtronger he ought to be in his addreſſes to our magnanimity and to our reaſon.

In ſtating that Walpole was driven by a popular clamour into a meaſure not to be juſtified, I do not

not mean wholly to excuſe his conduct. My time of obſervation did not exactly coincide with that event; but I read much of the controverſies then carried on. Several years after the conteſts of parties had ceaſed, the people were amuſed, and in a degree warmed with them. The events of that æra ſeemed then of magnitude, which the revolutions of our time have reduced to parochial importance; and the debates, which then ſhook the nation, now appear of no higher moment than a diſcuſſion in a veſtry. When I was very young, a general faſhion told me I was to admire ſome of the writings againſt that Miniſter; a little more maturity taught me as much to deſpiſe them. I obſerved one fault in his general proceeding. He never manfully put forward the entire ſtrength of his cauſe. He temporiſed; he managed; and adopting very nearly the ſentiments of his adverſaries, he oppoſed their inferences. This, for a political commander, is the choice of a weak poſt. His adverſaries had the better of the argument, as he handled it, not as the reaſon and juſtice of his cauſe enabled him to manage it. I ſay this, after having ſeen, and with ſome care examined, the original documents concerning certain important tranſactions of thoſe times. They perfectly ſatisfied me of the extreme injuſtice of that war, and of the falſehood of the colours, which to his own ruin, and guided by a miſtaken policy, he ſuf-

fered to be daubed over that meaſure. Some years after, it was my fortune to converſe with many of the principal actors againſt that Miniſter, and with thoſe, who principally excited that clamour. None of them, no not one, did in the leaſt defend the meaſure, or attempt to juſtify their conduct. They condemned it as freely as they would have done in commenting upon any proceeding in hiſtory, in which they were totally unconcerned. Thus it will be. They who ſtir up the people to improper deſires, whether of peace or war, will be condemned by themſelves. They who weakly yield to them will be condemned by hiſtory.

In my opinion, the preſent Miniſtry are as far from doing full juſtice to their cauſe in this war, as Walpole was from doing juſtice to the peace which at that time he was willing to preſerve. They throw the light on one ſide only of their caſe; though it is impoſſible they ſhould not obſerve, that the other ſide which is kept in the ſhade, has it's importance too. They muſt know, that France is formidable, not only as ſhe is France, but as ſhe is Jacobin France. They knew from the beginning that the Jacobin party was not confined to that country. They knew, they felt, the ſtrong diſpoſition of the ſame faction in both countries to communicate and to co-operate. For ſome time paſt, theſe two points

have

have been kept, and even induſtriouſly kept, out of ſight. France is conſidered as merely a foreign Power; and the ſeditious Engliſh only as a domeſtick faction. The merits of the war with the former have been argued ſolely on political grounds. To prevent the miſchievous doctrines of the latter, from corrupting our minds, matter and argument have been ſupplied abundantly, and even to ſurfeit, on the excellency of our own government. But nothing has been done to make us feel in what manner the ſafety of that Government is connected with the principle and with the iſſue of this war. For any thing, which in the late diſcuſſion has appeared, the war is entirely collateral to the ſtate of Jacobiniſm; as truly a foreign war to us and to all our home concerns, as the war with Spain in 1739, about *Garda-Coſtas*, the Madrid Convention, and the fable of Captain *Jenkins's* ears.

Whenever the adverſe party has raiſed a cry for peace with the Regicide, the anſwer has been little more than this, "that the Adminiſtration wiſhed for "ſuch a peace, full as much as the Oppoſition; but "that the time was not convenient for making it." Whatever elſe has been ſaid was much in the ſame ſpirit. Reaſons of this kind never touched the ſubſtantial merits of the war. They were in the nature of dilatory pleas, exceptions of form, pre-

vious queſtions. Accordingly all the arguments againſt a compliance with what was repreſented as the popular deſire, (urged on with all poſſible vehemence and earneſtneſs by the Jacobins) have appeared flat and languid, feeble and evaſive. They appeared to aim only at gaining time. They never entered into the peculiar and diſtinctive character of the war. They ſpoke neither to the underſtanding nor to the heart. Cold as ice themſelves, they never could kindle in our breaſts a ſpark of that zeal, which is neceſſary to a conflict with an adverſe zeal; much leſs were they made to infuſe into our minds, that ſtubborn perſevering ſpirit, which alone is capable of bearing up againſt thoſe viciſſitudes of fortune, which will probably occur, and thoſe burthens which muſt be inevitably borne in a long war. I ſpeak it emphatically, and with a deſire that it ſhould be marked, in a *long* war; becauſe, without ſuch a war, no experience has yet told us, that a dangerous power has ever been reduced to meaſure or to reaſon. I do not throw back my view to the Peloponneſian war of twenty-ſeven years; nor to two of the Punick wars, the firſt of twenty-four, the ſecond of eighteen; nor to the more recent war concluded by the treaty of Weſtphalia, which continued, I think, for thirty. I go to what is but juſt fallen behind living memory, and immediately touches our own country. Let the portion of our hiſtory

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from the year 1689 to 1713 be brought before us. We ſhall find, that in all that period of twenty-four years, there were hardly five that could be called a ſeaſon of peace; and the interval between the two wars was in reality, nothing more than a very active preparation for renovated hoſtility. During that period, every one of the propoſitions of peace came from the enemy: The firſt, when they were accepted, at the peace of Ryſwick; The ſecond, where they were rejected at the congreſs at Gertruydenburgh; The laſt, when the war ended by the treaty of Utrecht. Even then, a very great part of the nation, and that which contained by far the moſt intelligent ſtateſmen, was againſt the concluſion of the war. I do not enter into the merits of that queſtion as between the parties. I only ſtate the exiſtence of that opinion as a fact, from whence you may draw ſuch an inference as you think properly ariſes from it.

It is for us at preſent to recollect what we have been; and to conſider what, if we pleaſe, we may be ſtill. At the period of thoſe wars, our principal ſtrength was found in the reſolution of the people; that in the reſolution of a part only and of the then whole, which bore no proportion to our exiſting magnitude. England and Scotland were not united at the beginning of that mighty ſtruggle. When, in the courſe of the conteſt,

they

they were conjoined, it was in a raw, an ill-cemented, an unproductive union. For the whole duration of the war, and long after, the names, and other outward and visible signs of approximation, rather augmented than diminished our insular feuds. They were rather the causes of new discontents and new troubles, than promoters of cordiality and affection. The now single and potent Great Britain was then not only two countries, but, from the party heats in both, and the divisions formed in each of them, each of the old kingdoms within itself in effect was made up of two hostile nations. Ireland, now so large a source of the common opulence and power, which wisely managed might be made much more beneficial and much more effective, was then the heaviest of the burthens. An army not much less than forty thousand men, was drawn from the general effort, to keep that kingdom in a poor, unfruitful, and resourceless subjection.

Such was the state of the empire. The state of our finances was worse, if possible. Every branch of the revenue became less productive after the Revolution. Silver, not as now a sort of counter, but the body of the current coin, was reduced so low, as not to have above three parts in four of the value in the shilling. It required a dead expence of three millions sterling to renew the coin-

age.

age. Publick credit, that great but ambiguous principle, which has fo often been predicted as the caufe of our certain ruin, but which for a century has been the conftant companion, and often the means, of our profperity and greatnefs, had it's origin, and was cradled, I may fay, in bankruptcy and beggary. At this day we have feen parties contending to be admitted, at a moderate premium, to advance eighteen millions to the Exchequer. For infinitely fmaller loans, the Chancellor of the Exchequer of that day, Montagu, the father of publick credit, counter-fecuring the State by the appearance of the city, with the Lord-Mayor of London at his fide, was obliged, like an agent at an election, to go cap in hand from fhop to fhop, to borrow an hundred pound and even fmaller fums. When made up in driblets as they could, their beft fecurities were at an intereft of 12 per cent. Even the paper of the Bank (now at par with cafh, and even fometimes preferred to it) was often at a difcount of twenty per cent. By this the ftate of the reft may be judged.

As to our commerce, the imports and exports of the nation, now fix and forty million, did not then amount to ten. The inland trade, which is commonly paffed by in this fort of eftimates, but which, in part growing out of the foreign, and connected with it, is more advantageous, and more fubftan-

tially

tially nutritive to the State, is not only grown in a proportion of near five to one as the foreign, but has been augmented, at leaſt, in a tenfold proportion. When I came to England, I remember but one river navigation, the rate of carriage on which was limited by an Act of Parliament. It was made in the reign of William the Third; I mean that of the Aire and Calder. The rate was ſettled at thirteen pence. So high a price demonſtrated the feebleneſs of theſe beginnings of our inland intercouſe. In my time, one of the longeſt and ſharpeſt conteſts I remember in your Houſe, and which rather reſembled a violent contention amongſt national parties than a local diſpute, was, as well as I can recollect, to hold the price up to threepence. Even this, which a very ſcanty juſtice to the proprietors required, was done with infinite difficulty. As to private credit, there were not, as I beſt remember, twelve Bankers ſhops at that time out of London. In this their number, when I firſt ſaw the country, I cannot be quite exact; but certainly thoſe machines of domeſtick credit were then very few indeed. They are now in almoſt every market town: and this circumſtance (whether the thing be carried to an exceſs or not) demonſtrates the aſtoniſhing encreaſe of private confidence, of general circulation, and of internal commerce; an encreaſe out of all proportion to the growth of the foreign trade.

Our

Our naval ſtrength in the time of King William's war was nearly matched by that of France; and though conjoined with Holland, then a maritime Power hardly inferior to our own, even with that force we were not always victorious. Though finally ſuperior, the allied fleets experienced many unpleaſant reverſes on their own element. In two years three thouſand veſſels were taken from the Engliſh trade. On the continent we loſt almoſt every battle we fought.

In 1697, it is not quite an hundred years ago, in that ſtate of things, amidſt the general debaſement of the coin, the fall of the ordinary revevenue, the failure of all the extraordinary ſupplies, the ruin of commerce and the almoſt total extinction of an infant credit, the Chancellor of the Exchequer himſelf whom we have juſt ſeen begging from door to door—came forward to move a reſolution, full of vigour, in which far from being diſcouraged by the generally adverſe fortune, and the long continuance of the war, the Commons agreed to addreſs the Crown in the following manly, ſpirited, and truly animating ſtyle.

"This is the EIGHTH year in which your Ma-
"jeſty's moſt dutiful and loyal ſubjects the Com-
"mons in Parliament aſſembled, have aſſiſted your
"Majeſty with large ſupplies for carrying on a juſt

"and neceſſary war, in defence of our religion, and "preſervation of our laws, and vindication of the "rights and liberties of the people of England.

Afterwards they proceed in this manner:— "To ſhew to your Majeſty and all Chriſtendom, "that the Commons of England will not be "*amuſed* or diverted from their firm reſolutions of "obtaining by War, a ſafe and honourable peace, "we do in the name of thoſe we repreſent, renew "our aſſurances to ſupport your Majeſty and your "Government againſt all your enemies at home "and abroad; and that we will effectually aſſiſt "you in carrying on the war againſt France."

The amuſement and diverſion they ſpeak of, was the ſuggeſtion of a treaty *propoſed by the enemy*, and announced from the Throne. Thus the people of England felt in the *eighth*, not in the *fourth* year of the war. No ſighing or panting after negociation; no motions from the Oppoſition to force the Miniſtry into a peace; no meſſages from Miniſters to palſy and deaden the reſolution of Parliament or the ſpirit of the nation. They did not ſo much as adviſe the King to liſten to the propoſitions of the enemy, nor to ſeek for peace but through the mediation of a vigorous war. This addreſs was moved in an hot, a divided, a factious, and in a great part, diſaffected Houſe of Commons, and it was carried *nemine contradicente*.

While

While that firſt war (which was ill ſmothered by the treaty of Ryſwick) ſlept in the thin aſhes of a ſeeming peace, a new conflagration was in it's immediate cauſes. A freſh and a far greater war was in preparation. A year had hardly elapſed when arrangements were made for renewing the conteſt with tenfold fury. The ſteps which were taken, at that time, to compoſe, to reconcile, to unite, and to diſcipline all Europe againſt the growth of France, certainly furniſh to a ſtateſman the fineſt and moſt intereſting part in the hiſtory of that great period. It formed the maſter-piece of King William's policy, dexterity, and perſeverance. Full of the idea of preſerving, not only a local civil liberty united with order, to our country, but to embody it in the political liberty, the order, and the independence of nations united under a natural head, the King called upon his Parliament to put itſelf into a poſture "*to preſerve to England the* "*weight and influence it at preſent had on the coun-* "*cils and affairs* ABROAD. It will be requiſite *Eu-* "*rope* ſhould ſee you will not be wanting to your- "ſelves."

Baffled as that Monarch was, and almoſt heart-broken at the diſappointment he met with in the mode he firſt propoſed for that great end, he held on his courſe. He was faithful to his object; and in councils, as in arms, over and over again

 repulſed,

repulſed, over and over again he returned to the charge. All the mortifications he had ſuffered from the laſt Parliament, and the greater he had to apprehend from that newly choſen, were not capable of relaxing the vigour of his mind. He was in Holland when he combined the vaſt plan of his foreign negociations. When he came to open his deſign to his Miniſters in England, even the ſober firmneſs of Somers, the undaunted reſolution of Shrewſbury, and the adventurous ſpirit of Montagu and Orford, were ſtaggered. They were not yet mounted to the elevation of the King. The Cabinet met on the ſubject at Tunbridge Wells the 28th of Auguſt, 1698; and there, Lord Somers holding the pen, after expreſſing doubts on the ſtate of the continent, which they ultimately refer to the King, as beſt informed, they give him a moſt diſcouraging portrait of the ſpirit of this nation. "So far as relates to "England," ſay theſe Miniſters, "it would be "want of duty not to give your Majeſty this clear "account, that *there* is a *deadneſs and want of ſpi-* "*rit in the nation univerſally*, ſo as not to be at "all diſpoſed to *entering into a new war*. That "they ſeem to be *tired out with taxes* to a degree "beyond what was diſcerned, till it appeared upon "occaſion of the *late elections*. This is the truth "of the fact upon which your Majeſty will deter- "mine what reſolution ought to be taken."

His

His Majesty did determine; and did take and pursue his resolution. In all the tottering imbecility of a new Government, and with Parliament totally unmanageable, he persevered. He persevered to expel the fears of his people, by his fortitude—To steady their fickleness, by his constancy—To expand their narrow prudence, by his enlarged wisdom—To sink their factious temper in his public spirit.—In spite of his people he resolved to make them great and glorious; to make England, inclined to shrink into her narrow self, the Arbitress of Europe, the tutelary Angel of the human race. In spite of the Ministers, who staggered under the weight that his mind imposed upon theirs, unsupported as they felt themselves by the popular spirit, he infused into them his own soul; he renewed in them their ancient heart; he rallied them in the same cause.

It required some time to accomplish this work. The people were first gained, and through them their distracted representatives. Under the influence of King William Holland had resisted the allurements of every seduction, and had resisted the terrors of every menace. With Hannibal at her gates, she had nobly and magnanimously refused all separate treaty, or any thing which might for a moment appear to divide her affection or her interest, or even to distinguish her in identity from England.

Having

Having settled the great point of the consolidation (which he hoped would be eternal) of the countries made for a common interest, and common sentiment, the King, in his message to both Houses, calls their attention to the affairs of the *States General*. The House of Lords was perfectly sound, and entirely impressed with the wisdom and dignity of the King's proceedings. In answer to the message, which you will observe was narrowed to a single point, (the danger of the States General) after the usual professions of zeal for his service, the Lords opened themselves at large. They go far beyond the demands of the message. They express themselves as follows: "We take this occasion *further* to assure your "Majesty, that we are sensible of the *great and* "*imminent danger to which the States General are* "*exposed. And we perfectly agree with them in be-* "*lieving that their safety and ours are so inseparably* "*united, that whatsoever is ruin to the one must be* "*fatal to the other.*

"We humbly desire your Majesty will be pleas- "ed, *not only* to make good all the articles of any "*former* treaties to the Sates General, but that you "will enter into a strict league, offensive and de- "fensive, with them, *for their common preservation:* "*and that you will invite into it all Princes, and*

"*States*

"*States who are concerned in the present visible dan-*
"*ger, arising from the union of France and Spain.*

"And we further desire your Majesty, that you "will be pleased to enter into such alliances with "the *Emperor*, as your Majesty shall think fit, "pursuant to the ends of the treaty of 1689; to-"wards all which we assure your Majesty of our "hearty and sincere assistance; not doubting, but "whenever your Majesty shall be obliged to be "engaged for the defence of your allies, *and se-*"*curing the liberty and quiet of Europe*, Almighty "God will protect your sacred person in so righte-"ous a cause. And that the unanimity, wealth, "and courage of your subjects will carry your Ma-"jesty with honour and success *through all the* "*difficulties of a* JUST WAR."

The House of Commons was more reserved; the late popular disposition was still in a great degree prevalent in the representative, after it had been made to change in the constituent body. The principle of the Grand Alliance was not directly recognized in the resolution of the Commons, nor the war announced, though they were well aware the alliance was formed for the war. However, compelled by the returning sense of the people, they went so far as to fix the three great immoveable pillars of the safety and greatness of England,

as they were then, as they are now, and as they muſt ever be to the end of time. They aſſerted in general terms the neceſſity of ſupporting Holland; of keeping united with our allies; and maintaining the liberty of Europe; though they reſtricted their vote to the ſuccours ſtipulated by actual treaty. But now they were fairly embarked; they were obliged to go with the courſe of the veſſel; and the whole nation, ſplit before into an hundred adverſe factions, with a King at it's head evidently declining to his tomb, the whole nation, Lords, Commons, and People, proceeded as one body, informed by one ſoul. Under the Britiſh union, the union of Europe was conſolidated; and it long held together with a degree of coheſion, firmneſs, and fidelity not known before or ſince in any political combination of that extent.

Juſt as the laſt hand was given to this immenſe and complicated machine, the maſter workman died: But the work was formed on true mechanical principles; and it was as truly wrought. It went by the impulſe it had received from the firſt mover. The man was dead: But the grand alliance ſurvived, in which King William lived and reigned. That heartleſs and diſpirited people, whom Lord Somers had repreſented, about two years before, as dead in energy and operation, continued that war to which it was ſuppoſed they

were

were unequal in mind, and in means, for near thirteen years.

For what have I entered into all this detail? To what purpofe have I recalled your view to the end of the laft century? It has been done to fhew that the Britifh Nation was then a great people—to point out how and by what means they came to be exalted above the vulgar level, and to take that lead which they affumed among mankind. To qualify us for that pre-eminence, we had then an high mind, and a conftancy unconquerable; we were then infpired with no flafhy paffions; but fuch as were durable as well as warm; fuch as correfponded to the great interefts we had at ftake. This force of character was infpired, as all fuch fpirit muft ever be, from above. Government gave the impulfe. As well may we fancy, that, of itfelf the fea will fwell, and that without winds the billows will infult the adverfe fhore, as that the grofs mafs of the people will be moved, and elevated, and continue by a fteady and permanent direction to bear upon one point, without the influence of fuperior authority, or fuperior mind.

This impulfe ought, in my opinion, to have been given in this war; and it ought to have been continued to it at every inftant. It is made, if ever war was made, to touch all the great fprings of

 action

action in the human breaſt. It ought not to have been a war of apology. The Miniſter had, in this conflict, wherewithal to glory in ſucceſs; to be conſoled in adverſity; to hold high his principle in all fortunes. If it were not given him to ſupport the falling edifice, he ought to bury himſelf under the ruins of the civilized world. All the art of Greece, and all the pride and power of eaſtern Monarchs, never heaped upon their aſhes ſo grand a monument.

There were days when his great mind was up to the criſis of the world he is called to act in*. His manly eloquence was equal to the elevated wiſdom of ſuch ſentiments. But the little have triumphed over the great; an unnatural, (as it ſhould ſeem) not an unuſual victory. I am ſure you cannot forget with how much uneaſineſs we heard in converſation, the language of more than one gentleman at the opening of this conteſt, "that he was willing to "try the war for a year or two, and if it did not "ſucceed, then to vote for peace." As if war was a matter of experiment! As if you could take it up or lay it down as an idle frolick! As if the dire goddeſs that preſides over it, with her murderous ſpear in her hand, and her gorgon at her breaſt, was a coquette to be flirted with! We ought with reverence to approach that tremendous

* See the Declaration.

divinity,

divinity, that loves courage, but commands counſel. War never leaves, where it found a nation. It is never to be entered into without a mature deliberation; not a deliberation lengthened out into a perplexing indeciſion, but a deliberation leading to a ſure and fixed judgment. When ſo taken up it is not to be abandoned without reaſon as valid, as fully, and as extenſively conſidered. Peace may be made as unadviſedly as war. Nothing is ſo raſh as fear; and the counſels of puſillanimity very rarely put off, whilſt they are always ſure to aggravate, the evils from which they would fly.

In that great war carried on againſt Louis the XIVth, for near eighteen years, Government ſpared no pains to ſatisfy the nation, that though they were to be animated by a deſire of glory, glory was not their ultimate object: but that every thing dear to them, in religion, in law, in liberty, every thing which as freemen, as Engliſhmen, and as citizens of the great commonwealth of Chriſtendom, they had at heart, was then at ſtake. This was to know the true art of gaining the affections and confidence of an high-minded people; this was to underſtand human nature. A danger to avert a danger---a preſent inconvenience and ſuffering to prevent a foreſeen future, and a worſe calamity---theſe are the motives that belong to

an animal, who, in his conſtitution, is at once adventurous and provident; circumſpect and daring; whom his Creator has made, as the Poet ſays, "of "large diſcourſe, looking before and after." But never can a vehement and ſuſtained ſpirit of fortitude be kindled in a people by a war of calculation. It has nothing that can keep the mind erect under the guſts of adverſity. Even where men are willing, as ſometimes they are, to barter their blood for lucre, to hazard their ſafety for the gratification of their avarice, the paſſion, which animates them to that ſort of conflict, like all the ſhort-ſighted paſſions, muſt ſee it's objects diſtinct and near at hand. The paſſions of the lower order are hungry and impatient. Speculative plunder; contingent ſpoil; future, long adjourned, uncertain booty; pillage which muſt enrich a late poſterity, and which poſſibly may not reach to poſterity at all; theſe, for any length of time, will never ſupport a mercenary war. The people are in the right. The calculation of profit in all ſuch wars is falſe. On balancing the account of ſuch wars, ten thouſand hogſheads of ſugar are purchaſed at ten thouſand times their price. The blood of man ſhould never be ſhed but to redeem the blood of man. It is well ſhed for our family, for our friends, for our God, for our country, for our kind. The reſt is vanity; the reſt is crime.

In

In the war of the Grand Alliance, moſt of theſe conſiderations voluntarily and naturally had their part. Some were preſſed into the ſervice. The political intereſt eaſily went in the track of the natural ſentiment. In the reverſe courſe the carriage does not follow freely. I am ſure the natural feeling, as I have juſt ſaid, is a far more predominant ingredient in this war, than in that of any other that ever was waged by this kingdom.

If the war made to prevent the union of two crowns upon one head was a juſt war, this, which is made to prevent the tearing all crowns from all heads which ought to wear them, and with the crowns to ſmite off the ſacred heads themſelves, this is a juſt war.

If a war to prevent Louis the XIVth from impoſing his religion was juſt, a war to prevent the murderers of Louis the XVIth from impoſing their irreligion upon us is juſt; a war to prevent the operation of a ſyſtem, which makes life without dignity, and death without hope, is a juſt war.

If to preſerve political independence and civil freedom to nations, was a juſt ground of war; a war to preſerve national independence, property, liberty, life, and honour, from certain univerſal havock, is a war juſt, neceſſary, manly, pious; and

and we are bound to perſevere in it by every principle, divine and human, as long as the ſyſtem which menaces them all, and all equally, has an exiſtence in the world.

You, who have looked at this matter with as fair and impartial an eye as can be united with a feeling heart, you will not think it an hardy aſſertion, when I affirm, that it were far better to be conquered by any other nation, than to have this faction for a neighbour. Before I felt myſelf authoriſed to ſay this, I conſidered the ſtate of all the countries in Europe for theſe laſt three hundred years, which have been obliged to ſubmit to a foreign law. In moſt of thoſe I found the condition of the annexed countries even better, certainly not worſe, than the lot of thoſe which were the patrimony of the conquerour. They wanted ſome bleſſings—but they were free* from many very great evils. They were rich and tranquil. Such was Artois, Flanders, Lorrain, Alſatia, under the old Government of France. Such was Sileſia under the King of Pruſſia. They who are to live in the vicinity of this new fabrick, are to prepare to live in perpetual conſpiracies and ſeditions; and to end at laſt, in being conquered, if not to her dominion, to her reſemblance. But when we talk of conqueſt by other nations, it is only to put a caſe. This is the only power in Europe by which

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it is *possible* we should be conquered. To live under the continual dread of such immeasurable evils is itself a grievous calamity. To live without the dread of them is to turn the danger into the disaster. The influence of such a France is equal to a war; it's example, more wasting than an hostile irruption. The hostility with any other power is separable and accidental; this power, by the very condition of it's existence, by it's very essential constitution, is in a state of hostility with us, and with all civilized people.*

A Government of the nature of that set up at our very door has never been hitherto seen, or even imagined, in Europe. What our relation to it will be cannot be judged by other relations. It is a serious thing to have a connexion with a people, who live only under positive, arbitrary, and changeable institutions; and those not perfected nor supplied, nor explained, by any common acknowledged rule of moral science. I remember that in one of my last conversations with the late Lord Camden, we were struck much in the same manner with the abolition in France of the law, as a science of methodized and artificial equity. France, since her Revolution, is under the sway of a sect, whose leaders have deliberately, at one stroke, demolished the whole body of that jurisprudence which France had pretty nearly in common with

* See declaration, Whitehall, October 29, 1793.

other

other civilized countries. In that juriſprudence were contained the elements and principles of the law of nations, the great ligament of mankind. With the law they have of courſe deſtroyed all ſeminaries in which juriſprudence was taught, as well as all the corporations eſtabliſhed for it's conſervation. I have not heard of any country, whether in Europe or Aſia, or even in Africa on this ſide of Mount Atlas, which is wholly without ſome ſuch colleges and ſuch corporations, except France. No man, in a publick or private concern, can divine by what rule or principle her judgments are to be directed; nor is there to be found a profeſſor in any Univerſity, or a practitioner in any Court, who will hazard an opinion of what is or is not law in France, in any caſe whatever. They have not only annulled all their old treaties; but they have renounced the law of nations from whence treaties have their force. With a fixed deſign they have outlawed themſelves, and to their power outlawed all other nations.

Inſtead of the religion and the law by which they were in a great politick communion with the Chriſtian world, they have conſtructed their Republick on three baſes, all fundamentally oppoſite to thoſe on which the communities of Europe are built. It's foundation is laid in Regicide; in Jacobiniſm; and in Atheiſm; and it has joined to thoſe

thoſe principles, a body of ſyſtematick manners which ſecures their operation.

If I am aſked how I would be underſtood in the uſe of theſe terms, Regicide, Jacobiniſm, Atheiſm, and a ſyſtem of correſpondent manners and their eſtabliſhment, I will tell you.

I call a commonwealth *Regicide*, which lays it down as a fixed law of nature, and a fundamental right of man, that all government, not being a democracy, is an uſurpation*. That all Kings, as ſuch, are uſurpers; and for being Kings, may and ought to be put to death, with their wives, families, and adherents. The commonwealth which acts uniformly upon thoſe principles; and which after aboliſhing every feſtival of religion, chooſes the moſt flagrant act of a murderous Regicide treaſon for a feaſt of eternal commemoration, and which forces all her people to obſerve it---This I call *Regicide by eſtabliſhment.*

* Nothing could be more ſolemn than their promulgation of this principle as a preamble to the deſtructive code of their famous articles for the decompoſition of ſociety into whatever country they ſhould enter. "La Convention Nationale, aprés avoir entendu le rapport de ſes Comittés de Finances, de la guerre, & diplomatiques réunis, fidelle *au principe de ſouveraintè de peuples qui ne lui permet pas de reconnoitre aucune inſtitution qui y porte atteinte,*" &c. &c. Decret ſur le Rapport de Cambon. Dec. 18, 1792, and ſee the ſubſequent proclamation.

Jacobinifm is the revolt of the enterprifing talents of a country againft it's property. When private men form themfelves into affociations for the purpofe of deftroying the pre-exifting laws and inftitutions of their country; when they fecure to themfelves an army by dividing amongft the people of no property, the eftates of the ancient and lawful proprietors; when a ftate recognizes thofe acts; when it does not make confifcations for crimes, but makes crimes for confifcations; when it has it's principal ftrength, and all it's refources in fuch a violation of property; when it ftands chiefly upon fuch a violation; maffacring by judgments, or otherwife, thofe who make any ftruggle for their old legal government, and their legal, hereditary, or acquired poffeffions—I call this *Jacobinifm by Eftablifhment*.

I call it *Atheifm by Eftablifhment*, when any State, as fuch, fhall not acknowledge the exiftence of God as a moral Governor of the World; when it fhall offer to Him no religious or moral worfhip;—when it fhall abolifh the Chriftian religion by a regular decree;—when it fhall perfecute with a cold, unrelenting, fteady cruelty, by every mode of confifcation, imprifonment, exile, and death, all it's minifters;—when it fhall generally fhut up, or pull down, churches; when the few buildings which remain of this kind fhall be opened only for the purpofe

of

of making a profane apotheosis of monsters, whose vices and crimes have no parallel amongst men, and whom all other men consider as objects of general detestation, and the severest animadversion of law. When, in the place of that religion of social benevolence, and of individual self-denial, in mockery of all religion, they institute impious, blasphemous, indecent theatric rites, in honour of their vitiated, perverted reason, and erect altars to the personification of their own corrupted and bloody Republick;—when schools and seminaries are founded at publick expence to poison mankind, from generation to generation, with the horrible maxims of this impiety;—when wearied out with incessant martyrdom, and the cries of a people hungering and thirsting for religion, they permit it, only as a tolerated evil—I call this *Atheism by Establishment.*

When to these establishments of Regicide, of Jacobinism, and of Atheism, you add the *correspondent system of manners,* no doubt can be left on the mind of a thinking man, concerning their determined hostility to the human race. Manners are of more importance than laws. Upon them, in a great measure the laws depend. The law touches us but here and there, and now and then. Manners are what vex or sooth, corrupt or purify, exalt or debase, barbarize or refine us, by a constant, steady,

uniform, infenfible operation, like that of the air we breathe in. They give their whole form and colour to our lives. According to their quality, they aid morals, they fupply them, or they totally deftroy them. Of this the new French Legiflators were aware; therefore, with the fame method, and under the fame authority, they fettled a fyftem of manners, the moft licentious, proftitute, and abandoned that ever has been known, and at the fame time the moft coarfe, rude, favage, and ferocious. Nothing in the Revolution, no, not to a phrafe or a gefture, not to the fafhion of a hat or a fhoe, was left to accident. All has been the refult of defign; all has been matter of inftitution. No mechanical means could be devifed in favour of this incredible fyftem of wickednefs and vice, that has not been employed. The nobleft paffions, the love of glory, the love of country, have been debauched into means of it's prefervation and it's propagation. All forts of fhews and exhibitions calculated to inflame and vitiate the imagination, and pervert the moral fenfe, have been contrived. They have fometimes brought forth five or fix hundred drunken women, calling at the bar of the Affembly for the blood of their own children, as being royalifts or conftitutionalifts. Sometimes they have got a body of wretches, calling themfelves fathers, to demand the murder of their fons; boafting that Rome had but one Brutus, but that they could fhew five hundred.

There were inſtances, in which they inverted, and retaliated the impiety, and produced ſons, who called for the execution of their parents. The foundation of their Republick is laid in moral paradoxes. Their patriotiſm is always prodigy. All thoſe inſtances to be found in hiſtory, whether real or fabulous, of a doubtful publick ſpirit, at which morality is perplexed, reaſon is ſtaggered, and from which affrighted nature recoils, are their choſen, and almoſt ſole examples for the inſtruction of their youth.

The whole drift of their inſtitution is contrary to that of the wiſe Legiſlators of all countries, who aimed at improving inſtincts into morals, and at grafting the virtues on the ſtock of the natural affections. They, on the contrary, have omitted no pains to eradicate every benevolent and noble propenſity in the mind of men. In their culture it is a rule always to graft virtues on vices. They think every thing unworthy of the name of publick virtue, unleſs it indicates violence on the private. All their new inſtitutions, (and with them every thing is new) ſtrike at the root of our ſocial nature. Other Legiſlators, knowing that marriage is the origin of all relations, and conſequently the firſt element of all duties, have endeavoured, by every art, to make it ſacred. The Chriſtian Religion, by confining it to the pair, and by rendering that relation indiſſoluble

luble, has, by these two things, done more towards the peace, happiness, settlement, and civilization of the world, than by any other part in this whole scheme of Divine Wisdom. The direct contrary course has been taken in the Synagogue of Antichrist, I mean in that forge and manufactory of all evil, the sect which predominated in the Constituent Assembly of 1789. Those monsters employed the same, or greater industry, to desecrate and degrade that State, which other Legislators have used to render it holy and honourable. By a strange, uncalled for declaration, they pronounced, that marriage was no better than a common, civil contract. It was one of their ordinary tricks, to put their sentiments into the mouths of certain personated characters, which they theatrically exhibited at the bar of what ought to be a serious Assembly. One of these was brought out in the figure of a prostitute, whom they called by the affected name of "a mother without being a wife." This creature they made to call for a repeal of the incapacities, which in civilized States are put upon bastards. The prostitutes of the Assembly gave to this their puppet the sanction of their greater impudence. In consequence of the principles laid down, and the manners authorised, bastards were not long after put on the footing of the issue of lawful unions. Proceeding in the spirit of the first authors of their constitution, succeeding assemblies

femblies went the full length of the principle, and gave a licence to divorce at the mere pleafure of either party, and at a month's notice. With them the matrimonial connexion is brought into fo degraded a ftate of concubinage, that, I believe, none of the wretches in London, who keep warehoufes of infamy, would give out one of their victims to private cuftody on fo fhort and infolent a tenure. There was indeed a kind of profligate equity in thus giving to women the fame licentious power. The reafon they affigned was as infamous as the act; declaring that women had been too long under the tyranny of parents and of hufbands. It is not neceffary to obferve upon the horrible confequences of taking one half of the fpecies wholly out of the guardianfhip and protection of the other.

The practice of divorce, though in fome countries permitted, has been difcouraged in all. In the Eaft, polygamy and divorce are in difcredit; and the manners correct the laws. In Rome, whilft Rome was in it's integrity, the few caufes allowed for divorce amounted in effect to a prohibition. They were only three. The arbitrary was totally excluded; and accordingly fome hundreds of years paffed, without a fingle example of that kind. When manners were corrupted, the laws were relaxed; as the latter always follow the former, when they are not able to regulate them,

or

or to vanquiſh them. Of this circumſtance the Legiſlators of vice and crime were pleaſed to take notice, as an inducement to adopt their regulation; holding out an hope, that the permiſſion would as rarely be made uſe of. They knew the contrary to be true; and they had taken good care, that the laws ſhould be well ſeconded by the manners. Their law of divorce, like all their laws, had not for it's object the relief of domeſtick uneaſineſs, but the total corruption of all morals, the total diſconnection of ſocial life.

It is a matter of curioſity to obſerve the operation of this encouragement to diſorder. I have before me the Paris paper, correſpondent to the uſual regiſter of births, marriages, and deaths. Divorce, happily, is no regular head of regiſtry amongſt civilized nations. With the Jacobins it is remarkable, that divorce is not only a regular head, but it has the poſt of honour. It occupies the firſt place in the liſt. In the three firſt months of the year 1793, the number of divorces in that city amounted to 562. The marriages were 1785; ſo that the proportion of divorces to marriages was not much leſs than one to three; a thing unexampled, I believe, among mankind. I cauſed an enquiry to be made at Doctor's Commons, concerning the number of divorces; and found, that all the divorces, (which, except by ſpecial Act of Parliament, are

ſeparations,

ſeparations, and not proper divorces) did not amount in all thoſe Courts, and in an hundred years, to much more than one fifth of thoſe that paſſed, in the ſingle city of Paris, in three months. I followed up the enquiry relative to that city through ſeveral of the ſubſequent months until I was tired, and found the proportions ſtill the ſame. Since then I have heard that they have declared for a reviſal of theſe laws: but I know of nothing done. It appears as if the contract that renovates the world was under no law at all. From this we may take our eſtimate of the havock that has been made through all the relations of life. With the Jacobins of France, vague intercourſe is without reproach; marriage is reduced to the vileſt concubinage; children are encouraged to cut the throats of their parents; mothers are taught that tenderneſs is no part of their character; and to demonstrate their attachment to their party, that they ought to make no ſcruple to rake with their bloody hands in the bowels of thoſe who came from their own.

To all this let us join the practice of *cannibaliſm*, with which, in the proper terms, and with the greateſt truth, their ſeveral factions accuſe each other. By cannibaliſm, I mean their devouring, as a nutriment of their ferocity, ſome part of the bodies of thoſe they have murdered; their

drinking the blood of their victims, and forcing the victims themſelves to drink the blood of their kindred ſlaughtered before their faces. By cannibaliſm, I mean alſo to ſignify all their nameleſs, unmanly, and abominable inſults on the bodies of thoſe they ſlaughter.

As to thoſe whom they ſuffer to die a natural death, they do not permit them to enjoy the laſt conſolations of mankind, or thoſe rights of ſepulture, which indicate hope, and which meer nature has taught to mankind in all countries, to ſoothe the afflictions, and to cover the infirmity of mortal condition. They diſgrace men in the entry into life; they vitiate and enſlave them through the whole courſe of it; and they deprive them of all comfort at the concluſion of their diſhonoured and depraved exiſtence. Endeavouring to perſuade the people that they are no better than beaſts, the whole body of their inſtitution tends to make them beaſts of prey, furious and ſavage. For this purpoſe the active part of them is diſciplined into a ferocity which has no parallel. To this ferocity there is joined not one of the rude, unfaſhioned virtues, which accompany the vices, where the whole are left to grow up together in the rankneſs of uncultivated nature. But nothing is left to nature in their ſyſtems.

The ſame diſcipline which hardens their hearts relaxes their morals. Whilſt courts of juſtice were thruſt out by revolutionary tribunals, and ſilent churches were only the funeral monuments of departed religion, there were no fewer than nineteen or twenty theatres, great and ſmall, moſt of them kept open at the publick expence, and all of them crowded every night. Among the gaunt, hagard forms of famine and nakedneſs, amidſt the yells of murder, the tears of affliction, and the cries of deſpair, the ſong, the dance, the mimick ſcene, the buffoon laughter, went on as regularly as in the gay hour of feſtive peace. I have it from good authority, that under the ſcaffold of judicial murder, and the gaping planks that poured down blood on the ſpectators, the ſpace was hired out for a ſhew of dancing dogs. I think, without concert, we have made the very ſame remark on reading ſome of their pieces, which being written for other purpoſes, let us into a view of their ſocial life. It ſtruck us that the habits of Paris had no reſemblance to the finiſhed virtues, or to the poliſhed vice, and elegant, though not blameleſs luxury, of the capital of a great empire. Their ſociety was more like that of a den of outlaws upon a doubtful frontier; of a lewd tavern for the revels and debauches of banditti, aſſaſſins, bravos, ſmugglers, and their more deſperate paramours, mixed with bombaſtick players, the refuſe and rejected offal of ſtrolling theatres, puffing out ill-ſorted verſes

about virtue, mixed with the licentious and blaſphemous ſongs, proper to the brutal and hardened courſe of life belonging to that ſort of wretches. This ſyſtem of manners in itſelf is at war with all orderly and moral ſociety, and is in it's neighbourhood unſafe. If great bodies of that kind were any where eſtabliſhed in a bordering territory, we ſhould have a right to demand of their Governments the ſuppreſſion of ſuch a nuiſance. What are we to do if the Government and the whole community is of the ſame deſcription? Yet that Government has thought proper to invite ours to lay by its unjuſt hatred, and to liſten to the voice of humanity as taught by their example.

The operation of dangerous and deluſive firſt principles obliges us to have recourſe to the true ones. In the intercourſe between nations, we are apt to rely too much on the inſtrumental part. We lay too much weight upon the formality of treaties and compacts. We do not act much more wiſely when we truſt to the intereſts of men as guarantees of their engagements. The intereſts frequently tear to pieces the engagements; and the paſſions trample upon both. Entirely to truſt to either, is to diſregard our own ſafety, or not to know mankind. Men are not tied to one another by papers and ſeals. They are led to aſſociate by reſemblances, by conformities, by ſympathies. It is with nations as with individuals.

Nothing

Nothing is ſo ſtrong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correſpondence in laws, cuſtoms, manners, and habits of life. They have more than the force of treaties in themſelves. They are obligations written in the heart. They approximate men to men, without their knowledge, and ſometimes againſt their intentions. The ſecret, unſeen, but irrefragable bond of habitual intercourſe, holds them together, even when their perverſe and litigious nature ſets them to equivocate, ſcuffle, and fight about the terms of their written obligations.

As to war, if it be the means of wrong and violence, it is the ſole means of juſtice amongſt nations. Nothing can baniſh it from the world. They who ſay otherwiſe, intending to impoſe upon us, do not impoſe upon themſelves. But it is one of the greateſt objects of human wiſdom to mitigate thoſe evils which we are unable to remove. The conformity and analogy of which I ſpeak, incapable, like every thing elſe, of preſerving perfect truſt and tranquillity among men, has a ſtrong tendency to facilitate accommodation, and to produce a generous oblivion of the rancour of their quarrels. With this ſimilitude, peace is more of peace, and war is leſs of war. I will go further. There have been periods of time in which communities, apparently in peace with each other, have been more perfectly ſeparated than, in later times, many na-

tions in Europe have been in the courſe of long and bloody wars. The cauſe muſt be ſought in the ſimilitude throughout Europe of religion, laws, and manners. At bottom, theſe are all the ſame. The writers on public law have often called this *aggregate* of nations a Commonwealth. They had reaſon. It is virtually one great ſtate having the ſame baſis of general law; with ſome diverſity of provincial cuſtoms and local eſtabliſhments. The nations of Europe have had the very ſame chriſtian religion, agreeing in the fundamental parts, varying a little in the ceremonies and in the ſubordinate doctrines. The whole of the polity and œconomy of every country in Europe has been derived from the ſame ſources. It was drawn from the old Germanic or Gothic cuſtumary; from the feudal inſtitutions which muſt be conſidered as an emanation from that cuſtumary; and the whole has been improved and digeſted into ſyſtem and diſcipline by the Roman law. From hence aroſe the ſeveral orders, with or without a Monarch, (which are called States) in every European country; the ſtrong traces of which, where Monarchy predominated, were never wholly extinguiſhed or merged in deſpotiſm. In the few places where Monarchy was caſt off, the ſpirit of European Monarchy was ſtill left. Thoſe countries ſtill continued countries of States; that is, of claſſes, orders, and diſtinctions, ſuch as had before ſubſiſted, or

nearly ſo. Indeed the force and form of the inſtitution called States, continued in greater perfection in thoſe republican communities than under Monarchies. From all thoſe ſcources aroſe a ſyſtem of manners and of education which was nearly ſimilar in all this quarter of the globe; and which ſoftened, blended, and harmonized the colours of the whole. There was little difference in the form of the Univerſities for the education of their youth, whether with regard to faculties, to ſciences, or to the more liberal and elegant kinds of erudition. From this reſemblance in the modes of intercourſe, and in the whole form and faſhion of life, no citizen of Europe could be altogether an exile in any part of it. There was nothing more than a pleaſing variety to recreate and inſtruct the mind; to enrich the imagina tion; and to meliorate the heart. When a man travelled or reſided for health, pleaſure, buſineſs or neceſſity, from his own country, he never felt himſelf quite abroad.

The whole body of this new ſcheme of manners in ſupport of the new ſcheme of politicks, I conſider as a ſtrong and deciſive proof of determined ambition and ſyſtematick hoſtility. I defy the moſt refining ingenuity to invent any other cauſe for the total departure of the Jacobin Republick from every one of the ideas and uſages, religious,

legal,

legal, moral, or ſocial, of this civilized world, and for her tearing herſelf from its communion with ſuch ſtudied violence, but from a formed reſolution of keeping no terms with that world. It has not been, as has been falſely and inſidiouſly repreſented, that theſe miſcreants had only broke with their old Government. They made a ſchiſm with the whole univerſe; and that ſchiſm extended to almoſt every thing great and ſmall. For one, I wiſh, ſince it is gone thus far, that the breach had been ſo compleat, as to make all intercourſe impracticable; but partly by accident, partly by deſign, partly from the reſiſtance of the matter, enough is left to preſerve intercourſe, whilſt amity is deſtroyed or corrupted in it's principle.

This violent breach of the community of Europe, we muſt conclude to have been made, (even if they had not expreſsly declared it over and over again) either to force mankind into an adoption of their ſyſtem, or to live in perpetual enmity with a community the moſt potent we have ever known. Can any perſon imagine, that in offering to mankind this deſperate alternative, there is no indication of a hoſtile mind, becauſe men in poſſeſſion of the ruling authority are ſuppoſed to have a right to act without coercion in their own territories? As to the right of men to act any where according to their pleaſure, without any moral tie, no ſuch right exiſts. Men are never in

a ſtate

a ſtate of *total* independence of each other. It is not the condition of our nature: nor is it conceivable how any man can purſue a conſiderable courſe of action without it's having ſome effect upon others; or, of courſe, without producing ſome degree of reſponſibility for his conduct. The *ſituations* in which men relatively ſtand produce the rules and principles of that reſponſibility, and afford directions to prudence in exacting it,

Diſtance of place does not extinguiſh the duties or the rights of men; but it often renders their exerciſe impracticable. The ſame circumſtance of diſtance renders the noxious effects of an evil ſyſtem in any community leſs pernicious. But there are ſituations where this difficulty does not occur; and in which, therefore, theſe duties are obligatory, and theſe rights are to be aſſerted. It has ever been the method of publick juriſts to draw a great part of the analogies on which they form the law of nations, from the principles of law which prevail in civil community. Civil laws are not all of them merely poſitive. Thoſe which are rather concluſions of legal reaſon, than matters of ſtatutable proviſion, belong to univerſal equity, and are univerſally applicable. Almoſt the whole prætorian law is ſuch. There is a *Law of Neighbourhood* which does not leave a man perfect maſter on his own ground. When a neighbour ſees a *new erection*,

in the nature of a nuiſance, ſet up at his door, he has a right to repreſent it to the judge; who, on his part, has a right to order the work to be ſtaid; or if eſtabliſhed, to be removed. On this head, the parent law is expreſs and clear; and has made many wiſe proviſions, which, without deſtroying, regulate and reſtrain the right of *ownerſhip*, by the right of *vicinage*. No *innovation* is permitted that may redound, even ſecondarily, to the prejudice of a neighbour. The whole doctrine of that important head of prætorian law, "*De novi operis nunciatione*," is founded on the principle, that no *new* uſe ſhould be made of a man's private liberty of operating upon his private property, from whence a detriment may be juſtly apprehended by his neighbour. This law of denunciation is proſpective. It is to anticipate what is called *damnum infectum*, or *damnum nondum factum*, that is a damage juſtly apprehended but not actually done. Even before it is clearly known, whether the innovation be damageable or not, the judge is competent to iſſue a prohibition to innovate, until the point can be determined. This prompt interference is grounded on principles favourable to both parties. It is preventive of miſchief difficult to be repaired, and of ill blood difficult to be ſoftened. The rule of law, therefore, which comes before the evil, is amongſt the very beſt parts of equity, and juſtifies the promptneſs of the remedy; becauſe, as it is well

obſerved,

obferved, *Res damni infecti celeritatem defiderat & periculofa eft dilatio.* This right of denunciation does not hold, when things continue, however inconveniently to the neighbourhood, according to the *antient* mode. For there is a fort of prefumption againft novelty, drawn out of a deep confideration of human nature and human affairs; and the maxim of jurifprudence is well laid down, *Vetuftas pro lege femper habetur.*

Such is the law of civil vicinity. Now where there is no conftituted judge, as between independent ftates there is not, the vicinage itfelf is the natural judge. It is, preventively, the affertor of it's own rights; or remedially, their avenger. Neighbours are prefumed to take cognizance of each other's acts. "*Vicini, vicinorum facta prefumuntur fcire.*" This principle, which, like the reft, is as true of nations, as of individual men, has beftowed on the grand vicinage of Europe, a duty to know, and a right to prevent, any capital innovation which may amount to the erection of a dangerous nuifance.* Of the importance of that innovation, and the

* "This ftate of things cannot exift in France without involving all the furrounding powers in one common danger, "without giving them the right, without impofing it on them "as a duty, to ftop the progrefs of an evil which attacks the fundamental principles by which mankind is united in civil fociety." Declaration, 29th Oct. 1793.

 mifchief

mischief of that nuisance, they are, to be sure, bound to judge not litigiously: but it is in their competence to judge. They have uniformly acted on this right. What in civil society is a ground of action, in politick society is a ground of war. But the exercise of that competent jurisdiction is a matter of moral prudence. As suits in civil society, so war in the political must ever be a matter of great deliberation. It is not this or that particular proceeding, picked out here and there, as a subject of quarrel, that will do. There must be an aggregate of mischief. There must be marks of deliberation; there must be traces of design; there must be indications of malice; there must be tokens of ambition. There must be force in the body where they exist; there must be energy in the mind. When all these circumstances combine, or the important parts of them, the duty of the vicinity calls for the exercise of it's competence; and the rules of prudence do not restrain, but demand it. . . .

In describing the nuisance erected by so pestilential a manufactory, by the construction of so infamous a brothel, by digging a night cellar for such thieves, murderers, and house-breakers, as never infested the world, I am so far from aggravating, that I have fallen infinitely short of the evil. No man who has attended to the particulars of what has been

been done in France, and combined them with the principles there asserted, can possibly doubt it. When I compare with this great cause of nations, the trifling points of honour, the still more contemptible points of interest, the light ceremonies, the undefinable punctilios, the disputes about precedency, the lowering or the hoisting of a sail, the dealing in a hundred or two of wild cat-skins on the other side of the Globe, which have often kindled up the flames of war between nations, I stand astonished at those persons, who do not feel a resentment, not more natural than politick, at the atrocious insults that this monstrous compound offers to the dignity of every nation, and who are not alarmed with what it threatens to their safety.

I have therefore been decidedly of opinion, with our declaration at Whitehall, in the beginning of this war, that the vicinage of Europe had not only a right, but an indispensible duty, and an exigent interest, to denunciate this new work before it had produced the danger we have so sorely felt, and which we shall long feel. The example of what is done by France is too important not to have a vast and extensive influence; and that example backed with it's power, must bear with great force on those who are near it; especially on those who shall recognize the pretended Republick on the principle

upon

upon which it now ſtands. It is not an old ſtructure which you have found as it is, and are not to diſpute of the original end and deſign with which it had been ſo faſhioned. It is a recent wrong, and can plead no preſcription. It violates the rights upon which not only the community of France, but thoſe on which all communities are founded. The principles on which they proceed are *general* principles, and are as true in England as in any other country. They who (though with the pureſt intentions) recognize the authority of theſe Regicides and robbers upon principle, juſtify their acts, and eſtabliſh them as precedents. It is a queſtion not between France and England. It is a queſtion between property and force. The property claims; and it's claim has been allowed. The property of the nation is the nation. They who maſſacre, plunder, and expel the body of the proprietary, are murderers and robbers. The State, in it's eſſence, muſt be moral and juſt: and it may be ſo, though a tyrant or uſurper ſhould be accidentally at the head of it. This is a thing to be lamented: but this notwithſtanding, the body of the commonwealth may remain in all it's integrity and be perfectly ſound in it's compoſition. The preſent caſe is different. It is not a revolution in government. It is not the victory of party over party. It is a deſtruction and decompoſition of the whole ſociety;

which

which never can be made of right by any faction, however powerful, nor without terrible consequences to all about it, both in the act and in the example. This pretended Republick is founded in crimes, and exists by wrong and robbery; and wrong and robbery, far from a title to any thing, is war with mankind. To be at peace with robbery is to be an accomplice with it.

Mere locality does not constitute a body politick. Had Cade and his gang got possession of London, they would not have been the Lord-Mayor, Aldermen, and Common Council. The body politick of France existed in the majesty of it's throne; in the dignity of it's nobility; in the honour of it's gentry; in the sanctity of it's clergy; in the reverence of it's magistracy; in the weight and consideration due to it's landed property in the several bailliages; in the respect due to it's moveable substance represented by the corporations of the kingdom. All these particular *moleculæ* united, form the great mass of what is truly the body politick in all countries. They are so many deposits and receptacles of justice; because they can only exist by justice. Nation is a moral essence, not a geographical arrangement, or a denomination of the nomenclator. France, though out of her territorial possession, exists; because the sole possible

poſſible claimant, I mean the proprietary, and the government to which the proprietary adheres, exiſts and claims. God forbid, that if you were expelled from your houſe by ruffians and aſſaſſins, that I ſhould call the material walls, doors and windows of ———, the ancient and honourable family of ———. Am I to transfer to the intruders, who not content to turn you out naked to the world, would rob you of your very name, all the eſteem and reſpect I owe to you? The Regicides in France are not France. France is out of her bounds, but the kingdom is the ſame.

To illuſtrate my opinions on this ſubject, let us ſuppoſe a caſe, which, after what has happened, we cannot think abſolutely impoſſible, though the augury is to be abominated, and the event deprecated with our moſt ardent prayers. Let us ſuppoſe then, that our gracious Sovereign was ſacrilegiouſly murdered; his exemplary Queen, at the head of the matronage of this land, murdered in the ſame manner: That thoſe Princeſſes whoſe beauty and modeſt elegance are the ornaments of the country, and who are the leaders and patterns of the ingenuous youth of their ſex, were put to a cruel and ignominious death, with hundreds of others, mothers and daughters, ladies of the firſt diſtinction;—that the Prince of Wales and the Duke of York, princes the hope and pride of the

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nation, with all their brethren, were forced to fly from the knives of aſſaſſins---that the whole body of our excellent Clergy were either maſſacred or robbed of all, and tranſported—the Chriſtian Religion, in all it's denominations, forbidden and perſecuted; the law totally, fundamentally, and in all it's parts deſtroyed—the judges put to death by revolutionary tribunals--the Peers and Commons robbed to the laſt acre of their eſtates; maſſacred if they ſtaid, or obliged to ſeek life in flight, in exile and in beggary—that the whole landed property ſhould ſhare the very ſame fate—that every military and naval officer of honour and rank, almoſt to a man, ſhould be placed in the ſame deſcription of confiſcation and exile—that the principal merchants and bankers ſhould be drawn out, as from an hen-coop, for ſlaughter—that the citizens of our greateſt and moſt flouriſhing cities, when the hand and the machinery of the hangman were not found ſufficient, ſhould have been collected in the publick ſquares, and maſſacred by thouſands with cannon ;—if three hundred thouſand others ſhould have been doomed to a ſituation worſe than death in noiſome and peſtilential priſons;—in ſuch a caſe, is it in the faction of robbers I am to look for my country? Would this be the England that you and I, and even ſtrangers, admired, honoured, loved, and cheriſhed? Would not the exiles of England alone be my Government and my fellow citizens? Would

not their places of refuge be my temporary country? Would not all my duties and all my affections be there and there only? Should I confider myfelf as a traitor to my country, and deferving of death, if I knocked at the door and heart of every Potentate in Chriftendom to fuccour my friends, and to avenge them on their enemies? Could I, in any way, fhew myfelf more a Patriot? What fhould I think of thofe Potentates who infulted their fuffering brethren; who treated them as vagrants, or at leaft as mendicants; and could find no allies, no friends, but in Regicide murderers and robbers? What ought I to think and feel, if being geographers inftead of Kings, they recognized the defolated cities, the wafted fields, and the rivers polluted with blood, of this geometrical meafurement, as the honourable member of Europe, called England? In that condition what fhould we think of Sweden, Denmark, or Holland, or whatever Power afforded us a churlifh and treacherous hofpitality, if they fhould invite us to join the ftandard of our King, our Laws, and our Religion, if they fhould give us a direct promife of protection,---if after all this, taking advantage of our deplorable fituation, which left us no choice, they were to treat us as the loweft and vileft of all mercenaries? If they were to fend us far from the aid of our King, and our fuffering Country, to fquander us away in the moft peftilen-

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tial climates for a venal enlargement of their own territories, for the purpofe of trucking them, when obtained, with thofe very robbers and murderers they had called upon us to oppofe with our blood? What would be our fentiments, if in that mifera-ble fervice we were not to be confidered either as Englifh, or as Swedes, Dutch, Danes, but as out-cafts of the human race? Whilft we were fighting thofe battles of their intereft, and as their foldiers, how fhould we feel if we were to be excluded from all their cartels? How muft we feel, if the pride and flower of the Englifh Nobility and Gentry, who might efcape the peftilential clime, and the devouring fword, fhould, if taken pri-foners, be delivered over as rebel fubjects, to be condemned as rebels, as traitors, as the vileft of all criminals, by tribunals formed of Maroon ne-groe flaves, covered over with the blood of their mafters, who were made free and organifed into judges, for their robberies and murders? What fhould we feel under this inhuman, infulting, and barbarous protection of Mufcovites, Swedes or Hollanders? Should we not obteft Heaven, and whatever juftice there is yet on Earth? Oppreffion makes wife men mad; but the diftemper is ftill the madnefs of the wife, which is better than the fobriety of fools. Their cry is the voice of facred mifery, exalted, not into wild raving, but into the fanctified phrenfy of prophecy and infpiration—in that bitternefs of

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ſoul, in that indignation of ſuffering virtue, in that exaltation of deſpair, would not perſecuted Engliſh Loyalty cry out, with an awful warning voice, and denounce the deſtruction that waits on Monarchs, who conſider fidelity to them as the moſt degrading of all vices; who ſuffer it to be puniſhed as the moſt abominable of all crimes; and who have no reſpect but for rebels, traitors, Regicides, and furious negro ſlaves, whoſe crimes have broke their chains? Would not this warm language of high indignation have more of ſound reaſon in it, more of real affection, more of true attachment, than all the lullabies of flatterers, who would huſh Monarchs to ſleep in the arms of death? Let them be well convinced, that if ever this example ſhould prevail in it's whole extent, it will have it's full operation. Whilſt Kings ſtand firm on their baſe, though under that baſe there is a ſure-wrought mine, there will not be wanting to their levees a ſingle perſon of thoſe who are attached to their fortune, and not to their perſons or cauſe: But hereafter none will ſupport a tottering throne. Some will fly for fear of being cruſhed under the ruin; ſome will join in making it. They will ſeek in the deſtruction of Royalty, fame, and power, and wealth, and the homage of Kings, with *Reubel*, with *Carnot*, with *Revelliere*, and with the *Merlins* and the *Talliens*, rather than ſuffer exile and beggary with the *Condés*, or the *Broglios*,

the *Castries*, the *D'Avrais*, the *Serrents*, the *Cazalés*, and the long line of loyal, suffering Patriot Nobility, or to be butchered with the oracles and the victims of the laws, the *D'Ormessons*, the *d'Espremenils*, and the *Malesherbes*. This example we shall give, if instead of adhering to our fellows in a cause which is an honour to us all, we abandon the lawful Government and lawful corporate body of France, to hunt for a shameful and ruinous fraternity, with this odious usurpation that disgraces civilized society and the human race.

And is then example nothing? It is every thing. Example is the school of mankind, and they will learn at no other. This war is a war against that example. It is not a war for Louis the Eighteenth, or even for the property, virtue, fidelity of France. It is a war for George the Third, for Francis the Second, and for all the dignity, property, honour, virtue, and religion of England, of Germany, and of all nations.

I know that all I have said of the systematick unsociability of this new-invented species of republick, and the impossibility of preserving peace, is answered by asserting that the scheme of manners, morals, and even of maxims and principles of state, is of no weight in a question of peace or war between communities. This doctrine is supported by example.

ample. The caſe of Algiers is cited, with an hint, as if it were the ſtronger caſe. I ſhould take no notice of this ſort of inducement, if I had found it only where firſt it was. I do not want reſpect for thoſe from whom I firſt heard it—but having no controverſy at preſent with them, I only think it not amiſs to reſt on it a little, as I find it adopted with much more of the ſame kind, by ſeveral of thoſe on whom ſuch reaſoning had formerly made no apparent impreſſion. If it had no force to prevent us from ſubmitting to this neceſſary war, it furniſhes no better ground for our making an unneceſſary and ruinous peace.

This analogical argument drawn from the caſe of Algiers would lead us a good way. The fact is, we ourſelves with a little cover, others more directly, pay a *tribute* to the Republick of Algiers. Is it meant to reconcile us to the payment of a *tribute* to the French Republick? That this, with other things more ruinous, will be demanded hereafter, I little doubt; but for the preſent, this will not be avowed---though our minds are to be gradually prepared for it. In truth, the arguments from this caſe are worth little, even to thoſe who approve the buying an Algerine forbearance of piracy. There are many things which men do not approve, that they muſt do to avoid a greater evil. To argue from thence, that they

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are to act in the ſame manner in all caſes, is turning neceſſity into a law. Upon what is matter of prudence, the argument concludes the contrary way. Becauſe we have done one humiliating act, we ought, with infinite caution, to admit more acts of the ſame nature, leſt humiliation ſhould become our habitual ſtate. Matters of prudence are under the dominion of circumſtances, and not of logical analogies. It is ſo abſurd to take it otherwiſe.

I, for one, do more than doubt the policy of this kind of convention with Algiers. On thoſe who think as I do, the argument *ad hominem* can make no ſort of impreſſion. I know ſomething of the Conſtitution and compoſition of this very extraordinary Republick. It has a Conſtitution, I admit, ſimilar to the preſent tumultuous military tyranny of France, by which an handful of obſcure ruffians domineer over a fertile country, and a brave people. For the compoſition, too, I admit, the Algerine community reſembles that of France; being formed out of the very ſcum, ſcandal, diſgrace, and peſt of the Turkiſh Aſia. The grand Seignor, to diſburthen the country, ſuffers the Dey to recruit, in his dominions, the corps of Janiſaries, or Aſaphs, which form the Directory and Council of Elders of the African Republick one and indiviſible. But notwithſtanding this reſemblance, which I allow, I

never ſhall ſo far injure the Janiſarian Republick of Algiers, as to put it in compariſon for every ſort of crime, turpitude, and oppreſſion with the Jacobin Republick of Paris. There is no queſtion with me to which of the two I ſhould chooſe to be a neighbour or a ſubject. But ſituated as I am, I am in no danger of becoming to Algiers either the one or the other. It is not ſo in my relation to the atheiſtical fanaticks of France. I *am* their neighbour; I *may* become their ſubject. Have the Gentlemen who borrowed this happy parallel, no idea of the different conduct to be held with regard to the very ſame evil at an immenſe diſtance, and when it is at your door? when it's power is enormous, as when it is comparatively as feeble as it's diſtance is remote? when there is a barrier of language and uſages, which prevents corruption through certain old correſpondences and habitudes, from the contagion of the horrible novelties that are introduced into every thing elſe? I can contemplate, without dread, a royal or a national tyger on the borders of Pegu. I can look at him, with an eaſy curioſity, as priſoner within bars in the menagerie of the Tower. But if, by Habeas Corpus, or otherwiſe, he was to come into the Lobby of the Houſe of Commons whilſt your door was open, any of you would be more ſtout than wiſe, who would not gladly make your eſcape out of the back windows. I certainly ſhould

ſhould dread more from a wild cat in my bed-chamber, than from all the lions that roar in the deſerts behind Algiers. But in this parallel it is the cat that is at a diſtance, and the lions and tygers that are in our anti-chambers and our lobbies. Algiers is not near; Algiers is not powerful; Algiers is not our neighbour; Algiers is not infectious. Algiers, whatever it may be, is an old creation; and we have good data to calculate all the miſchief to be apprehended from it. When I find Algiers transferred to Calais, I will tell you what I think of that point. In the mean time, the caſe quoted from the Algerine reports, will not apply as authority. We ſhall put it out of court; and ſo far as that goes, let the counſel for the Jacobin peace take nothing by their motion.

When we voted, as you and I did, with many more whom you and I reſpect and love, to reſiſt this enemy, we were providing for dangers that were direct, home, preſſing, and not remote, contingent, uncertain, and formed upon looſe analogies. We judged of the danger with which we were menaced by Jacobin France, from the whole tenor of it's conduct; not from one or two doubtful or detached acts or expreſſions. I not only concurred in the idea of combining with Europe in this war; but to the beſt of my power ever ſtimulated Miniſters to that conjunction of intereſts and of efforts. I joined

with them with all my ſoul, on the principles contained in that manly and maſterly ſtate-paper, which I have two or three times referred to,* and may ſtill more frequently hereafter. The diplomatick collection never was more enriched than with this piece. The hiſtorick facts juſtify every ſtroke of the maſter. "Thus painters write their names at Co."

Various perſons may concur in the ſame meaſure on various grounds. They may be various, without being contrary to, or excluſive of each other. I thought the inſolent, unprovoked aggreſſion of the Regicide, upon our Ally of Holland, a good ground of war. I think his manifeſt attempt to overturn the balance of Europe, a good ground of war. As a good ground of war, I conſider his declaration of war on his Majeſty and his kingdom. But though I have taken all theſe to my aid, I conſider them as nothing more than as a ſort of evidence to indicate the treaſonable mind within. Long before their acts of aggreſſion, and their declaration of war, the faction in France had aſſumed a form, had adopted a body of principles and maxims, and had regularly and ſyſtematically acted on them, by which ſhe virtually had put herſelf in a poſture, which was in itſelf a declaration of war againſt mankind.

* Declaration, Whitehall, Oct. 29, 1793.

It is ſaid by the Directory in their ſeveral manifeſtoes, that we of the people are tumultuous for peace; and that Miniſters pretend negociation to amuſe us. This they have learned from the language of many amongſt ourſelves, whoſe converſations have been one main cauſe of whatever extent the opinion for peace with Regicide may be. But I who think the Miniſters unfortunately to be but too ſerious in their proceedings, find myſelf obliged to ſay a little more on this ſubject of the popular opinion.

Before our opinions are quoted againſt ourſelves, it is proper that, from our ſerious deliberation, they may be worth quoting. It is without reaſon we praiſe the wiſdom of our Conſtitution, in putting under the diſcretion of the Crown, the awful truſt of war and peace, if the Miniſters of the Crown virtually return it again into our hands. The truſt was placed there as a ſacred depoſit, to ſecure us againſt popular raſhneſs in plunging into wars, and againſt the effects of popular diſmay, diſguſt, or laſſitude in getting out of them as imprudently as we might firſt engage in them. To have no other meaſure in judging of thoſe great objects than our momentary opinions and deſires, is to throw us back upon that very democracy which, in this part, our Conſtitution was formed to avoid.

It is no excuse at all for a minister, who at our desire, takes a measure contrary to our safety, that it is our own act. He who does not stay the hand of suicide, is guilty of murder. On our part I say, that to be instructed, is not to be degraded or enslaved. Information is an advantage to us; and we have a right to demand it. He that is bound to act in the dark cannot be said to act freely. When it appears evident to our governors that our desires and our interests are at variance, they ought not to gratify the former at the expence of the latter. Statesmen are placed on an eminence, that they may have a larger horizon than we can possibly command. They have a whole before them, which we can contemplate only in the parts, and even without the necessary relations. Ministers are not only our natural rulers but our natural guides. Reason clearly and manfully delivered, has in itself a mighty force: but reason in the mouth of legal authority, is, I may fairly say, irresistible.

I admit that reason of state will not, in many circumstances permit the disclosure of the true ground of a public proceeding. In that case silence is manly and it is wise. It is fair to call for trust when the principle of reason itself suspends it's public use. I take the distinction to be this. The ground of a particular measure, making a part of a plan,

a plan, it is rarely proper to divulge. All the broader grounds of policy on which the general plan is to be adopted, ought as rarely to be concealed. They who have not the whole cauſe before them, call them politicians, call them people, call them what you will, are no judges. The difficulties of the caſe, as well as it's fair ſide, ought to be preſented. This ought to be done: and it is all that can be done. When we have our true ſituation diſtinctly preſented to us, if then we reſolve with a blind and headlong violence, to reſiſt the admonitions of our friends, and to caſt ourſelves into the hands of our potent and irreconcileable foes, then, and not till then, the miniſters ſtand acquitted before God and man, for whatever may come.

Lamenting as I do, that the matter has not had ſo full and free a diſcuſſion as it requires, I mean to omit none of the points which ſeem to me neceſſary for conſideration, previous to an arrangement which is for ever to decide the form and the fate of Europe. In the courſe, therefore, of what I ſhall have the honour to addreſs to you, I propoſe the following queſtions to your ſerious thoughts. 1. Whether the preſent ſyſtem, which ſtands for a Government in France, be ſuch as in peace and war affects the neighbouring States in a manner different from the internal Govern-

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ment that formerly prevailed in that country? 2. Whether that syſtem, ſuppoſing it's views hoſtile to other nations, poſſeſſes any means of being hurtful to them peculiar to itſelf? 3. Whether there has been lately ſuch a change in France, as to alter the nature of it's ſyſtem, or it's effect upon other Powers? 4. Whether any publick declarations or engagements exiſt, on the part of the allied Powers, which ſtand in the way of a treaty of peace, which ſuppoſes the right and confirms the power of the Regicide faction in France? 5. What the ſtate of the other Powers of Europe will be with reſpect to each other, and their colonies, on the concluſion of a Regicide Peace? 6. Whether we are driven to the abſolute neceſſity of making that kind of peace?

Theſe heads of enquiry will enable us to make the application of the ſeveral matters of fact and topicks of argument, that occur in this vaſt diſcuſſion, to certain fixed principles. I do not mean to confine myſelf to the order in which they ſtand. I ſhall diſcuſs them in ſuch a manner as ſhall appear to me the beſt adapted for ſhewing their mutual bearings and relations. Here then I cloſe the public matter of my Letter; but before I have done, let me ſay one word in apology for myſelf.

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In wiſhing this nominal peace not to be precipitated, I am ſure no man living is leſs diſpoſed to blame the preſent Miniſtry than I am. Some of my oldeſt friends, (and I wiſh I could ſay it of more of them) make a part in that Miniſtry. There are ſome indeed, "whom my dim eyes in vain explore." In my mind, a greater calamity could not have fallen on the publick than the excluſion of one of them. But I drive away that, with other melancholy thoughts. A great deal ought to be ſaid upon that ſubject or nothing. As to the diſtinguiſhed perſons to whom my friends who remain, are joined, if benefits, nobly and generouſly conferred, ought to procure good wiſhes, they are intitled to my beſt vows; and they have them all. They have adminiſtered to me the only conſolation I am capable of receiving, which is to know that no individual will ſuffer by my thirty years ſervice to the publick. If things ſhould give us the comparative happineſs of a ſtruggle, I ſhall be found, I was going to ſay fighting, (that would be fooliſh) but dying by the ſide of Mr. Pitt. I muſt add, that if any thing defenſive in our domeſtick ſyſtem can poſſibly ſave us from the diſaſters of a Regicide peace, he is the man to ſave us. If the finances in ſuch a caſe can be repaired, he is the man to repair them. If I ſhould lament any of his acts, it is only when they appear to me to have no reſemblance to acts of his. But

let him not have a confidence in himſelf, which no human abilities can warrant. His abilities are fully equal (and that is to ſay much for any man) to thoſe that are oppoſed to him. But if we look to him as our ſecurity againſt the conſequences of a Regicide Peace, let us be aſſured, that a Regicide Peace and a Conſtitutional Miniſtry are terms that will not agree. With a Regicide Peace the King cannot long have a Miniſter to ſerve him, nor the Miniſter a King to ſerve. If the Great Diſpoſer, in reward of the royal and the private virtues of our Sovereign, ſhould call him from the calamitous ſpectacles, which will attend a ſtate of amity with Regicide, his ſucceſſor will ſurely ſee them, unleſs the ſame Providence greatly anticipates the courſe of nature. Thinking thus, (and not, as I conceive, on light grounds) I dare not flatter the reigning Sovereign, nor any Miniſter he has or can have, nor his Succeſſor Apparent, nor any of thoſe who may be called to ſerve him, with what appears to me a falſe ſtate of their ſituation. We cannot have them and that Peace together.

I do not forget that there had been a conſiderable difference between ſeveral of our friends, with my inſignificant ſelf, and the great man at the head of Miniſtry, in an early ſtage of theſe diſcuſſions. But I am ſure there was a period in which we agreed better in the danger of a Jacobin exiſt-

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ence in France. At one time, he and all Europe ſeemed to feel it. But why am not I converted with ſo many great Powers, and ſo many great Miniſters? It is becauſe I am old and ſlow.— I am in this year, 1796, only where all the powers of Europe were in 1793. I cannot move with this proceſſion of the Equinoxes, which is preparing for us the return of ſome very old, I am afraid no golden æra, or the commencement of ſome new æra that must be denominated from ſome new metal. In this criſis I muſt hold my tongue, or I muſt ſpeak with freedom. Falſhood and deluſion are allowed in no caſe whatever: But, as in the exerciſe of all the virtues, there is an œconomy of truth. It is a ſort of temperance, by which a man ſpeaks truth with meaſure that he may ſpeak it the longer. But as the ſame rules do not hold in all caſes—what would be right for you, who may preſume on a ſeries of years before you, would have no ſenſe for me, who cannot, without abſurdity, calculate on ſix months of life. What I ſay, I *muſt* ſay at once. Whatever I write is in it's nature teſtamentary. It may have the weakneſs, but it has the ſincerity of a dying declaration. For the few days I have to linger here, I am removed completely from the buſy ſcene of the world; but I hold myſelf to be ſtill reſponſible for every thing that I have done whilſt I continued on the place of action. If the raweſt Tyro in politicks has been influenced by the

authority of my grey hairs, and led by any thing in my ſpeeches, or my writings, to enter into this war, he has a right to call upon me to know why I have changed my opinions, or why, when thoſe I voted with, have adopted better notions, I perſevere in exploded errour?

When I ſeem not to acquieſce in the acts of thoſe I reſpect in every degree ſhort of ſuperſtition, I am obliged to give my reaſons fully. I cannot ſet my authority againſt their authority. But to exert reaſon is not to revolt againſt authority. Reaſon and authority do not move in the ſame parallel. That reaſon is an *amicus curiæ* who ſpeaks *de plano*, not *pro tribunali*. It is a friend who makes an uſeful ſuggeſtion to the Court, without queſtioning it's juriſdiction. Whilſt he acknowledges it's competence, he promotes it's efficiency. I ſhall purſue the plan I have chalked out in my Letters that follow this.

LETTER II.

On the Genius and Character of the French Revolution as it regards other Nations.

MY DEAR SIR,

I Closed my first Letter with serious matter; and I hope it has employed your thoughts. The system of peace must have a reference to the system of the war. On that ground, I must therefore again recal your mind to our original opinions, which time and events have not taught me to vary.

My ideas and my principles led me, in this contest, to encounter France, not as a State, but as a Faction. The vast territorial extent of that country, it's immense population, it's riches of production, it's riches of commerce and convention—the whole aggregate mass of what, in ordinary cases, constitutes the force of a State, to me were but objects of secondary consideration. They might be balanced; and they have

been often more than balanced. Great as these things are, they are not what make the faction formidable. It is the faction that makes them truly dreadful. That faction is the evil spirit that possesses the body of France; that informs it as a soul; that stamps upon it's ambition, and upon all it's pursuits, a characteristick mark, which strongly distinguishes them from the same general passions, and the same general views, in other men and in other communities. It is that spirit which inspires into them, a new, a pernicious, a desolating activity. Constituted as France was ten years ago, it was not in that France to shake, to shatter, and to overwhelm Europe in the manner that we behold. A sure destruction impends over those infatuated Princes, who, in the conflict with this new and unheard-of power, proceed as if they were engaged in a war that bore a resemblance to their former contests; or that they can make peace in the spirit of their former arrangements of pacification. Here the beaten path is the very reverse of the safe road.

As to me, I was always steadily of opinion, that this disorder was not in it's nature intermittent. I conceived that the contest once begun, could not be laid down again, to be resumed at our discretion; but that our

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firſt ſtruggle with this evil would alſo be our laſt. I never thought we could make peace with the ſyſtem; becauſe it was not for the ſake of an object we purſued in rivalry with each other, but with the ſyſtem itſelf that we were at war. As I underſtood the matter, we were at war not with it's conduct, but with it's exiſtence; convinced that it's exiſtence and it's hoſtility were the ſame.

The faction is not local or territorial. It is a general evil. Where it leaſt appears in action, it is ſtill full of life. In it's ſleep it recruits it's ſtrength, and prepares it's exertion. It's ſpirit lies deep in the corruptions of our common nature. The ſocial order which reſtrains it, feeds it. It exiſts in every country in Europe; and among all orders of men in every country, who look up to France as to a common head. The centre is there. The circumference is the world of Europe wherever the race of Europe may be ſettled. Every where elſe the faction is militant; in France it is triumphant. In France is the bank of depoſit, and the bank of circulation, of all the pernicious principles that are forming in every State. It will be a folly ſcarcely deſerving of pity, and too miſchievous for contempt, to think of reſtraining it in any other country whilſt it is predominant there. War, inſtead of

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being the cauſe of it's force, has ſuſpended it's operation. It has given a reprieve, at leaſt, to the Chriſtian World.

The true nature of a Jacobin war, in the beginning, was, by moſt of the Chriſtian Powers, felt, acknowledged, and even in the moſt preciſe manner declared. In the joint manifeſto, publiſhed by the Emperor and the King of Pruſſia, on the 4th of Auguſt 1792, it is expreſſed in the cleareſt terms, and on principles which could not fail, if they had adhered to them, of claſſing thoſe monarchs with the firſt benefactors of mankind. This manifeſto was publiſhed, as they themſelves expreſs it, "to "lay open to the preſent generation, as well as "to poſterity, their motives, their intentions, "and the *diſintereſtedneſs* of their perſonal views; "taking up arms for the purpoſe of preſerving "ſocial and political order amongſt all civilized "nations, and to ſecure to *each* ſtate it's reli-"gion, happineſs, independence, territories, "and real conſtitution."—"On this ground, "they hoped that all Empires, and all States, "ought to be unanimous; and becoming the firm "guardians of the happineſs of mankind, that "they cannot fail to unite their efforts to reſcue "a numerous nation from it's own fury, to pre-"ſerve Europe from the return of barbariſm,

" and the Univerſe from the ſubverſion and " anarchy with which it was threatened." The whole of that noble performance ought to be read at the firſt meeting of any Congreſs, which may aſſemble for the purpoſe of pacification. In that piece " theſe Powers expreſsly renounce all views " of perſonal aggrandizement," and confine themſelves to objects worthy of ſo generous, ſo heroic, and ſo perfectly wiſe and politick an enterpriſe. It was to the principles of this confederation and to no other, that we wiſhed our Sovereign and our Country to accede, as a part of the commonwealth of Europe. To theſe principles with ſome trifling exceptions and limitations they did fully accede.* And all our friends who did take office acceded to the Miniſtry (whether wiſely or not) as I always underſtood the matter, on the faith and on the principles of that declaration.

As long as theſe powers flattered themſelves that the menace of force would produce the effect of force, they acted on thoſe declarations: but when their menaces failed of ſucceſs, their efforts took a new direction. It did not appear to them that virtue and heroiſm ought to be purchaſed by millions of rix-dollars. It is a dreadful

* See Declaration. Whitehall, Oct. 29, 1793.

truth,

truth, but it is a truth that cannot be concealed; in ability, in dexterity, in the diftinctnefs of their views, the Jacobins are our fuperiours. They faw the thing right from the very beginning. Whatever were the firft motives to the war among politicians, they faw that it is in it's fpirit, and for it's objects, a *civil war*; and as fuch they purfued it. It is a war between the partizans of the antient, civil, moral, and political order of Europe againft a fect of fanatical and ambitious atheifts which means to change them all. It is not France extending a foreign empire over other nations: it is a fect aiming at univerfal empire, and beginning with the conqueft of France. The leaders of that fect fecured the *centre of Europe*; and that fecured, they knew, that whatever might be the event of battles and fieges, their *caufe* was victorious. Whether it's territory had a little more or a little lefs peeled from it's furface, or whether an ifland or two was detached from it's commerce, to them was of little moment. The conqueft of France was a glorious acquifition. That once well laid as a bafis of empire, opportunities never could be wanting to regain or to replace what had been loft, and dreadfully to avenge themfelves on the faction of their adverfaries.

They ſaw it was a *civil war*. It was their buſineſs to perſuade their adverſaries that it ought to be a *foreign* war. The Jacobins every where ſet up a cry againſt the new cruſade; and they intrigued with effect in the cabinet, in the field, and in every private ſociety in Europe. Their taſk was not difficult. The condition of Princes, and ſometimes of firſt Miniſters too, is to be pitied. The creatures of the deſk, and the creatures of favour, had no reliſh for the principles of the manifeſtoes. They promiſed no governments, no regiments, no revenues from whence emoluments might ariſe, by perquiſite or by grant. In truth, the tribe of vulgar politicians are the loweſt of our ſpecies. There is no trade ſo vile and mechanical as government in their hands. Virtue is not their habit. They are out of themſelves in any courſe of conduct recommended only by conſcience and glory. A large, liberal and proſpective view of the intereſts of States paſſes with them for romance; and the principles that recommend it for the wanderings of a diſordered imagination. The calculators compute them out of their ſenſes. The jeſters and buffoons ſhame them out of every thing grand and elevated. Littleneſs in object and in means, to them appears ſoundneſs and ſobriety. They think there is nothing worth purſuit, but that which

they can handle; which they can meaſure with a two-foot rule; which they can tell upon ten fingers.

Without the principles of the Jacobins, perhaps without any principles at all, they played the game of that faction. There was a beaten road before them. The Powers of Europe were armed; France had always appeared dangerous; the war was eaſily diverted from France as a faction, to France as a ſtate. The Princes were eaſily taught to ſlide back into their old habitual courſe of politicks. They were eaſily led to conſider the flames that were conſuming France, not as a warning to protect their own buildings, (which were without any party wall, and linked by a contignation into the edifice of France,) as an happy occaſion for pillaging the goods, and for carrying off the materials of their neighbour's houſe. Their provident fears were changed into avaricious hopes. They carried on their new deſigns without ſeeming to abandon the principles of their old policy. They pretended to ſeek, or they flattered themſelves that they ſought, in the acceſſion of new fortreſſes, and new territories, a *defenſive* ſecurity. But the ſecurity wanted was againſt a kind of power, which was not ſo truly dangerous in it's fortreſſes nor in it's territories, as in it's ſpirit and

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it's principles. They aimed, or pretended to aim, at *defending* themſelves againſt a danger, from which there can be no ſecurity in any *defenſive* plan. If armies and fortreſſes were a defence againſt Jacobiniſm, Louis the Sixteenth would this day reign a powerful monarch over an happy people.

This error obliged them, even in their offenſive operations, to adopt a plan of war, againſt the ſucceſs of which there was ſomething little ſhort of mathematical demonſtration. They refuſed to take any ſtep which might ſtrike at the heart of affairs. They ſeemed unwilling to wound the enemy in any vital part. They acted through the whole, as if they really wiſhed the conſervation of the Jacobin power; as what might be more favourable than the lawful Government to the attainment of the petty objects they looked for. They always kept on the circumference; and the wider and remoter the circle was, the more eagerly they choſe it as their ſphere of action in this centrifugal war. The plan they purſued, in it's nature demanded great length of time. In it's execution, they, who went the neareſt way to work, were obliged to cover an incredible extent of country. It left to the enemy every means of deſtroying this extended line of weakneſs. Ill ſucceſs in any part was ſure to de-

feat the effect of the whole. This is true of Auſtria. It is ſtill more true of England. On this falſe plan, even good fortune, by further weakening the victor, put him but the further off from his object.

As long as there was any appearance of ſucceſs, the ſpirit of aggrandizement, and conſequently the ſpirit of mutual jealouſy ſeized upon all the coaleſced Powers. Some ſought an acceſſion of territory at the expence of France, ſome at the expence of each other; ſome at the expence of third parties; and when the viciſſitude of diſaſter took it's turn, they found common diſtreſs a treacherous bond of faith and friendſhip.

The greateſt ſkill conducting the greateſt military apparatus has been employed; but it has been worſe than uſeleſsly employed, through the falſe policy of the war. The operations of the field ſuffered by the errors of the Cabinet. If the ſame ſpirit continues when peace is made, the peace will fix and perpetuate all the errors of the war; becauſe it will be made upon the ſame falſe principle. What has been loſt in the field, in the field may be regained. An arrangement of peace in it's nature is a permanent ſettlement; it is the effect

of

of counſel and deliberation, and not of fortuitous events. If built upon a baſis fundamentally erroneous, it can only be retrieved by ſome of thoſe unforeſeen diſpoſitions, which the all-wiſe but myſterious Governor of the World, ſometimes interpoſes, to ſnatch nations from ruin. It would not be pious error, but mad and impious preſumption for any one to truſt in an unknown order of diſpenſations, in defiance of the rules of prudence, which are formed upon the known march of the ordinary providence of God.

It was not of that ſort of war that I was amongſt the leaſt conſiderable, but amongſt the moſt zealous adviſers; and it is not by the ſort of peace now talked of, that I wiſh it concluded. It would anſwer no great purpoſe to enter into the particular errours of the war. The whole has been but one errour. It was but nominally a war of alliance. As the combined powers purſued it, there was nothing to hold an alliance together. There could be no tie of *honour*, in a ſociety for pillage. There could be no tie of a common *intereſt* where the object did not offer ſuch a diviſion amongſt the parties, as could well give them a warm concern in the gains of each other, or could indeed form ſuch a body of equivalents, as might make one of them

them willing to abandon a ſeparate object of his ambition for the juſtification of any other member of the alliance. The partition of Poland offered an object of ſpoil in which the parties *might* agree. They were circumjacent; and each might take a portion convenient to his own territory. They might diſpute about the value of their ſeveral ſhares, but the contiguity to each of the demandants always furniſhed the means of an adjuſtment. Though hereafter the world will have cauſe to rue this iniquitous meaſure, and they moſt who were moſt concerned in it, for the moment, there was wherewithal in the object to preſerve peace amongſt confederates in wrong. But the ſpoil of France, did not afford the ſame facilities for accommodation. What might ſatisfy the Houſe of Auſtria in a Flemiſh frontier afforded no equivalent to tempt the cupidity of the King of Pruſſia. What might be deſired by Great Britain in the Weſt-Indies, muſt be coldly and remotely, if at all, felt as an intereſt at Vienna; and it would be felt as ſomething worſe than a negative intereſt at Madrid. Auſtria, long poſſeſſed with unwiſe and dangerous deſigns on Italy, could not be very much in earneſt about the conſervation of the old patrimony of the Houſe of Savoy: and Sardinia, who owed to an Italian force all her means of ſhutting out

France from Italy, of which ſhe has been ſuppoſed to hold the key, would not purchaſe the means of ſtrength upon one ſide by yielding it on the other. She would not readily give the poſſeſſion of Novara for the hope of Savoy. No continental Power was willing to loſe any of it's continental objects for the encreaſe of the naval power of Great Britain; and Great Britain would not give up any of the objects ſhe ſought for as the means of an encreaſe to her naval power, to further their aggrandizement.

The moment this war came to be conſidered as a war merely of profit, the actual circumſtances are ſuch, that it never could become really a war of alliance. Nor can the peace be a peace of alliance, until things are put upon their right bottom.

I don't find it denied, that when a treaty is entered into for peace, a demand will be made on the Regicides to ſurrender a great part of their conqueſts on the Continent. Will they, in the preſent ſtate of the war, make that ſurrender without an equivalent? This continental ceſſion muſt of courſe be made in favour of that party in the alliance, that has ſuffered loſſes. That party has nothing to furniſh towards an equivalent. What equivalent, for inſtance, has

Holland

Holland to offer, who has loſt her all? What equivalent can come from the Emperor, every part of whoſe territories contiguous to France, is already within the pale of the Regicide dominion? What equivalent has Sardinia to offer for Savoy and for Nice, I may ſay for her whole being? What has ſhe taken from the faction of France? She has loſt very near her all; and ſhe has gained nothing. What equivalent has Spain to give? Alas! ſhe has already paid for her own ranſom the fund of equivalent, and a dreadful equivalent it is, to England and to herſelf. But I put Spain out of the queſtion. She is a province of the Jacobin Empire, and ſhe muſt make peace or war according to the orders ſhe receives from the Directory of Aſſaſſins. In effect and ſubſtance, her Crown is a fief of Regicide.

Whence then can the compenſation be demanded? Undoubtedly from that power which alone has made ſome conqueſts. That power is England. Will the allies then give away their antient patrimony, that England may keep Iſlands in the Weſt-Indies? They never can protract the war in good earneſt for that object; nor can they act in concert with us, in our refuſal to grant any thing towards their redemption. In that caſe we are thus ſituated. Either we muſt give Europe, bound hand and foot to France;

or

or we muſt quit the Weſt Indies without any one object, great or ſmall, towards indemnity and ſecurity. I repeat it without any advantage whatever: becauſe, ſuppoſing that our conqueſt could comprize all that France ever poſſeſſed in the tropical America, it never can amount in any fair eſtimation to a fair equivalent for Holland, for the Auſtrian Netherlands, for the lower Germany, that is for the whole antient kingdom or circle of Burgundy, now under the yoke of Regicide, to ſay nothing of almoſt all Italy under the ſame barbarous domination. If we treat in the preſent ſituation of things, we have nothing in our hands that can redeem Europe. Nor is the Emperor, as I have obſerved; more rich in the fund of equivalents.

If we look to our ſtock in the Eaſtern world, our moſt valuable and ſyſtematick acquiſitions are made in that quarter. Is it from France they are made? France has but one or two contemptible factories, ſubſiſting by the offal of the private fortunes of Engliſh individuals to ſupport them, in any part of India. I look on the taking of the Cape of Good Hope as the ſecuring of a poſt of great moment. It does honour to thoſe who planned, and to thoſe who executed that enterprize: but I ſpeak of it always as compararively good; as good as any

thing can be in a ſcheme of war that repels us from a center, and employs all our forces where nothing can be finally deciſive. But giving, as I freely give, every poſſible credit to theſe eaſtern conqueſts, I aſk one queſtion, on whom are they made? It is evident, that if we can keep our eaſtern conqueſts, we keep them not at the expence of France, but at the expence of Holland our *ally*; of Holland the immediate cauſe of the war, the nation whom we had undertaken to protect, and not of the Republic which it was our buſineſs to deſtroy. If we return the African and the Aſiatick conqueſts, we put them into the hands of a nominal State, (to that Holland is reduced) unable to retain them; and which will virtually leave them under the direction of France. If we withhold them, Holland declines ſtill more as a State; and ſhe loſes ſo much carrying trade and that means of keeping up the ſmall degree of naval power ſhe holds; for which policy, and not for any commercial gain, ſhe maintains the Cape, or any ſettlement beyond it. In that caſe, reſentment, faction, and even neceſſity will throw her more and more into the power of the new miſchievous Republick. But on the probable ſtate of Holland, I ſhall ſay more, when in this correſpondence I come to talk over with you the ſtate in

which

which any ſort of Jacobin peace will leave all Europe.

So far as to the Eaſt Indies.

As to the Weſt Indies, indeed as to either, if we look for matter of exchange in order to ranſom Europe, it is eaſy to ſhew that we have taken a terribly roundabout road. I cannot conceive, even if, for the ſake of holding conqueſts there, we ſhould refuſe to redeem Holland, and the Auſtrian Netherlands, and the hither Germany, that Spain, merely as ſhe is Spain, (and forgetting that the Regicide Ambaſſador governs at Madrid) will ſee with perfect ſatisfaction, Great Britain ſole miſtreſs of the Iſles. In truth it appears to me, that, when we come to balance our account, we ſhall find in the propoſed peace only the pure, ſimple, and unendowed charms of Jacobin amity. We ſhall have the ſatisfaction of knowing, that no blood or treaſure has been ſpared by the allies for ſupport of the Regicide ſyſtem. We ſhall reflect at leiſure on one great truth, that it was ten times more eaſy totally to deſtroy the ſyſtem itſelf, than when eſtabliſhed, it would be to reduce it's power---and that this Republick, moſt formidable abroad, was, of all things, the weakeſt at home; That her frontier was terrible---

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her interior feeble---that it was matter of choice to attack her where she is invincible; and to spare her where she was ready to dissolve by her own internal disorders. We shall reflect, that our plan was good neither for offence nor defence.

It would not be at all difficult to prove, that an army of an hundred thousand men, horse, foot, and artillery, might have been employed against the enemy on the very soil which he has usurped, at a far less expence than has been squandered away upon tropical adventures. In these adventures it was not an enemy we had to vanquish, but a cemetery to conquer. In carrying on the war in the West Indies, the hostile sword is merciful; the country in which we engage is the dreadful enemy. There the European conqueror finds a cruel defeat in the very fruits of his success. Every advantage is but a new demand on England for recruits to the West Indian grave. In a West India war, the Regicides have for their troops, a race of fierce barbarians, to whom the poisoned air, in which our youth inhale certain death, is sa-

lubrity

lubrity and life. To them the climate is the furest and most faithful of allies.

Had we carried on the war on the fide of France which looks towards the channel or the Atlantick, we fhould have attacked our enemy on his weak and unarmed fide. We fhould not have to reckon on the lofs of a man, who did not fall in battle. We fhould have an Ally in the heart of the country, who to our hundred thoufand, would at one time have added eighty thoufand men at the leaft, and all animated by principle, by enthufiafm and by vengeance; motives which fecured them to the caufe in a very different manner from fome of thofe Allies whom we fubfidized with millions. This Ally (or rather this principal in the war) by the confeffion of the Regicide himfelf, was more formidable to him than all his other foes united. Warring there, we fhould have led our arms to the capital of Wrong. Defeated, we could not fail (proper precautions taken) of a fure retreat. Stationary, and only fupporting the royalifts, an impenetrable barrier, an impregnable rampart would have been formed between

between the enemy and his naval power. We are probably the only nation who have declined to act against an enemy, when it might have been done in his own country; and who, having an armed, a powerful, and a long victorious Ally in that country, declined all effectual co-operation, and suffered him to perish for want of support. On the plan of a war in France, every advantage that our Allies might obtain, would be doubled in it's effect. Disasters on the one side, might have a fair chance of being compensated by victories on the other. Had we brought the main of our force to bear upon that quarter, all the operations of the British and Imperial crowns would have been combined. The war would have had system, correspondence, and a certain direction. But as the war has been pursued, the operations of the two crowns have not the smallest degree of mutual bearing or relation.

Had acquisitions in the West Indies been our object, on success in France, every thing reasonable in those remote parts might be demanded with decorum, and justice, and a sure effect.

Well

Well might we call for a recompence in America, for those services to which Europe owed it's safety. Having abandoned this obvious policy connected with principle, we have seen the Regicide power taking the reverse course, and making real conquests in the West Indies, to which all our dear-bought advantages (if we could hold them) are mean and contemptible. The noblest island within the tropicks, worth all that we possess put together, is, by the vassal Spaniard, delivered into her hands. The island of Hispaniola, (of which we have but one poor corner, by a slippery hold) is perhaps equal to England in extent, and in fertility is far superior. The part possessed by Spain, of that great island, made for the seat and centre of a tropical empire, was not improved, to be sure, as the French division had been, before it was systematically destroyed by the cannibal Republick; but it is not only the far larger, but the far more salubrious, and more fertile part.

It was delivered into the hands of the barbarians without, as I can find, any publick reclamation on our part, not only in contraven-

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tion to one of the fundamental treaties that compose the publick law of Europe, but in defiance of the fundamental colonial policy of Spain herſelf. This part of the treaty of Utrecht was made for great general ends unqueſtionably; but whilſt it provided for thoſe general ends, it was in affirmance of that particular policy. It was not to injure but to ſave Spain, by making a ſettlement of her eſtate, which prohibited her to alienate to France. It is her policy, not to ſee the balance of Weſt Indian power overturned by France or by Great Britain. Whilſt the Monarchies ſubſiſted, this unprincipled ceſſion was what the influence of the elder branch of the Houſe of Bourbon never dared to attempt on the younger: but cannibal terrour has been more powerful than family influence. The Bourbon Monarchy of Spain is united to the Republick of France, by what may be truly called the ties of blood.

By this meaſure the balance of power in the Weſt Indies is totally deſtroyed. It has followed the balance of power in Europe. It is not alone what ſhall be left nominally to the aſſaſ-

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fess that is theirs. Theirs is the whole empire of Spain in America. That ſtroke finiſhes all. I ſhould be glad to ſee our ſuppliant Negociator in the act of putting his feather to the ear of the Directory, to make it unclench the fiſt; and by his tickling, to charm that rich prize out of the iron gripe of robbery and ambition! It does not require much ſagacity to diſcern, that no power wholly baffled and defeated in Europe, can flatter itſelf with conqueſts in the Weſt Indies. In that ſtate of things it can neither keep nor hold. No! It cannot even long make war, if the grand bank and depoſit of it's force is at all in the Weſt Indies. But here a ſcene opens to my view too important to paſs by, perhaps too critical to touch. Is it poſſible, that it ſhould not preſent itſelf in all it's relations, to a mind habituated to conſider either war or peace on a large ſcale, or as one whole?

Unfortunately other ideas have prevailed. A remote, an expenſive, a murderous, and in the end, an unproductive adventure, carried on upon ideas of mercantile knight errantry,

rantry, without any of the generous wildness of Quixotism, is considered as sound, solid sense; and a war in a wholesome climate, a war at our door, a war directly on the enemy, a war in the heart of his country, a war in concert with an internal Ally, and in combination with the external, is regarded as folly and romance.

My dear Friend, I hold it impossible that these considerations should have escaped the Statesmen on both sides of the water, and on both sides of the house of Commons. How a question of peace can be discussed without having them in view, I cannot imagine. If you or others see a way out of these difficulties I am happy. I see indeed a fund from whence equivalents will be proposed. I see it. But I cannot just now touch it. It is a question of high moment. It opens another Iliad of woes to Europe.

Such is the time proposed for making *a common political peace*, to which no one circumstance is propitious. As to the grand principle of the peace, it is left, as if by common consent, wholly out of the question.

Viewing things in this light, I have frequently sunk into a degree of despondency and dejection hardly to be described: yet out of the pro-

foundeſt depths of this deſpair, an impulſe which I have in vain endeavoured to reſiſt, has urged me to raiſe one feeble cry againſt this unfortunate coalition which is formed at home, in order to make a coalition with France, ſubverſive of the whole ancient order of the world. No diſaſter of war, no calamity of ſeaſon could ever ſtrike me with half the horror which I felt from what is introduced to us by this junction of parties, under the ſoothing name of peace. We are apt to ſpeak of a low and puſillanimous ſpirit as the ordinary cauſe by which dubious wars terminate in humiliating treaties. It is here the direct contrary. I am perfectly aſtoniſhed at the boldneſs of character, at the intrepidity of mind, the firmneſs of nerve, in thoſe who are able with deliberation to face the perils of Jacobin fraternity.

This fraternity is indeed ſo terrible in it's nature, and in it's manifeſt conſequences, that there is no way of quieting our apprehenſions about it, but by totally putting it out of ſight, by ſubſtituting for it, through a ſort of periphraſis, ſomething of an ambiguous quality, and deſcribing ſuch a connection under the terms of "*the uſual relations of peace and amity*:" By this means the propoſed fraternity is huſtled in the crowd of thoſe treaties, which imply no change in

in the public law of Europe, and which do not upon fyftem affect the interior condition of nations. It is confounded with thofe conventions in which matters of difpute among fovereign powers are compromifed, by the taking off a duty more or lefs, by the furrender of a frontier town, or a difputed diftrict on the one fide or the other; by pactions in which the pretenfions of families are fettled, (as by a conveyancer, making family fubftitutions and fucceffions) without any alteration in the laws, manners, religion, privileges and cuftoms of the cities or territories which are the fubject of fuch arrangements.

All this body of old conventions, compofing the vaft and voluminous collection called the *corps diplomatique*, forms the code or ftatute law, as the methodized reafonings of the great publicifts and jurifts form the digeft and jurifprudence, of the Chriftian world. In thefe treafures are to be found the *ufual* relations of peace and amity in civilized Europe; and there the relations of ancient France were to be found amongft the reft.

The prefent fyftem in France is not the ancient France. It is not the ancient France with ordinary ambition and ordinary means. It is not a new power of an old kind. It is a new power of

a new

a new ſpecies. When ſuch a queſtionable ſhape is to be admitted for the firſt time into the brotherhood of Chriſtendom, it is not a mere matter of idle curioſity to conſider how far it is in it's nature alliable with the reſt, or whether "the relations of peace and amity" with this new State are likely to be of the ſame nature with the *uſual* relations of the States of Europe.

The Revolution in France had the relation of France to other nations as one of it's principal objects. The changes made by that Revolution were not the better to accommodate her to the old and uſual relations, but to produce new ones. The Revolution was made, not to make France free, but to make her formidable; not to make her a neighbour, but a miſtreſs; not to make her more obſervant of laws, but to put her in a condition to impoſe them. To make France truly formidable it was neceſſary that France ſhould be new-modelled. They who have not followed the train of the late proceedings, have been led by deceitful repreſentations (which deceit made a part in the plan) to conceive that this totally new model of a ſtate in which nothing eſcaped a change, was made with a view to it's internal relations only.

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In the Revolution of France two sorts of men were principally concerned in giving a character and determination to it's pursuits; the philosophers and the politicians. They took different ways, but they met in the same end. The philosophers had one predominant object, which they pursued with a fanatical fury, that is, the utter extirpation of religion. To that every question of empire was subordinate. They had rather domineer in a parish of Atheists, than rule over a Christian world. Their temporal ambition was wholly subservient to their proselytizing spirit, in which they were not exceeded by Mahomet himself.

They who have made but superficial studies in the Natural History of the human mind, have been taught to look on religious opinions as the only cause of enthusiastick zeal, and sectarian propagation. But there is no doctrine whatever, on which men can warm, that is not capable of the very same effect. The social nature of man impels him to propagate his principles, as much as physical impulses urge him to propagate his kind. The passions give zeal and vehemence. The understanding bestows design and system. The whole man moves under the discipline of his opinions. Religion is among the most powerful causes of enthusiasm. When any

any thing concerning it becomes an object of much meditation, it cannot be indifferent to the mind. They who do not love religion, hate it. The rebels to God perfectly abhor the Author of their being. They hate him "with all their "heart, with all their mind, with all their ſoul, "and with all their ſtrength." He never preſents himſelf to their thoughts, but to menace and alarm them. They cannot ſtrike the Sun out of Heaven, but they are able to raiſe a ſmouldering ſmoke that obſcures him from their own eyes. Not being able to revenge themſelves on God, they have a delight in vicariouſly defacing, degrading, torturing, and tearing in pieces his image in man. Let no one judge of them by what he has conceived of them, when they were not incorporated, and had no lead. They were then only paſſengers in a common vehicle. They were then carried along with the general motion of religion in the community, and without being aware of it, partook of it's influence. In that ſituation, at worſt their nature was left free to counterwork their principles. They deſpaired of giving any very general currency to their opinions. They conſidered them as a reſerved privilege for the choſen few. But when the poſſibility of dominion, lead, and propagation preſented themſelves, and that the ambition, which before had ſo often made them hy-

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pocrites, might rather gain than lofe by a daring avowal of their fentiments, then the nature of this infernal fpirit, which has "evil for it's good" appeared in it's full perfection. Nothing indeed but the poffeffion of fome power can with any certainty difcover, what at the bottom is the true character of any man. Without reading the fpeeches of Vergniaux, Français of Nantz, Ifnard, and fome others of that fort, it would not be eafy to conceive the paffion, rancour, and malice of their tongues and hearts They worked themfelves up to a perfect phrenzy againft religion and all it's profeffors. They tore the reputation of the Clergy to pieces by their infuriated declamations and invectives, before they lacerated their bodies by their maffacres. This fanatical atheifm left out, we omit the principal feature in the French Revolution, and a principal confideration with regard to the effects to be expected from a peace with it.

The other fort of men were the politicians, To them who had little or not at all reflected on the fubject, religion was in itfelf no object of love or hatred. They difbelieved it, and that was all. Neutral with regard to that object, they took the fide which in the prefent ftate of things might beft anfwer their purpofes. They foon found that they could not do without the philofophers;

ſophers; and the philoſophers ſoon made them ſenſible, that the deſtruction of religion was to ſupply them with means of conqueſt firſt at home, and then abroad. The philoſophers were the active internal agitators, and ſupplied the ſpirit and principles: the ſecond gave the practical direction. Sometimes the one predominated in the compoſition, ſometimes the other. The only difference between them was in the neceſſity of concealing the general deſign for a time, and in their dealing with foreign nations; the fanaticks going ſtrait forward and openly, the politici ns by the ſurer mode of zigzag. In the courſe of events this, among other cauſes, produced fierce and bloody contentions between them. But at the bottom they thoroughly agreed in all the objects of ambition and irreligion, and ſubſtantially in all the means of promoting theſe ends.

Without queſtion, to bring about the unexampled event of the French revolution, the concurrence of a very great number of views and paſſions was neceſſary. In that ſtupendous wo k, no one principle by which the human mind may have it's faculties at once invigorated and depraved, was left unemployed: but I can ſpeak it to a certainty, and ſupport it by undoubted proofs, that the ruling prin-

ciple of thofe who acted in the Revolution *as ftatefmen*, had the exterior aggrandizement of France as their ultimate end in the moft minute part of the internal changes that were made. We, who of late years, have been drawn from an attention to foreign affairs by the importance of our domeftic difcuffions, cannot eafily form a conception of the general eagernefs of the active and energetick part of the French nation itfelf, the moft active and energetick of all nations previous to it's revolution, upon that fubject. I am convinced that the foreign fpeculators in France, under the old Government, were twenty to one of the fame defcription then or now in England; and few of that defcription there were, who did not emuloufly fet forward the Revolution. The whole official fyftem, particularly in the diplomatic part, the regulars, the irregulars, down to the clerks in office, (a corps, without all comparifon, more numerous than the fame amongft us) co-operated in it. All the intriguers in foreign politicks, all the fpies, all the intelligencers, actually or late in function, all the candidates for that fort of employment, acted folely upon that principle.

On that fyftem of aggrandizement there was but one mind: but two violent factions arofe about the means. The firft wifhed

France,

France, diverted from the politicks of the continent, to attend ſolely to her marine, to feed it by an encreaſe of commerce, and thereby to overpower England on her own element. They contended, that if England were diſabled, the Powers on the continent would fall into their proper ſubordination; that it was England which deranged the whole continental ſyſtem of Europe. The others, who were by far the more numerous, though not the moſt outwardly prevalent at Court, conſidered this plan for France as contrary to her genius, her ſituation, and her natural means. They agreed as to the ultimate object, the reduction of the Britiſh power, and if poſſible, it's naval power; but they conſidered an aſcendancy on the continent as a neceſſary preliminary to that undertaking. They argued, that the proceedings of England herſelf had proved the ſoundneſs of this policy. That her greateſt and ableſt Stateſmen had not conſidered the ſupport of a continental balance againſt France as a deviation from the principle of her naval power, but as one of the moſt effectual modes of carrying it into effect. That ſuch had been her policy ever ſince the Revolution; during which period the naval ſtrength of Great Britain had gone on encreaſing in the direct ratio of her interference in the politicks of the continent.

nent. With much ſtronger reaſon ought the politicks of France to take the ſame direction; as well for purſuing objects which her ſituation would dictate to her, though England had no exiſtence, as for counteracting the politicks of that nation; to France continental politicks are primary; they looked on them only of ſecondary conſideration to England, and however neceſſary, but as means neceſſary to an end.

What is truly aſtoniſhing, the partizans of thoſe two oppoſite ſyſtems were at once prevalent, and at once employed, and in the very ſame tranſactions, the one oſtenſibly, the other ſecretly, during the latter part of the reign of Lewis XV. Nor was there one Court in which an Ambaſſador reſided on the part of the Miniſters, in which another as a ſpy on him did not alſo reſide on the part of the King. They who purſued the ſcheme for keeping peace on the continent, and particularly with Auſtria, acting officially and publickly, the other faction counteracting and oppoſing them. Theſe private agents were continually going from their function to the Baſtille, and from the Baſtille to employment, and favour again. An inextricable cabal was formed, ſome of perſons of rank, others of ſubordinates. But by this means

means the corps of politicians was augmented in number, and the whole formed a body of active, adventuring, ambitious, discontented people, despising the regular Ministry, despising the Courts at which they were employed, despising the Court which employed them.

The unfortunate Louis the Sixteenth * was not the first cause of the evil by which he suffered. He came to it, as to a sort of inheritance, by the false politicks of his immediate predeces-

* It may be right to do justice to Louis XVI. He did what he could to destroy the double diplomacy of France. He had all the secret correspondence burnt, except one piece, which was called, *Conjectures raisonnées sur la Situation de la France dans le Systeme Politique de l'Europe*; a work executed by M. Favier, under the direction of Count Broglie. A single copy of this was said to have been found in the Cabinet of Louis XVI. It was published with some subsequent state papers of Vergennes, Turgot, and others, as, "A new Benefit of the Revolution;" and the advertisement to the publication ends with the following words. "*Il sera facile de se convaincre, qu'* Y COMPRIS MEME LA REVOLUTION, *en grande partie*, ON TROUVE DANS CES MEMOIRES ET SES CONJECTURES LE GERME DE TOUT CE QU' ARRIVA AUJOURD'HUI, *& qu'on ne peut pas sans les avoir lus, être bien au fait des intérêts, & même des vues actuelles des diverses puissances de l'Europe.*" The book is entitled, *Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe pendant les regnes de Louis* XV. *& Louis* XVI. It is altogether very curious, and worth reading.

for. This ſyſtem of dark and perplexed intrigue had come to it's perfection before he came to the throne: and even then the Revolution ſtrongly operated in all it's cauſes.

' There was no point on which the diſcontented diplomatic politicians ſo bitterly arraigned their Cabinet, as for the decay of French influence in all others. From quarrelling with the Court, they began to complain of Monarchy itſelf; as a ſyſtem of Government too variable for any regular plan of national aggrandizement. They obſerved, that in that ſort of regimen too much depended on the perſonal character of the Prince; that the viciſſitudes produced by the ſucceſſion of Princes of a different character, and even the viciſſitudes produced in the ſame man, by the different views and inclinations belonging to youth, manhood, and age, diſturbed and diſtracted the policy of a country made by nature for extenſive empire, or what was ſtill more to their taſte, for that ſort of general over-ruling influence which prepared empire or ſupplied the place of it. They had continually in their hands the obſervations of *Machiavel* on *Livy*. They had *Monteſquieu's Grandeur & Décadence des Romains* as a manual; and they compared with mortification the ſyſtematic proceedings of a Roman ſenate with the fluctuations

fluctuations of a Monarchy. They obſerved, the very ſmall additions of territory which all the power of France, actuated by all the ambition of France, had acquired in two centuries. The Romans had frequently acquired more in a ſingle year. They ſeverely and in every part of it criticiſed the reign of Louis the XIVth, whoſe irregular and deſultory ambition had more provoked than endangered Europe. Indeed, they who will be at the pains of ſeriouſly conſidering the hiſtory of that period will ſee, that thoſe French politicians had ſome reaſon. They who will not take the trouble of reviewing it through all it's wars and all it's negociations, will conſult the ſhort but judicious criticiſm of the Marquis de Montalambert on that ſubject. It may be read ſeparately from his ingenious ſyſtem of fortification and military defence, on the practical merit of which I am unable to form a judgment.

The diplomatick politicians of whom I ſpeak, and who formed by far the majority in that claſs, made diſadvantageous compariſons even between their more legal and formaliſing Monarchy, and the monarchies of other ſtates, as a ſyſtem of power and influence. They obſerved, that France not only loſt ground herſelf, but through the languor and unſteadineſs of her pur-

ſuits, and from her aiming through commerce at naval force which ſhe never could attain without loſing more on one ſide than ſhe could gain on the other, three great powers, each of them (as military ſtates) capable of balancing her, had grown up on the continent. Ruſſia and Pruſſia had been created almoſt within memory; and Auſtria, though not a new power, and even curtailed in territory, was by the very colliſion in which ſhe loſt that territory, greatly improved in her military diſcipline and force. During the reign of Maria Thereſa the interior œconomy of the country was made more to correſpond with the ſupport of great armies than formerly it had been. As to Pruſſia, a merely military power, they obſerved that one war had enriched her with as conſiderable a conqueſt as France had acquired in centuries. Ruſſia had broken the Turkiſh power by which Auſtria might be, as formerly ſhe had been, balanced in favour of France. They felt it with pain, that the two northern powers of Sweden and Denmark were in general under the ſway of Ruſſia; or that at beſt, France kept up a very doubtful conflict, with many fluctuations of fortune, and at an enormous expence in Sweden. In Holland, the French party ſeemed, if not extinguiſhed, at leaſt utterly obſcured, and kept under by a Stadtholder, ſometimes leaning for ſupport on Great Britain, ſometimes

on Pruſſia, ſometimes on both, never on France. Even the ſpreading of the Bourbon family had become merely a family accommodation; and had little effect on the national politicks. This alliance, they ſaid, extinguiſhed Spain by deſtroying all it's energy, without adding any thing to the real power of France in the acceſſion of the forces of it's great rival. In Italy, the ſame family accommodation, the ſame national inſignificance were equally viſible. What cure for the radical weakneſs of the French Monarchy, to which all the means which wit could deviſe, or nature and fortune could beſtow, towards univerſal empire, was not of force to give life, or vigour, or conſiſtency,—but in a republick? Out the word came; and it never went back.

Whether they reaſoned right or wrong, or that there was ſome mixture of right and wrong in their reaſoning, I am ſure, that in this manner they felt and reaſoned. The different effects of a great military and ambitious republick, and of a monarchy of the ſame deſcription were conſtantly in their mouths. The principle was ready to operate when opportunities ſhould offer, which few of them indeed foreſaw in the extent in which they were afterwards preſented; but theſe opportunities, in ſome degree or other, they all ardently wiſhed for.

When I was in Paris in 1773, the treaty of 1756 between Auſtria and France was deplored as a national calamity; becauſe it united France in friendſhip with a Power, at whoſe expence alone they could hope any continental aggrandizement. When the firſt partition of Poland was made, in which France had no ſhare, and which had farther aggrandized every one of the three Powers of which they were moſt jealous, I found them in a perfect phrenzy of rage and indignation: Not that they were hurt at the ſhocking and uncoloured violence and injuſtice of that partition, but at the debility, improvidence, and want of activity in their Government, in not preventing it as a means of aggrandizement to their rivals, or in not contriving, by exchanges of ſome kind or other, to obtain their ſhare of advantage from that robbery.

In that or nearly in that ſtate of things and of opinions, came the Auſtrian match; which promiſed to draw the knot, as afterwards in effect it did, ſtill more cloſely between the old rival houſes. This added exceedingly to their hatred and contempt of their monarchy. It was for this reaſon that the late glorious Queen, who on all accounts was formed to produce general love and admiration, and whoſe life was as mild and beneficent as her death was beyond example great and heroic, be-

came ſo very ſoon and ſo very much the object of an implacable rancour, never to be extinguiſhed but in her blood. When I wrote my letter in anſwer to M. de Menonville, in the beginning of January, 1791, I had good reaſon for thinking that this deſcription of revolutioniſts did not ſo early nor ſo ſteadily point their murderous deſigns at the martyr King as at the Royal Heroine. It was accident, and the momentary depreſſion of that part of the faction, that gave to the huſband the happy priority in death.

From this their reſtleſs deſire of an over-ruling influence, they bent a very great part of their deſigns and efforts to revive the old French party, which was a democratick party in Holland, and to make a revolution there. They were happy at the troubles which the ſingular imprudence of Joſeph the Second had ſtirred up in the Auſtrian Netherlands. They rejoiced, when they ſaw him irritate his ſubjects, profeſs philoſophy, ſend away the Dutch garriſons, and diſmantle his fortifications. As to Holland, they never forgave either the King or the Miniſtry, for ſuffering that object, which they juſtly looked on as principal in their deſign of reducing the power of England, to eſcape out of their hands. This was the true ſecret of the commercial treaty, made, on their part, againſt all

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the old rules and principles of commerce, with a view of diverting the Engliſh nation, by a purſuit of immediate profit, from an attention to the progreſs of France in it's deſigns upon that Republic. The ſyſtem of the œconomiſts, which led to the general opening of commerce, facilitated that treaty, but did not produce it. They were in deſpair when they found that by the vigour of Mr. Pitt, ſupported in this point by Mr. Fox and the oppoſition, the object, to which they had ſacrificed their manufactures, was loſt to their ambition. This eager deſire of raiſing France from the condition into which ſhe had fallen, as they conceived, from her monarchical imbecillity, had been the main ſpring of their precedent interference in that unhappy American quarrel, the bad effects of which to this nation have not, as yet, fully diſcloſed themſelves.

Theſe ſentiments had been long lurking in their breaſts, though their views were only diſcovered now and then, in heat and as by eſcapes; but on this occaſion they exploded ſuddenly. They were profeſſed with oſtentation, and propagated with zeal. Theſe ſentiments were not produced, as ſome think, by their American alliance. The American alliance was produced by their republican principles and republican

policy

policy. This new relation undoubtedly did much. The difcourfes and cabals that it produced, the intercourfe that it eftablifhed, and above all, the example, which made it feem practicable to eftablifh a Republick in a great extent of country, finifhed the work, and gave to that part of the Revolutionary faction a degree of ftrength, which required other energies than the late King poffeffed, to refift, or even to reftrain. It fpread every where; but it was no where more prevalentthan in the heart of the Court. The palace of Verfailles, by it's language, feemed a forum of democracy. To have pointed out to moft of thofe politicians, from their difpofitions and movements, what has fince happened, the fall of their own Monarchy, of their own Laws, of their own Religion, would have been to furnifh a motive the more for pufhing forward a fyftem on which they confidered all thefe things as incumbrances. Such in truth they were. And we have feen them fucceed not only in the deftruction of their monarchy; but in all the objects of ambition that they propofed from that deftruction.

When I contemplate the fcheme on which France is formed, and when I compare it with thefe fyftems, with which it is, and ever muft be in conflict, thofe things which feem as defects in her polity, are the very things which make me tremble. The States of the Chriftian World have grown up to their prefent magnitude in a

great length of time, and by a great variety of accidents. They have been improved to what we ſee them with greater or leſs degrees of felicity and ſkill. Not one of them has been formed upon a regular plan or with any unity of deſign. As their Conſtitutions are not ſyſtematical, they have not been directed to any *peculiar* end, eminently diſtinguiſhed, and ſuperſeding every other. The objects which they embrace are of the greateſt poſſible variety, and have become in a manner infinite. In all theſe old countries the ſtate has been made to the people, and not the people conformed to the ſtate. Every ſtate has purſued, not only every ſort of ſocial advantage, but it has cultivated the welfare of every individual. His wants, his wiſhes, even his taſtes have been conſulted. This comprehenſive ſcheme, virtually produced a degree of perſonal liberty in forms the moſt adverſe to it. That liberty was found, under monarchies ſtiled abſolute, in a degree unknown to the ancient commonwealths. From hence the powers of all our modern ſtates, meet in all their movements, with ſome obſtruction. It is therefore no wonder, that when theſe ſtates are to be conſidered as machines to operate for ſome one great end, that this diſſipated and balanced force is not eaſily concentred, or made to bear with the whole nation upon one point.

The Britiſh State is, without queſtion, that which purſues the greateſt variety of ends,

and is the leaſt diſpoſed to ſacrifice any one of them to another, or to the whole. It aims at taking in the entire circle of human deſires, and ſecuring for them their fair enjoyment. Our legiſlature has been ever cloſely connected, in it's moſt efficient part, with individual feeling and individual intereſt. Perſonal liberty, the moſt lively of theſe feelings and the moſt important of theſe intereſts, which in other European countries has rather ariſen from the ſyſtem of manners and the habitudes of life, than from the laws of the ſtate, (in which it flouriſhed more from neglect than attention) in England, has been a direct object of Government.

On this principle England would be the weakeſt power in the whole ſyſtem. Fortunately, however, the great riches of this kingdom, ariſing from a vaiety of cauſes, and the diſpoſition of the people, which is as great to ſpend as to accumulate, has eaſily afforded a diſpoſeable ſurplus that gives a mighty momentum to the ſtate. This difficulty, with theſe advantages to overcome it, has called forth the talents of the Engliſh financiers, who, by the ſurplus of induſtry poured out by prodigality, have outdone every thing which has been accompliſhed in other nations. The preſent Miniſter has outdone his predeceſſors; and as a Miniſter of revenue, is far above my power of praiſe. But ſtill there are caſes in which Eng-

land feels more than ſeveral others, (though they all feel) the perplexity of an immenſe body of balanced advantages, and of individual demands, and of ſome irregularity in the whole maſs.

France differs eſſentially from all thoſe Governments which are formed without ſyſtem, which exiſt by habit, and which are confuſed with the multitude, and with the complexity of their purſuits. What now ſtands as Government in France is ſtruck out at a heat. The deſign is wicked, immoral, impious, oppreſſive; but it is ſpirited and daring; it is ſyſtematick; it is ſimple in it's principle; it has unity and conſiſtency in perfection. In that country entirely to cut off a branch of commerce, to extinguiſh a manufacture, to deſtroy the circulation of money, to violate credit, to ſuſpend the courſe of argriculture, even to burn a city, or to lay waſte a province of their own, does not coſt them a moment's anxiety. To them, the will, the wiſh, the want, the liberty, the toil, the blood of individuals is as nothing. Individuality is left out of their ſcheme of Government. The ſtate is all in all. Every thing is referred to the production of force; afterwards every thing is truſted to the uſe of it. It is military in it's principle, in it's maxims, in it's ſpirit, and in all it's movements. The ſtate has dominion and conqueſt for it's ſole objects; dominion over minds by proſelytiſm, over bodies by arms.

Thus

Thus conſtituted with an immenſe body of natural means, which are leſſened in their amount only to be increaſed in their effect, France has, ſince the accompliſhment of the Revolution, a complete unity in it's direction. It has deſtroyed every reſource of the State, which depends upon opinion and the good-will of individuals. The riches of convention diſappear. The advantages of nature in ſome meaſure remain; even theſe, I admit, are aſtoniſhingly leſſened; the command over what remains is complete and abſolute. We go about aſking when aſſignats will expire, and we laugh at the laſt price of them. But what ſignifies the fate of thoſe tickets of deſpotiſm? The deſpotiſm will find deſpotick means of ſupply. They have found the ſhort cut to the productions of Nature, while others in purſuit of them, are obliged to wind through the labyrinth of a very intricate ſtate of ſociety. They ſeize upon the fruit of the labour; they ſeize upon the labourer himſelf. Were France but half of what it is in population, in compactneſs, in applicability of it's force, ſituated as it is, and being what it is, it would be too ſtrong for moſt of the States of Europe, conſtituted as they are, and proceeding as they proceed. Would it be wiſe to eſtimate what the world of Europe, as well as the world of Aſia, had to dread from Jinghiz Khân, upon a contemplation of the reſources of the cold and barren ſpot in the remoteſt Tartary, from whence firſt iſſued that

ſcourge

ſcourge of the human race? Ought we to judge from the exciſe and ſtamp duties of the rocks, or from the paper circulation of the ſands of Arabia, the power by which Mahomet and his tribes laid hold at once on the two moſt powerful Empires of the world; beat one of them totally to the ground, broke to pieces the other, and, in not much longer ſpace of time than I have lived, overturned governments, laws, manners, religion, and extended an empire from the Indus to the Pyrennees.

Material reſources never have ſupplied, nor ever can ſupply the want of unity in deſign and conſtancy in purſuit. But unity in deſign, and perſeverance, and boldneſs in purſuit, have never wanted reſources, and never will. We have not conſidered as we ought the dreadful energy of a State, in which the property has nothing to do with the Government. Reflect, my dear Sir, reflect again and again on a Government, in which the property is in complete ſubjection, and where nothing rules but the mind of deſperate men. The condition of a commonwealth not governed by it's property was a combination of things, which the learned and ingenious ſpeculator Harrington, who has toſſed about ſociety into all forms, never could imagine to be poſſible. We have ſeen it; the world has felt it; and if the world will ſhut their eyes to this ſtate of things, they will feel it more. The Rulers there have found their reſources in crimes. The

difcovery is dreadful: the mine exhauftlefs. They have every thing to gain, and they have nothing to lofe. They have a boundlefs inheritance in hope; and there is no medium for them, betwixt the higheft elevation, and death with infamy. Never can they who from the miferable fervitude of the defk have been raifed to Empire, again fubmit to the bondage of a ftarving bureau, or the profit of copying mufic, or writing plaidoyers by the fheet. It has made me often fmile in bitternefs, when I have heard talk of an indemnity to fuch men, provided they returned to their allegiance.

From all this, what is my inference? It is, that this new fyftem of robbery in France, cannot be rendered fafe by any art; that it *muft* be deftroyed, or that it will deftroy all Europe; that to deftroy that enemy, by fome means or other, the force oppofed to it fhould be made to bear fome analogy and refemblance to the force and fpirit which that fyftem exerts; that war ought to be made againft it, in its vulnerable parts. Thefe are my inferences. In one word, with this Republick nothing independent can co-exift. The errors of Louis the XVIth. were more pardonable to prudence, than any of thofe of the fame kind into which the Allied Courts may fall. They have the benefit of his dreadful example.

The unhappy Louis XVI. was a man of the beft intentions

intentions that probably ever reigned. He was by no means deficient in talents. He had a moſt laudable deſire to ſupply by general reading, and even by the acquiſition of elemental knowledge, an education in all points originally defective; but nobody told him (and it was no wonder he ſhould not himſelf divine it) that the world of which he read, and the world in which he lived, were no longer the ſame. Deſirous of doing every thing for the beſt, fearful of cabal, diſtruſting his own judgment, he ſought his Miniſters of all kinds upon public teſtimony. But as Courts are the field for caballers, the publick is the theatre for mountebanks and impoſtors. The cure for both thoſe evils is in the diſcernment of the Prince. But an accurate and penetrating diſcernment is what in a young Prince could not be looked for.

His conduct in it's principle was not unwiſe; but, like moſt other of his well-meant deſigns, it failed in his hands. It failed partly from mere ill fortune, to which ſpeculators are rarely pleaſed to aſſign that very large ſhare to which ſhe is juſtly entitled in all human affairs. The failure, perhaps, in part was owing to his ſuffering his ſyſtem to be vitiated and diſturbed by thoſe intrigues, which it is, humanly ſpeaking, impoſſible wholly to prevent in Courts, or indeed under any form of Government. However, with theſe aberrations, he gave himſelf over to a ſucceſſion of the ſtateſmen of publick

opinion,

opinion. In other things he thought that he might be a King on the terms of his predeceſſors. He was conſcious of the purity of his heart and the general good tendency of his Government. He flattered himſelf, as moſt men in his ſituation will, that he might conſult his eaſe without danger to his ſafety. It is not at all wonderful that both he and his Miniſters, giving way abundantly in other reſpects to innovation, ſhould take up in policy with the tradition of their monarchy. Under his anceſtors the Monarchy had ſubſiſted, and even been ſtrengthened by the generation or ſupport of Republicks. Firſt, the Swiſs Republicks grew under the guardianſhip of the French Monarchy. The Dutch Republicks were hatched and cheriſhed under the ſame incubation. Afterwards, a republican conſtitution was under it's influence eſtabliſhed in the Empire againſt the pretenſions of it's Chief. Even whilſt the Monarchy of France, by a ſeries of wars and negotiations, and laſtly by the treaties of Weſtphalia, had obtained the eſtabliſhment of the Proteſtants in Germany as a law of the Empire, the ſame Monarchy under Louis the XIIIth, had force enough to deſtroy the republican ſyſtem of the Proteſtants at home.

Louis the XVIth was a diligent reader of hiſtory. But the very lamp of prudence blinded him. The guide of human life led him aſtray. A ſilent revolution in the moral world preceded the politi-

cal,

cal, and prepared it. It became of more importance than ever what examples were given, and what meafures were adopted. Their caufes no longer lurked in the receffes of cabinets, or in the private confpiracies of the factious. They were no longer to be controlled by the force and influence of the grandees, who formerly had been able to ftir up troubles by their difcontents, and to quiet them by their corruption. The chain of fubordination, even in cabal and fedition, was broken in it's moft important links. It was no longer the great and the populace. Other interefts were formed, other dependencies, other connexions, other communications. The middle claffes had fwelled far beyond their former proportion. Like whatever is the moft effectively rich and great in fociety, thefe claffes became the feat of all the active politicks; and the preponderating weight to decide on them. There were all the energies by which fortune is acquired; there the confequence of their fuccefs. There were all the talents which affert their pretenfions, and are impatient of the place which fettled fociety prefcribes to them. Thefe defcriptions had got between the great and the populace; and the influence on the lower claffes was with them. The fpirit of ambition had taken poffeffion of this clafs as violently as ever it had done of any other. They felt the importance of this fituation. The correfpondence of the monied and the mercantile world, the literary intercourfe of academies,

mies; but, above all, the preſs, of which they had in a manner, entire poſſeſſion, made a kind of electrick communication every where. The preſs, in reality, has made every Government, in it's ſpirit, almoſt democratick. Without the great, the firſt movements in this revolution could not, perhaps, have been given. But the ſpirit of ambition, now for the firſt time connected with the ſpirit of ſpeculation, was not to be reſtrained at will. There was no longer any means of arreſting a principle in it's courſe. When Louis the XVIth. under the influence of the enemies to Monarchy, meant to found but one Republick, he ſet up two. When he meant to take away half the crown of his neighbour, he loſt the whole of his own. Louis the XVIth could not with impunity countenance a new Republick: yet between his throne and that dangerous lodgment for an enemy, which he had erected, he had the whole Atlantick for a ditch. He had for an out-work the Engliſh nation itſelf, friendly to liberty, adverſe to that mode of it. He was ſurrounded by a rampart of Monarchies, moſt of them allied to him, and generally under his influence. Yet even thus ſecured, a Republick erected under his auſpices, and dependent on his power, became fatal to his throne. The very money which he had lent to ſupport this Republick, by a good faith, which to him operated as perfidy, was punctually paid to his enemies, and became a reſource in the hands of his aſſaſſins.

With this example before their eyes, do any Miniſters in England, do any Miniſters in Auſtria, really flatter themſelves, that they can erect, not on the remote ſhores of the Atlantick, but in their view, in their vicinity, in abſolute contact with one of them, not a commercial but a martial Republick—a Republick not of ſimple huſbandmen or fiſhermen, but of intriguers, and of warriors—a Republick of a character the moſt reſtleſs, the moſt enterprizing, the moſt impious, the moſt fierce and bloody, the moſt hypocritical and perfidious, the moſt bold and daring that ever has been ſeen, or indeed that can be conceived to exiſt, without bringing on their own certain ruin?

Such is the Republick to which we are going to give a place in civilized fellowſhip. The Republick, which with joint conſent we are going to eſtabliſh in the center of Europe, in a poſt that overlooks and commands every other State, and which eminently confronts and menaces this kingdom.

You cannot fail to obſerve, that I ſpeak as if the allied powers were actually conſenting, and not compelled by events to the eſtabliſhment of this faction in France. The words have not eſcaped me. You will hereafter naturally expect that I ſhould make them good. But whether in adopting this mea-

commu-

ſure we are madly active, or weakly paſſive, or puſillanimouſly panick-ſtruck, the effects will be the ſame. You may call this faction, which has eradicated the monarchy,—expelled the proprietary, perſecuted religion, and trampled upon law*,—you may call this France if you pleaſe: but of the ancient France nothing remains; but it's central geography; it's iron frontier; it's ſpirit of ambition; it's audacity of enterpriſe; it's perplexing intrigue. Theſe and theſe alone remain; and they remain heightened in their principle and augmented in their means. All the former correctives, whether of virtue or of weakneſs, which exiſted in the old Monarchy, are gone. No ſingle new corrective is to be found in the whole body of the new inſtitutions. How ſhould ſuch a thing be found there, when every thing has been choſen with care and ſelection to forward all thoſe ambitious deſigns and diſpoſitions, not to controul them? The whole is a body of ways and means for the ſupply of dominion, without one heterogeneous particle in it.

Here I ſuffer you to breathe, and leave to your meditation what has occurred to me on the *genius and character* of the French Revolution. From having this before us, we may be better able to determine on the firſt queſtion I propoſed, that is, how

* See our declaration.

far nations, called foreign, are likely to be affected with the ſyſtem eſtabliſhed within that territory? I intended to proceed next on the queſtion of her facilities, from *the internal ſtate of other nations, and particularly of this*, for obtaining her ends: but I ought to be aware, that my notions are controverted.---I mean, therefore, in my next letter, to take notice of what, in that way, has been recommended to me as the moſt deſerving of notice. In the examination of thoſe pieces, I ſhall have occaſion to diſcuſs ſome others of the topics I have recommended to your attention. You know, that the Letters which I now ſend to the preſs, as well as a part of what is to follow, have been long ſince written. A circumſtance which your partiality alone could make of importance to you, but which to the publick is of no importance at all, retarded their appearance. The late events which preſs upon us obliged me to make ſome few additions; but no ſubſtantial change in the matter.

This diſcuſſion, my Friend, will be long. But the matter is ſerious; and if ever the fate of the world could be truly ſaid to depend on a particular meaſure, it is upon this peace. For the preſent, farewel.